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SUMMARY 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the relationship 
between realism in-philosophy and in social science* I attempt 
to expound and defend two principal arguments; first, that a- 
realist approach in philosophy is a precondition of understanding 
science as a rational activity; se'condly,, that only a realist 
approach to the understanding of social phenomena seems to offer 
hope for developing an account-of social inquiry based on scientific 
principles. However, these two arguments are developed by way 
of a critical analysis of the realist view in relationship to 
some of its major rivals. Consequently, as well as my realist 
exposition of Marx's methodology of science outlined in chapters 
five and six, where I argue that only a dialectico-causal inter- 
pretatiOn of historical materialism seems to meet the require- 
ments of an historical science, there is a chapter on Weber's 
"itle of th e thesis)'and aIse1, cti ,o. n on methodology (hence the t 
other approaches to social science stating my case against the 
attempt to found social inquiry on alternative cognitive founda- 
tions. In addition, the'argument against non-realist views of 
social science is extend'ed'to the critique of Marxism itseli 
especially in the context of the theories of Colletti and 
Althusser contained in chapter 4. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an inquiry into the conceptual foundations and 
scientific aspirations of various schools of social science. It 
examines the epistemological roots of various attempts at social 
inquiry expressed in*the Marxist tradition as well as in what is 
understood as classical sociological theory. However, my critical 
inquiry, into this subject is not an "innocent" oner -since I do 
attempt to establish what can only count as a realist thesis :I 
argue that a non-reductive realism is a preconditýion. of developing 
an adequate understanding of science as a rational activityl and, 
in addition, that a non-reductive, realist-attempt at social theoryll 
expressed by a dialectico-causal interpretation of Marxism, seems 
to offer the best hopes of a social theory meeting the requirements 
of an historical science. 
By adhering to a "'non-reductive" realism, I eschew any attempt 
to provide generally stipulative conditionsf as to 
what is to count as "reality" or causality in the natural or social 
world in advance of. the practice of the empirical sciences. This 
sort of philosophical-realism avoids the well documented pitfalls 
of, for example, certain "materialist" philosophies like mechanical 
materialism or dialectical materialism which stipulate, 
lin 
advance 
of the work of science, what -- the essential character of the 
world is. A non-reductive realism avoids the metaphysics, of such 
theoretical attempts and instead merely wishes to demonstrate the 
cognitive foundation for assuming causality operates in the world 
without, however, stipulating the nature this causality must take 
.I 
outside of a consideration of the results of the empirical sciences 
This sort of approach is essential if one is to make sense of 
scientific theories, which despite shared principles of inquiry, 
- ii - 
nevertheless claim to have discovered different causal processes 
at work in their respective areas of research. To put this point 
in the context of the thesis; I argue in chapters 3,5 and 6 that 
Marx's realist-aims are fulfilled in a dialectico-causal approach 
to concept construction in social science. This sort of causality, 
however, does not appear to be centrally involved in the explana- 
tions of natural science. If, therefore, realists were to identify 
"realism" exclusively (and reductively) to a particular view of 
causality tied to one theory or set of theories as, for instancef- 
sociological positivists do, then one would be forced to deny the 
scientificity of either historical materialism or natural science! 
A non-reductive realism avoids this false dilemma by recognising 
that while the existence of the world is a precondition of any 
scientific inquiry, it nevertheless remains the task of-science to 
tell us how that world is to be understood. From this viewpoint 
realism is consistent with the results of science even if views 
as to the nature, of causality in, various domains differs. The 
link in the-thesis between chapter--l and the positive explication 
of a dialectico-causal science, is to show how the latter is not 
Only consistent with a realist viewf but in addition to show how 
realism in socia1science implies a commitment to a 
dialectico-causal view of social causality. This is a point taken 
up in'chapters 3 and 5 where Iýshow how a-dialectico-causal inter- 
pretation of historical materialism realises Marx's realist aim of 
establishing an historical science capable of grasping social 
development in its own terms, rather than by way of reference to 
supra-historical principles. -, This same theme is developed in 
chapter 6, where I interpret Marx's critique of political economy 
in terms of his commitment to a dialectico-causal methodology, and 
again in chapter 7 when I argue that this idea of social inquir 
serves as a methodological basis for a generalising science of 
- iii - 
history whereas Weber's methodology does not. There is'one more 
link i should mention before proceeding to an introduction of the 
relevance of the other chapters to my main argument, I strengthen 
the claims of a dialectico-causal social science by suggesting 
MarxIs critique of political economy can be regarded as a "revolu- 
ýion in science" analogous to those in natural science the form 
of which I describe in'chapter'l. 
I suggest not only that a non-reductive realism provides lines 
of defence for an interpretation of science as a rational activity 
and for a dialectico-ýcausal social science, but also that-it pro- 
vides a basis for the critique of reductive theories'of a distinctly 
non-realist character. This critique'is'demonstrated in chapter 1 
by way of a'critical rejection of positivist and conventionalist 
theories of scientific inquiry. ' These theories are rejected on 
account of their attempt to reduce science either to theory an 
incipient idealism- or to the "world'i -'a reductive positivism. 
- 
Th e same sort of reductionism is evident in the sociological counter 
parts of these general philosophical orientations. I argue, there- 
for'e, that Weber's methodology is a logical result of an idealist 
reduction oIf the social'world to the teleology of the social acýor; 
a reduction following I logically from a' neo-Kantian eI pistemology. 
Despite Weber's attempt to square'his neo-Kantian sociology with 
the rigour of empirical analysis and causal explanation, I argue 
that this attempt 'cannot succeed so long as it is founded on 
the epistemological'principles of a neo-Kantianism. The positivist 
inspired schools of social science are examined in 5.3. Againi I 
attempt to show how the reductive elements in this tradition 
prevent the construction of an adequate theory in social science. 
I trace these back to an implicit mechanicism in the positivists' 
idea of causality -a mechanicism, leading to ahistoricity in theory. 
- iv - 
This argument is illustrated in an analysis of Comte's law of 
progress and structural functionalism. 
It is worth pointing out here that the positivist/conventiona- 
list opposition expressed in social scienceitends to oppose a 
mechanistic idea of social causality to a, humanistic-teleology 
as rival ideas as to what-is basic to sociological explanation. 
This dualism I analyse in the thesis in a number of different 
guises; first,, in'respect to-its "Kantian" formulation in chapter 
2t then in its Feuerbachian form in chapter 3, and finally once 
more as a constitutive dualism of the Methodenstreit in German 
economics examined in chapter 7.1 attempt to demonstrate how a 
dialectico-causal social science overcomes-this dualism and by so 
doing at Iast formulates-a methodology which seems-to meet the 
requirements of an historical science. However, this-interpretatio 
of Marxism is not shared by either Colletti or Althusser. Both 
these thinkers reject Hegelian Marxism and so-it seems the mechani- 
cal causality/humanistic teleology dualism discussed above. This 
is strikingly evident in Collettils Marxism, since he poignantly 
exposes the-Hegel1an-and mechanistic elements-in the Marxist 
tradition both in the East and in-the West. - Indeed, in chapter, 3 
and elsewhere my ideas, are partly inspired by and concur-with 
Collettils sparkling critique. 'Nevertheless, in the final analysisj 
both he and Althusser fall prey to an Hegel/Feuerbach problematic 
analysed in, chapter 31 in whichýtheir Marxism is merely a compo-. 
site structure of, various elements borrowed from Hegells. dialectic 
and from mechanistic ideas of causation or humanistic teleology and 
indeterminism. In short, I-argue that they-fail to understand how 
Marx transformedýthe`estranged insights" of Hegel's philosophy 
into a dialectico-causal understanding of history. Consequently, 
I conclude that'despite their great contribution to the understand- 
- 
ing of historical materialism - an understanding without which this 
thesis would have been inconceivable- in the last'instance, 
Colletti. 1 s and'Althusser Is Marxism is based on the same problematic 
and'composite error. I argue,, in additionr this error is partly 
caused by their allegiance to recognisably idealist positions in 
epistemology. Only a realist interpretation of historical I materia- 
lism, I argue, seems to be capable of grasping the scientific 
significance of historical materialism - something that can be 
comprehended only if'one understands Marxism as a dialectico-causal 
discipline, 
I conclude the thesis in a critical comparison of the metho-' 
dologies of Marx and Weber,, placing it in the context. of the theore- 
tical relationship between the Methodenstreit in economics and 
Marx's critique of political economy. I argue that whereas Marx's 
critique of political economy is founded on the principles of a 
generalising historical'science, Weber's methodology merely recon- 
stitutes the dualism between ahistorical generalisation in "social" 
science and an ideographic'history'--ý a dualism at the very heart 
of Schmoller and Menger's methodological controversies. Finally, 
I'attempt to suggest general lines of argument for the discussion 
of the relationship'between science and politics in respect to 
the interpretation of historical materialism and Weber's sociology. 
Before-proceeding to the arguments put forward in this, thesist 
I'do wish to emphasise the following disclaimers. ' First, my chapter 
on the philosophy of science is far from exhaustive' in-what it has 
to say about realism. However, I do not attempt to give a full 
explication of realist philosophy'and what 'commitment to it entails', 
rather"'I attempt merely to show there is nothing in a realist theory 
of science precluding the dialectical account of causality Ia. rgue 
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for in chapter 5. If I have achieved anything more than, this, in 
chapter 1, then this should be regarded as a bonus vis "a vis the 
major object of my argument. Secondlyr although I give some space 
to the analysis of causality viz the positivisto dialectical and 
teleological ideas of causation, I do not, attempt a formal exposi- 
tion of these different ideas, since again. my aim is merely to 
establish the legitimacy, of dialectico-causal explanations and, not 
to write a thesis on causation per se. Thirdly# my-treatment of- 
the classical philosopherst Kant, Hegel and Feuerbach is, to say 
the least, cursory and schematic. In mitigation, I claim that I 
seek only to establish conceptual foundations of attempts at social 
theory and hopefully this does not depend on a knowledge of every 
detail of their philosophy. Fourthly,, my discussion of Weber's 
methodology and in particular his action theory, is not placed 
in the context of recent writing in the philosophy of action on the 
question of the relationship between reasons and causal explanationE 
While it may prove interesting to show that a project attempted by 
Weber viz reconciling "yersthende" explanations with causal explan- 
J' 
ation, has (or has not) been achieved by recent philosophers, if 
my argument in chapter 2 is valid, then this discussion would 
only have relevance for a social psychology and not a macro-socio- 
logy. However, as my inquiry is confined to an investigation of 
the possibility of a macro-theory of social development, it seems 
legitimate to omit reference to this discussion for the purposes 
of this thesis. Fifthly, my discussion of political economy in 
chapter 6. is constrained by the fact that I am writing about the 
subject as an "outsider", as it were,, and hence I claim no special 
erudition in this field. I nevertheless, feel justified in writ- 
ing this chapter since my aim is not to develop Marx's value-theory 
in some sort of substantive analysis, but rather is to clarify the 
methodological basis of Marx's critique of political economy and 
vii 
to square the law of value with his general theory of history. 
Finally, I must frankly acknowledge that the "core" of this thesis, 
the chapter on dialectical causality, is far from being or even 
attempting to be the last word on the subject. On the contrary, I 
intend this discussion'to be a basis for further reflection and---------_ 
refinement. But' the provisional nature of my treatment should 
not undermine the'general. claims 1 .1 mak , e': Cn the thesis in regard to 
the' centrality of this concept of causality for the'future develop- 
ment of an adequate methodology Of Social science. 
4- 
- 
&- 
- 
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Chapter 1, PHILOSOPHY AND THE EXPLICATION OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 
Sociologists, have found increasingly attractive the idea 
that any theory or body of theory which aspires to the name of 
science should be "realistic". 
1 Buts, it has prov6d difficult 
to say what "realism",, as an-articulated philosophy,, is. 
2 So,, 
when arguing for realism the general strategy hasbeen to shift 
the onus of proof oýto rival-ýapproachqs and then#, typically 
convict them. of reductionism or idealism. 'While doing so, one 
obtains a closer understanding and appreciation-of what is 
involved. in a commitment, to realism. In this first chapterr I 
intend to exhibit two philosophies of science, positivism and 
conventionalismp in just this-light. Both of these can be shown 
to fall short when measured against criteria indispensible to 
realism. 
-The essential weakness of both positivism and conventionalism 
is that neither philosophy-explains scientific inquiry as a 
rational activity. By this claim, I do not mean that -these 
philosophies. altogether fail to lay bare thei*ationAlity of science, 
but rather that two crucial areas of science viz theory develop- 
ment and theory change, cannot be explained as rational activities 
by positivist or conventionalist arguments. If positivists and 
conventionalists fail-in this key area, then there is good 
reason for developing an alternative philosophy which succeeds 
where others have failed, It is for this reason that, I develop 
a realist alternative. 
One advantage a realist-theory has over-its rivals;, is- 
that it'recognises the central importance of causality in science. 
Realists attempt, therefore, to elucidate the role causality 
- 
plays in the conceptual, structure of scientificlexplanation. , 
However, I have no wish to get bogged down in a detailed elabora- 
tion ofrealism as a philosophy.,, Instead I intend to assume 
that any realism must imply a commitment to at least two prin- 
ciples. First, realists must accept theexistence of objective 
causal processes in the world. ISecondlyr realists-should view, 
adequacy in the, face of the world, as being the ultimate test of 
scientific theories. Armed, with these two assumptions, I intend 
to succeed-where, positivists and conventionalists have failed, 
i. e., I, intend to present, theory development and theory change 
in science as rational activities.. 
1-1- POSITIVISM AND CONVENTIONALISM I 
The positivists, following Hume, reject a notion. oflan in- 
dependent and objective causal, process. 
3 Empiricist or positi- 
vist criteria of cognitive significance seek always to relate 
the scientific content of theories to a set of "observations" 
or "observation. statements'e. An objective causal, process is 
not, one that can, be established inductively from such a necessa- 
rily finite set oflobservations. In a well-known passage, Hume 
argues that one can never. perceive instances of, causation, only 
two events in conjunction, nothing in our experience can count- 
4 
as an observation of causality. The positivists go on to, 
conceive scientificIlaws asIcontingent generalisations based 
on habitual connections between eventst justified by. some--sort 
of relationship tO observation statements. 1 
There is no mention 
and, they believe,,, no need for, an objective causal process. The 
relationship between a scientific theory and its supporting 
observations has been variously interpreted; a lengthy story 
from, early formulations of the verification principle until 
- 
Popper's sophisticated development of methodological falsifica- 
5 tionism. It is a familiar part of our philosophical heritage 
that however the relationship between theory and observation is 
conceived from this cognitive foundation, positivists-have been 
unable to justify the attribution of causal processes to the 
world. Consequentlyr positivists can only end up with a regula- 
rity theory of causation. The causal laws supported by these 
regularities'or generalisations have nothing furthe: ý behind them 
than our experience of the conjunction of events, a conjunction 
that might well be accidental, so nothing significant - in a 
realist sense - can be 'revealed about causation. 
Hempel typifies the positivist approach to the logic of 
scientific explanation. He puts forward a deductive, nomological 
model of explanation in which an event 'E' - the "'explanandum" - 
is explained when it is legitmately derived from an "explanans" 
12 
which consists of statements of general laws LIL etc., and 
I-126 statements'of antecedent conditions CjC etc. The status 
of the 'explanation of IEI depends on the status of these general 
12 laws L j, L Here, in the explication and justification of these I 
universal generalisations of science, positivism meets an apparen- 
tly insuperable 'theoretical problem - the problem of induction .7 
Lacking a solution to this problem, positivists cannot legiti- 
mately make the inferential leap from the finite cases observed 
to the universal generalisations which form the explanatory core 
of all scientific theories. This deficiency is crucial: to 
explain why an event occurs it must be seen'to fall under a 
covering law establishing necessary and sufticient conditions 
for its occurrence. It is evident, however that if positivism 
fails to provide scientific generalisations then, ipso factor 
it cannot answer even the minimal claim of establishing grounds 
- 
for the attribution of necessary conditions, let alone the 
8 
sufficient conditions of an event's occurrence. One can see 
the regularity thesis fails to account for the specifically 
causal character of scientific explanation; the regularities it 
posits cannot become law-like generalisations unless'the problem 
of induction can be solved. - 
Popper attempted to solve thi's problem. He argued that the 
logic of-science does not involve an inductive step. On the 
contraryl science is based on a deductive logic of hypothesis 
and falsification. 
91, Scientists-formulate hypotheses# the 
universal generalisations'of law; these they attempt to falsify 
by discovering "observations" which run counter to the consequences 
deducible from the hypotheses. ' Even though Popper's account of 
the logic of scientific method avoids inductive inference, -the 
problem of induction re-emerges once he considers the practice 
of science. - When' scientists reject an hypothesis,, then they 
become entangled in an inductive step. Scientists reject an 
hypothesis which has been falsified only because they"inductively 
infer its continued falsification by similar counter-instances 
in the future. Unless one assumes the reality of an ordered 
causal processr there'is no reason why""an'hypothesis'falsified 
today should not turn round on us and prove adequate tomorrow 
and on every future occasion*-It would --ppear, -, -the, reforc-, -,, thý--+-- 
Popper's insistence that one counter-instance should be suffi- 
cient to falsify-an hypothesissis devoid of any cognitive founda- 
tion. Again, " Popper allows for a'comparison of theories by 
distinguishing those which are fairly well corroborated and 
those which are not. 
10 The corroboration criterion, however, 
can only be based on'inductive grounds (i. e. that'failures to ' 
- 
falsify are perpetual)@ Popper has not solved the problem of 
- 
induction. He has., merely displaced the problem from the logic 
of science to its actual practice., 
Popper's philosophy culminates in a profound scepticism., 
No grounds are given for believing that an hypothesis once falsi- 
fied stays falsified. for good. Consequently, the, criteria of 
cognitive significance based on the hypothesis/falsification-met- 
hod aresomewhat impotent. The, hypothesis., falsified,, by, one, 
counter-instance is in no way cognitively. inferior, 
-to 
one. which 
satisfies the falsifiability requirement yet so far has escaped 
falsification. By the same token, Popper can not establish non- 
inductive. criteria for, comparing, rivIal-theories whých, are-cohe- 
rently formulated and satisfy the-general-falsifýzýbility, testýI 
Old and new theories, so, 
_far 
as-. they are., sqieptific,, are-falsifi- 
able, and yet one believes, -, there is-a growth, in-explanatory- 
power. in the. cases of well established-revolutions in science. 
Popper is, faced with a theoretical dilemma:., either-he must 
accept a-. profound, scepticism, in, the philosophy of, sciencei, or 
else provide criteria, for comparing hypotheses and. theories 
and these,. as -I have, shown must, reintroduce, 
the classical 
problem-of induction, In the first instance,, he cannot-demonstratel 
the rational and evolutionary character of scientific inquiry; 
in the, second, he cannot show how-scientific'generalisations- 
possess cognitive significance. 
Popper renounces-naive positivism. He,, establishes an, obser- 
vation, language through the, Antersubjective agreement of the 
scientific. community, a language-devoid of theory-free observa- 
tions. 11 Once it is accepted that observations are. theory-_ , 
dependent, then the positivist project of founding the cognitive 
significance of science on a theory-neutral, bedrock of episte-- 
ý -I--- 
- 
mologically'privileged observations, founders. ' To expect to 
establish the, cognitive value of theories on the basis of observa- 
tions themselves tainted by'those very theorieslis'absurd. Yetp 
unless one pos'its -a relation between theory I and an, extra-theoretical 
world, it would seem that Popper's criteria of co-gnitive sign'iý- 
ficance must be restricted'to elements-entirely determined'by 
theory. Once it admits the thebry-dependency of observations, 
posit ivisM'must collapse into a- conven . tionalisf: m'where criteria 
of'scientificity are exclusiveli determined by intersubjective 
conventions. 
A conventionalist theory sees science as.. an activity deter- 
mined exclusively by scientists' assent to particular theories. 
12 
These theories define the object of scientific study- , -ý_its' 
experimental procedures, - wh . at is to count as an observation etc. 
Criteria of scientificityy apart from logical criteria of con- 
sistency and coherence, are established by and are'specific to 
particular'theories. Consequentlyr competing theories are 
13 
essentially incommensurable. With no theory-neutral or 
objective element capable of settling the claims between compet- 
ing theoretical claims I how can the replacement of one theory by 
another in a revolution in science be'unders-tood*as a 
development in scientific knowledge? Theories are merely diffe- 
rent from ea , ch other. Nothin Ig more cI an b-e said! 
If theories are incommensurable, one can make no sense of 
the continuity ev I ident in the replacement of one ýheory by - 
it-S 
su_=essor-as-. scie'ntific knowledge-develops. 
14 For the 
conventionalistst theory replacement or the'choice between com- 
peting theories cannot be matters settled by the' employment of 
any-objective criteria Since so much of-the history of science 
consists of theory replacementr replacements grounded in reasont 
- 
one has no purchase on the dominant motives, behind. scientific 
research. That scientists should 
_persistently 
spin out 
theories is, from a conventionalist standpoint,, perversly irrational 
and ultimately unintelligible. Conventionalistst it seems, would 
have no more success than positivists in developing a cognitive 
foundation for. the defence of science as arationallactivity'. It 
is in virtue of the failure of positivism and conventionalism in 
this matter, that I feel it is necessary to develop. a realist 
alternative to these logically inter'elýated philosophies of 
science. 
1.2. A REALIST THEORY OF SCIENCE 
Ilcontend an objective causal process_, fo: ýms the, foundation 
of a realist theory of science. An adequate realist1theory1must 
accept the absence of any theory-free access-to the. 
'real. 
Naive 
realism would beas inadequate a theory as naive positivism. A 
realist theory must attempt to forgea link between a theory 
dependent sclientificlactivity on. the one hand, and an independent 
or extra-theoretical object on the other. If one reduced theory 
to the real-by assimilating_it to a class of incorrigible obser- 
vation statementsf then one would relapse into naive positivism. 
If, on the other hand, one reduced the real to theory,? then one 
would fall prey to conventionalism. A realist explication of the 
relation between theory and the real, should be reductive in neither 
sense. It must accept that there is always a dualism between 
theory and the real. 
If there is no identity between theory and the real, then 
it follows that the relationship between theory and the real 
must always be put to the test. There is the world of difference 
- 
between a positivist test which involves a relationship between 
theory and "observations" and a realist test which assumes a 
relationship between the theories of science and real causal 
processes. Whereas in the first case, the idea of scientific 
laws which ensues from testing falls foul of the problem of 
induction,, in the second,, this problem does not arise. This 
does not imply realism "solves" the problem of induction -a 
problem which seems insuperable. Rather, one should regard 
realism as a philosophy of science which attempts to understand 
scientific inquiry in a way which does not seek an impossible 
justification of causality on the basis of finite observations. 
Instead of seeking to justify necessity in this way,, it assumes 
the existence of causal processes as an essential precondition 
of scientific explanation. From this standpoint, scientific 
testing tells us something about causal relationships in the 
world, rather than about relationships of theories to observa- 
tions. It would appearr therefore, that there is an inductive 
justification for a given theory's particular view of the causal 
relation once the existence of an objective causal process is 
presupposed. Although the positivist may object that the realist 
fails to justify the general attribution of causality to the 
world through a Posteriori-. procif#, the realist can reply that 
no proof of this sort would be equa. 1 -1--o-the i-ask. Thp, point is 
not to prove the unprovable, but rather is to make sense of 
the history of science and its accumulation of knowledge. I 
intend to show how realism suceeds in this quest where positivism 
and conventionalism clearly fail. 
I must now account for the means by which science understands 
the real without ever reducing it to thought. During scientific 
- 
inquiry and during the process of theory development, anomalies 
- 
are generated and surpassed. A scientific theory defines its 
conception of the real i. e., its object of knowledge; in this 
it states that the real is characterised by a particular set of 
causal relations. 
15 These relations are claimed to be more or 
less adequate to the real object. Anomalies will be generated 
where the theory is inadequate i. e., in circumstances where nature 
and the theory are at cross purposes. One should not suppose a 
theory's failure to generate anomalies is, ipso facto a proof of 
its scientific adequacy. Adequacy depends entirely on the manner 
in which the theory has been formulated and on its range of 
explanatory power. Indeedl., a theory might be so concocted as to 
be true by def inition. Then Inecessarly it would be f ree of, anomaly,, 
but this would not render it scientifically adequate. On the 
contraryt its lack of testability would deprive it of the power 
to generate anomalies. A scientific theory must in principle., 
be capable of generating anomalies. In fact, the potential 
explanatory power of a theory will depend on its ability to 
generate and supersede anomalies in as wide an area as possible. 
Consequently, far, from suggesting that freedom from anomaly is 
proof of adequacyf this account of science suggests rather that 
in the capacity to continue generating anomalies is the place 
where one can locate a scientific theory'-s essential adequacy and 
staying power. Such an account does not exclude the possibility 
of a scientific theory progressing to the point where anomalies- 
cease to surfacef but it does insist that such an ideal-end-point 
of theory development cannot be predetermined in advance ofý 
research. Such aterminal position in a body of theory, if it is 
indeed possiblef should be an outcome of an anomaly generation 
and supersession which increases the explanatory power of science. 
It should not be achieved by a form of conventionalistic caveat 
which would decrease the range of explanation. 
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The natural tendency of the scientist is to modify the body 
of theory in response to anomaly. Two developments are possible. 
First, the anomaly might be incorporated-izT a modif ied theory in which 
the conceptual core of the old theory is preserved. Secondly, 
the supersession of anomalies might be incompatible with the 
presentation of the old theory and may have to be"aehieved-at'---' 
the-cost of a theory-change involving wholesale reconceptualisa- 
tion of the object, of knowledge, 
science. 
16 
i. e., by a revolution in 
The anomaly is, 'at one le I vel an authentic product'of scienti- 
fic theorisation. It is partly generated by theoretical work 
and the determinations oi'theory which I cons - titute the object 
of knowledge. Only in relation to this theoretical object can 
an anomaly be recognised as, in any senser anomalous. As it has 
been well, put by Kuhn: 
"Anomaly appears only against the background provided by 
the paradigm. The more precise and far-reaching that 
paradigm is,, the more sensitive an indicator it provides 
17 of-anomal Iy and 1ýýnce of"an occasion for para I digm change. " 
Anomaly reveals the limits of-a theory. When an anomaly is 
detected,, it should not be interpreted as a direct expression of 
nature'unmediated"by theory. But,, 'on the other hand, anomaly is 
not a result Of tI heoretical ambivalence or inconsistency. If 
anomalies were the product of theory alonei, and if a theory were 
also consistent and coherent, anomalies in that theory would be 
impossible - not just'inexplicable. Anomaly would be then more 
like a formal contradiction or inconsistency in an axiomatic 
system. If however one understood anomaly in sciences, not as a 
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type of logical, contradictiont then, one would see how-they must 
be grounded in objective causalprocesses. 
Certain consequences follow from the postulation of a 
I' 
\'' 
real causal process. An anomaly expresses in-the language of 
the theory the present limit of that theory,, gr'asp of the real,, 
I 
so it follows that the theory, ýsupersession of an anomaly represents 
an extension of the knowledge of the real. The anomaly loses 
its anomalous character in being theoretically, integrated into 
the object of knowledge. By employing this method science pro- 
gressively understands, the world thr, ough the development and 
extension of its theories. Science-develops. a picture-of the, 
real; the world determines the limits 9f theory: anomaly is the 
product of friction between the two, without either one being 
reduced to the other. This whole activity can only. be understood 
as a rational processlif one assumes the independence of a real 
causal process as the essential,, precondition of a theory-dependent 
development of scientific theorisation. 
Kuhn's philosophy of science - to. which much ofIthe discussion 
above is obviously,, indebted-is founded on, an internal-contradic- 
tion which ý, myý realist theory of science resolves. , 
Kuhn combines 
an implicit realist theory of anomaly generation with a sociolo- 
gical conventionalism. He accepts that anomalies are generated 
by the relation between theory andthe real, yet., he failsIto use 
this conception. of scientific method to formulate. a defence of 
science as a progressive development of knowledge. He also fails 
to provide a complete account of theory growth and, theory change 
as rational activities. Nevertheless all this is implicit in 
his philosophy, especially his later-developments. Hence he 
argues that, 
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"Discovery commences with the'awareness of anomalyl i. e. 
with the recognition that nature has somehow violated ., 
18 
the paradigm expectations', that govern normal science. ", 
He'confirms this realist side of his thinking when he 
discusses-conditions for a paradigm change. He E, -. ys, 
"nature itself must first undermine professional security 
by making prior achievements seem problematic. " 
19 
The ability of scientists to overcome'anomalies reflects 
their ability to extend the depth and range of our knowledge and 
provides the, key for objective criteria for judging between 
theories and accounting for-scientific progress, - However, in-ý--- 
stead of developing this point, Kuhn pays less attention to such 
cognitive criteriar but concentrates rather on sociological or 
psychological factors. 'It is one thing to-emphasise the 
historical importance of these factors,, but, quite-"another to make 
them the pivot of -an epistemological theory. One might'Well 
accept that political orAdeological factors are historically 
deeply persuasive when there is a shift from one body of theory, 
to its replacement ---unavoidably, science has a social and, - 
historical context. From this, -however? one must notýconclude 
that--such'events in the history of science are necessarily deprived 
Of, any rational (or-scientific) foundation. On the-contrary; I 
believe-more sense can be made of the scientific endeavour when 
theory development and scientific revolution are explicated and 
defended as rational and progressive activities. If"Kuhn's 
sociological, conventionalism were expressly 'formulated to show 
the absence of scientific or objective criteria in theory change, 
then it. would contradict his own account of anomaly. My account 
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of anomaly,, ýon the other hand, provides the foundation for a 
defence of-science as a rational-activity without denying its 
historical-location or the possibility of social factors pre- 
cipitating ideological distortions in the methods of, science. 
Clearly such distortions can only be recognisedAf one has access 
to criteria, of scientificity. - 
Anomalies generated in scientific practice express-friction 
between theory and world,. This friction'precipitates-theory/ 
theory conflict expressed in terms of theory competition and- 
theory, change. In cases of development within-a theory orýdevelop- 
ment through theory change, science seeks to. overcome-the anomalies 
generated by its practice. It is-obliged to resolve the con- 
tradiction betweentheory and the anomaly in favour of anomaly 
and not in-favour of theory; refusal to do, so would deprive the 
science of its status as a causal-inquiry into the nature of- 
things. Scientists therefore should not ignore anomaly in order 
to defend a theory. They should not employ a conventionalistic 
device which preserves a given theory at the cost of denying 
anomaly. Such a strategy would-undermine the integrity of a 
theory. The denial of-anomaly in order to preserve theory-resolves 
the-theory/realýopposition in favour of theory. It thereby lessens 
the, potential explanatory power of, -theory and,, in the last analysis 
if anomaly were consistently ignoredr gne might wonder what it 
was that led the scientist to believe it was the world he was 
studying. 
Philosophical-contradictions are not generally contradictions 
between theory and the real. Usually they express contradictions 
between underlying philosophical assumptions., Contradictions of 
this kind can be resolved by opting for one or other of the compet 
ing assumptions, but not both. In a philosophical context, there 
- 14 - 
is no methodological'obligation'to resolve the contrýdiction one 
way rather than, theýother. Locke's representative theory-of per- 
ception, for example, 'combines a realist theory of perception in 
which objects cause sense-impressions, with an empiricist theory 
of knowledge in which all ideas must be-cognitively based on 
corresponding sense-data. 
20 This produces an, "anomaly" in the 
combined theory: the sensations causing material objects can not 
be credited with independence, given the-existence of empiricist 
criteria of cognitive significance. The "anomaly"", could be 
resolved by developing a realist-epistemology as a counterpart 
to the theory of perception; alternatively an empiricist theory- 
of sensation could be developed which is consistent with the 
empiricist epistemology. The "anomaly" could be eradicated by 
a perfection of either the empiricist or realist side Of Locke's 
thinking. 'Both supersessions are defensible in"te'rms of philoso- 
phical practice-because the anomaly-is generated by a conflict 
between theories and not by-a'contradiction between theory and 
the world. In fact-l it is probably correct to term these incon-, 
sistencies in philosophy logical contradictions; so, as to distinguish 
them from the-anomalies generated in scientific research. 'If 
one adopted this, terminologyr then one'would henceforth reserve 
the concept of anomaly'for cases, where the conflict'is, between 
theoryýand the world and not between'rival-Philosophical principles. 
The method of science obliges the scientist"--to rýii_61: lje 
the opposition between theory and the world in favour of the world. 
It must amiýend theory in"response to anomaly, This does not 
implyr however, that to do otherwise is to'act illogically. 
There is nothing illogical about resolving the theory/real, con- 
tradiction in favour of theory. When Durkheim., for instance#', 
denies that social conflict is "normal"l in order to defend the 
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theoretical assumption that societies are like organismsj ordered 
and equilibriated, - his position is logically if not scientifi-* 
cally'defensible. 
21 There is nothing logically inconsistent , 
about-resolving the-anomaly by taking'the theory-to be valid andý- 
the "anomaly" invalid. - This is not,, -however,, d scientific resolu- 
tion in cases where anomaly is "genuine", because it artificially 
renders'one set of theoretical assumptions invulnerable truths. 
The theory is preserved'only at the cost of transforming-it into 
an untestable metaphysical'system. '. 'Science is. founded on a 
commitment to develop'theory in response to anomaly and not to 
deny'anomaly in order to defend the theory. This' unique-response 
to anomaly fuel's, the dynan. ism of 'scientIfic-Iriquiry. ' 
A precondition for the su'Ccessful'use of the anomaly generation/ 
supersession method is"that science should be capable, in prin- 
ciple, of distinguishing'between anomalies which genuinely bring 
a theory into questionýand anomalies which only appear to do so. 
The history of science is full of examples of success and failure 
in making this distinction. For exampler the unexpected paths 
Of the planets of the solar system were explained by Newtonian' 
physics without amending the general-law of gravity. 'Planetary 
deviation was accounted for Iýy-the postulation of the existence 
Of planetary masses (Uranus' and Neptune)'which'later*evidence 
confirmed. The basic theory-of gravitation which explained the 
planetary movements'was-noto, therefore, brought into question__ 
by the "anomaly" but rather the "anomaly" Was later enveloped by 
general theory itself. -But if no planetary-masses had'been,, --,, 
discovered, then'Newtonian physics would have' been forced to 
amend its assumptions accordingly. With Durkheim's sociological 
theory, the-position is reversed. 'The'persistence and ubiquity 
of social conflict and disorder has no explanation in his theory. 
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Durkheim labels such phenomena "abnormal" outside society. The 
universality of such social phe I nomenal demonstrates-that the''"' 
abnormality label is nothing more than-a"conventionalistic device 
for defending-Durkheim's initial"assumption of harmony and equili- 
brium in the social totality. "Durkheim should havemodified his 
initial assumptions to supersede those anomalies. Instead, he 
argues that the ordered and equilibriated characteristics of 
society are features'implicit in every social fact. These 
characteristics are, for Durkheim,, "given" by the supposedly self- 
defining properties-of the social fact. 
22 By founding his-ý 
social theory on such a dogmatic positivismF Durkheim enervates" 
his conception of social phenomena; ' he b6lieves,, but mistakenly, he 
has somehow captured the essence of the social world. 'Durkheim, 
therefore, considers'llgenuihe"*ýanomalies to be "pseudo" 
anomalies because he thinks-his theory has already discovered 
the nature of society. Consequently, Durkheim abandons the 
method of science and ends up with just another form of 
metaphysics. 
To compare these two examples is instructive. 'In the first, 
an anomaly which appears to contradict the theory 
adequately explained by the theory throu gh the discovery of 
additional "facts". Such phenomena are only superficially'anoma- 
lous - further, the anomaly was the stimulus for their discovery. 
In the second example, it is assumed in advance that'certain 
oppositions between'the theory and the real are-11pseudo-anomalies" 
not fatal for the theory. When'further analysisýrevealed however, 
that these "pseudo-anomalies" arej, more thoughtfully considered 
"genuine" anomalies, the opposition can be more fruitfully resolved 
in favour of the anomaly. - Durkheim's failure to do so signals 
his abandonment of the scientific enterprise. 
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The distinction between'llpseudo-"'and "genuine" anomaly, is 
not one whichýcan be made a priori. -For this reason, scientists 
should assume that-all anomalies are potentially "genuine". - 
Scientific practice reveals in the course of time which anomalies 
vanish and which anomalies require theory development or theory 
change. The nature of the anomaly, therefore, is something. 
ultimately determined by scientists employing the method of 
anomaly generation and supersession. 
Scientific progress is a direct result of theoretical work 
founded on scientific method. This progress takes place through 
development within a theory and, at the limit, through-a revolu- 
tion in science. In the first instancer anomalies areýsuperseded 
by modifications within the general framework of the theory and 
its understanding of the object of knowledge; whereast in the 
second, anomalies can only be superseded by reconceptualising 
the object of knowledge and therefore-by theory change. Scientific 
revolution can,, in-this way be conceive&ýas a, special case of 
'theory growth, one where the-anomalies are superseded, by the 
development of a new theory. -A revolution-in science can, be under- 
stood retrOspectively-as, all authentic product of the old theory. 
The new theory is not superior because it isý"more scientific" 
than the old. It is precisely the scientific practice of the old 
theory that gives birth to the new theory. Insofar as theories 
adhere to, this-method of science, they are equally, scientifict 
regardless of the varying degree of their-explanatory, power. On 
the other handr it would be ridiculous to ascribe to a, theory 
scientific status if it had no appreciable scientific scope. 
Science is not to be judged science by method alone, even if 
it can only be science insofar as it adheres to this method. The 
problem of demarcating science from non-science is'a complex pro- 
blem which will depend on a host of other factors inseparable from 
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the histoiy, o'f science. Without wishing to get-entangled, in 
this question,? -I,, would nevertheless emphasise that a realist 
should maintain -that Allegi: ance, to theý'metho'd of science"is a 
necessary condition of a theory counting as-scientificsince it, 
is evident that the discoveries of scienceare not come`uponý 
accidentally. 'Indeed, the so-called'"accidental", discoveries of 
science can only be recognised as legitimate discoveries, -once 
they-have been integrated into a bod'ýof theory through'standard y 
scientific procedures. 
There is growth in scientific knowledge which forms the 
content of progress in science. When anomalies are superseded in 
the course'of the'development'6fa body'of theory,,, knowledge of 
the world'increases. -Scientists move from a less to'a more 
adequate conception'ofýthe world, In scientific revolution this 
development assumes'its'most'dramatic form. Not, every new"theory 
is successful in replacing-the-'old. -, -The'new theory1must do much 
more than explain the anomalies'generated by the old theory. ' 
The areas in which the old theory is more or less adequate are 
re-expr6ssed and transformed by the concepts of the new theory., 
The new theorygenerally"explains how and why the theory it 
replaces is valid within certain limits., "Kuhn states,, 
"the new candidate must seem to resolve some outstanding 
and generally recognisedproblem'that can be met in no-- 
-other'way. Second, the*new*paradigm'must-promise'to 
preserve a relatively large part of the, concrete'problem'--ý 
solving ability that has accrued to science through its 
predece'ssors. "' 
23 
Not only do new-theories-extend'knowledge by solving old- 
I 
problems and posing new ones; simultaneously, they 
3"preserve a 
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great deal of the most concrete parts of past achievement. 
Scientific progress is far from discontinuous even when theories 
and the concepts embodying them have changed greatly. Whereas 
for the positivists this-continuity consists of the preservation of 
the set of observation statements commanded by the old theory, - 
for the realist-a new theory will inherit a heritage of--laws and 
causal connections developed by its predecessors. - Againf a, 
realist theory makeslmore,. sense of the positive gains for science 
achieved by old theories, while showing simultaneously the 
superiority of the-new theory, in terms of. its greater explanatory 
power. 
Scientific progress is pot simply-unilinear, guaranteed by 
some cosmic law, of evolution. ý Besides the historical location 
of science at all times'exercis ing, a critical inf luence on .- its - 
development, the complexity of its-subject matter may render a 
simple forward march impossible. One should not'suppose that a 
realist theory of science, must'involve unilinear development. 
25 
My theory merely shows how scientific method facilitates a growth 
in knowledge.. It thereby makes s. ense of the historical evidence 
which does confirm this development. The lifeline of scientific 
progress and the fate of-particular theories is-, a matter for the 
history of science to sort, out., Progress may well involve-delays 
and retrogressions. In. the long runr however,,. the continued 
adherence to-scientific method makes possible the reality-of a 
growth in our knowledge of the world - this seems to make maximal 
sense of. the history-of science andits progressive achievements. 
1.3 THE DEFENCE, OF SCIENCE AS A RATIONAL-ACTIVITY 
0 
Even, though justification of a philosophy of, science cannot 
26 
escape circularityi, the c-ircularity-is not-vicious. It would be 
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in, Ane-Ito believe that the philosophical assumptions lying behind 
scientific practice are themselves open to scientific testing and 
proof. -The, rival claims of philosophies of-science cannot 
be 
decided by an appealto scientific evidence since the conflict 
here is between rival theories, and not simply between, theories and 
the world. There is an,, inescapably metaphysical element in every- 
philosophy of science. This does not howpverr imply that all 
positions in the philosophy of science are equally qefensible. 
The kind of realism argued for here demonstrates that a 
deepened and enriched conception. of the existence of a real, ,, 
causal process is required in, order to understand anomaly genera- 
tion and supersession. It doesnot, however, legislate in advance 
of scientific practice as to the nature of any actual causal 
process or predeter. mine the structure of reality. In this respect# 
it is superior to philosophies which superimpose a specific 
metaphysics on science which no concrete research can alter. 
The positivists, for example, insist on contracting the causal 
relation to a regularity thesis. Also, they assume the causal 
relation to be invariant across nature and the social world. 
Such an assumption prejudges the content of the concrete sciences 
and their accounts of causality. 
27 A positivis 
.t 
philosophy of 
science threatens the anomaly generation/supersession method- - Dy 
legislating, in advance,, what is- to count as an acceptable account of 
the nature of reality and the causal relation. 
A conventionalist theory of science need not predetermine the 
results of scientific research, but it does run into other pro- 
blems. Once it accepts the theory-dependency of observations 
and rejects the possibility of a link between theory and an 
extra-theoretical world, it falls prey to a relativism which fails 
to exhibit the rationality of scientific practice. 
28 My realist 
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theory,, on, the other handr succeeds in this task and so can make 
sense of the historical evidence for growth in our scientific 
knowledge. Only a realist theory, it seems, can fully account 
for the method of anomaly generatiqn, and supersession. This 
method explains both, the evolution of knowledge within a theory 
as well as, through scientific revolutions and allows us to compare 
the claims of rival. theories. Understanding science in this way 
obviously presupposes a,, general commitment to realism since our 
account of anomaly generation depends on there being-a relation 
between theory and.. the. world inediated by. scientific practice., If 
it can be demonstrated that the rational element, within scientific 
practice can-be understood only by a--realist, then this-,. must surely 
count as a very strong defence of a realist_theory of science. 
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Chapter 2. FROM NEO-KANTIANISM TO WEBER'S METHODOLOGY 
In this chapterr I attempt to examine the links between 
Kant's philosophy, neo-Kantian epistemology and Weber's methodo- 
logy of social science. There are two fundamental arguments., 
First, I argue that Weber's methodology is-a logical. outcome 
of a neo-Kantian understanding of science and social science; 
and secondly, that neo-Kantianism offers a theoretically-in- 
adequate foundation for-a scientific understanding of history. 
I will lead into these criticisms by way of a summary of Kant's 
philosophy as expressed in his "Critique ofýPure Reason" in 
order to specify the intellectual roots of the neo-Kantian 
movement and its reflections about science. 
i 
2.1 KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM 
Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" is an inquiry into human 
understanding and the possibility and limitations of human 
knowledge. 1 According to Kant, our experience of the phenomenal 
world consists of sense impressions which are organised by the 
categories of the understanding viz causalityr substance etc. 
The ideas of understanding are not, as empiricists believede 
derived from sense experience, they are as the rationalists 
maintained, prior to all experience. No knowledge of the world 
can be achieved by the'employment of the categories alone, any 
more than it can be gained by recourse to sensations unsullied 
by the categories. It is rather the union of the categories 
of the understanding - the a priori - and the content of 
sensation - the synthetic or a posteriori - which produces the 
objective world of phenomena. Without the categories, the world 
would lack substance, order and causality, and without sensation, 
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the categories would remain formal, without experiential content. 
Kant maintains that the possibility 6i'knowledge of the world 
depends Upon a unity of the a priori'and a-posteriori i. -e. of 
the uniýy 6f''ma'terial provided by the faculties of understanding 
and sensation. There are, however, two distinct levels of sensa- 
tion in the Kant ian system: pur e or tra ns6endental : sensation and 
empirical sensation. The former underlies all acts of empirical 
sensation since it refers to the intuition of the universal 
framework of space and time within which all sensations occur. 
The intuition of space and time as an act of pure perception is 
both synthetic and a priori. It'is synthetic ifisofar-as space 
and time are the very preconditions-of all acts of empirical- 
perception; and it is a prio ri in that space and time are levels 
of pure sensation contributed by the faculty of understanding. 
2 Kant regarded space and time, therefore, as synthetic a prioris. 
Inquiry into this level of sensation accordingly mustform the 
basis for a distinctly a priori science. This science can be 
clearly differentiated from empirical science, in method and- 
contentr since its subject matter would be' devoid of a posteriori 
elements. It would be restricted to an a priori inguiry Into 
the transcendental, that ist universal,, properties of the frame- 
work of space and time in which events occur. The empiricafor 
a posteriori sciences, on the other hand, would be involved in 
the causal analysis of the events taking place in this spatio- 
temporal framework. Consequently, they must pr6cecd-tn poster-iori. - 
empirically examining causal relations between phenomena. The 
universality of the causal relation, which empirical science seeks 
to elucidate in phenomenat ist however,, guaranteed in advance of 
0 
inquiry by the transcendental categories of the understanding. 
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In my exposition of Kant's transcendental idealism, I have 
up to now held myself to an examination of. the faculties of 
understanding and sensation and the phenomenal world they pro- 
duce. Both these faculties and the world of phenomena have in 
addition noumenal presuppositions. Altho*ugh in the Kantian 
system noumenal elements, which are apprehended by the faculty 
of Reason, cannot actually be known. ýthey do still play an in- 
dispensable role in Kant's philosophy (even though it is perplex- 
ing to understand how apprehension can occur without knowledge). 
For instancel. Kant postulates the "thing-in-itself"j, that which 
appears in phenomenal yet always in a form conditioned by the 
I 
faculty of sense and understanding. 
- 
claims this 
expresses Kant's acceptance of the notion of absolute knowledge 
as a transcendental idea or aim. 
3 Absolute knowledge is, how- 
evert beyond realisation because the "thing-in-itself" never 
appears as itself i. e. independently ofIthe world of phenomena, 
4 
so it is not possible to achieve knowledge of its essential 
nature. 
The thing-in-itself is not the only noumenal element in 
Kant's philosophy. Kant-argues also thatthe transcendental 
deduction ofthe categories pres 
( 
upposes the transcendental unity 
5 of pure apperception. Transcendental synthesis, which fur- 
bishes phenomenal experience by the application of a category 
to a manifold of sensation in space and time, implies the 
transcendental unity of the thinking and perceiving subject. 
Without this transcendental ego there can be no transcendental 
synthesis and then, obviously, no. objective experience. Yet 
this transcendental self, is, like the "thing-in-itself", 
noumenal. Lying outside the phenomenal world it, too, is also 
unknowable. Kant terms it not just "pure",, but "original apper- 
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ception", since without this noumenal self there could be no 
perception or knowledge at all. However, this noumenal self 
can have no knowledge of itself as itself. Hence, Kant statest 
"I am conscious not of how I appear to myself or of how I 
am myself but only that I am. ,6 
Evidentlyr although Kant recognises its transcendental 
foundation, knowledge is limited to the realm of phenomena. 
Kant's philosophy has ambitions distinct from those of, for 
example, Hegellst whose absolute idealism centres on an attempt 
to achieve absolute knowledge and a consciousness of self as 
absolute mind. Kant's critical philosophy, by limiting knowledge 
to the union of sense and understanding, attempts rather to 
establish a cognitive foundation for science by transcending the 
metaphysics of dogmatic rationalism and the scepticism of empiri- 
cism. Ironically, this manoeuvre culminates in another form 
of dogmatic metaphysics. 
In my first chapter, I put forward a realist theory of 
science which explained scientific inquiry as an attempt to 
grasp the nature of objective causal processes, processes in 
some fundamental sense independent of the categories of human 
thought. For Kant, however, the order and causality of the 
phenomenal world does not exist prior to the application of the 
categories. On the contrary, the objective phenomenal world 
is fathered by the application of the categories on a supposedly 
incoherent content furnished by sensation. Kant's philosophy is, 
therefore, a. transcendental idealism quite distinct from any 
sort of realist attempt at understanding science. A consequence 
of'Kant's transcendental idealism is that he can only justify 
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the universality and- objectivity of -empirical scisnce by e. -q-tablish- 
ing the universality of the categories and their applicability - 
rules. These are guaranteed insofar-as they are transcendental 
and,, thereforep'invariable properties of the faculty of under- 
standing. Howeverp there is weighty evidence. to suggest that 
the categories employed by Kant are underpinned by particular 
scientific theories. 'If thisIs the case then they should not-, 
be generalised as a priori and therefore universal-conditions of 
the phenomenal world. 
To the extent that these considerations are rightpKant's 
philosophy seems logically tied-to a Euclidian conception of 
space and a Newtonian conception., of the causal relation. So the 
natural world? through the transcendental categories, must be 
Newtonian and Euclidianj inescapably. 
7 
By projecting. the 
underlying concepts of these theories as if they were invariable 
properties of the understanding, Kant seems to suggest that 
they do indeed successfully accord with the essential nature of 
the world. What effect would alternative scientific theories 
have on this cornerstone of Kantian philosophy? Einstein's 
special theory of relativity conceives of-'space-and time 
relative to specific spatio-temporal frameworksF and can serve 
as an excellent example. For Einstenian physics distinctly non- 
Euclidian and non-Newtonian forms of space, time. and the causal 
relation follow. And'it is Einstein'st not Newton's theory 
which is now thought to be scientificallyývalid. Such revolu- 
tions in science, must have implications for Kant's philosophy. 
Kant's attempt to bind his philosophy to a particular form of 
geometry and to-the results of one particular scientific theory5 
seems to pre-judge our understanding of all scientific inquiry. 
I If one regarded Kant's philosophy'as an attempt to provide a 
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I 
cognitive foundation for scientific activityl then one must 
criticise this confusion. This confusion being'the use of one 
scientific theory as a-lens through which all others are scrut- 
inised. Such a procedure employs Newtonian physics as a universal 
condition'for the existence of the phenomenal world and cannot 
cope with and account for theory-change in science of a type 
exemplified by the replacement of Newtonian by Einsteinian phy- 
sics. In addition, it would appear to preclude the possibility 
of a non-Newtonian approach to concept formation in the other 
empirical sciences. 
Any scientific theory placed in a Kantian philosophy, as 
Newtonian physics was, would be equally. illegitimate, since it 
is the philosophical location of the theory which is-at fault 
here, not nec7essarily the theory which fills the place. The 
apparent contradiction between relativity theory and the cate- 
gories of the understanding may lead to a revision of Kant's 
general philosophy. Two strategies for revision seem possible. 
Firstj one could retain the principles of Kant's transcendental 
idealism and argue that the categories discovered by Einstein 
instead. of the outmoded Newtonian ones, more substantially ground 
the transcendental categories. of the understanding. However, 
Einsteinian categories far from being a priorij, are very much 
a product of research -a Postgriori research. This sort of 
revision of Kant's philosophy would merely substitute relativity 
theory for Newt9nian physics as a transcendentally guaranteed 
theory valid for all time. Einsteinian physics would, in this 
instance, cease to be only a scientific theory, but would in- 
stead suffer metaphysical deification in Kant's transcendental 
idealism. It cannot be assumedl however, that Einstein's theory 
and its, categories are eternally valid, since further advances in 
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scientific understanding are not beyond imagination. Secondly,, 
one could adopt a neo-Kantian point of view, which accepts Kant's 
account of the role of the categories in producing knowledge, 
8 but reject, s his view as to their, transcendental character. 
Once it is conceded; however, that the rules of concept formation 
are neither transcendental nor universally guaranteed properties 
of the human understandingo then there is nothing to prevent 
competition between rival sets of categories. The consequence 
would be that different sets of rules founded on diverse sets 
of categories would constitute essentially incoMMensurable objects 
of scientific study. A neo-Kantian exposition of the cognitive 
foundation of scientific inquiry would -I it s 1. eems, face a philoso- 
phical relativism analogous to the conventionalist theories dis- 
cussed in the previous chapter. From these considerations it 
can be seen that neither Kant's transcendental idealism nor a 
neo-Kantian revisionism succeeds in providing an adequate cogni- 
tive foundation for the explication of scientific inquiry. 
While this failure is damaging for Kant's attempt to combat 
Humean scepticism over science, it is infinitely more damaging 
for the neo-Kantian attempt to distinguish social science from 
natural science. The philosophical relativism implicit in this 
understanding of Kant's philosophy undermines the whole neo- 
Kantian enterprise, since whatever distinctions the neo-Kantians 
draw between natural and social science will have no validity if# 
as has been demonstratedr they fail to justify the objectivity 
and universality of scientific inquiry. 
2.2 WEBER AND THE NEO-KANTIANS 
The principal doctrine of the Heidelberg neo-Kantians who 
influenced the formation of Weber's methodological thought was 
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that distinct rules of concept formation should be employed in 
9 
constituting the objects of social and natural science. 
Developing this view of social scientific-inquiry, theorists 
like Rickert and Windelband took inspiration from Kant's proce- 
dure in his ethical as well as his general epistemological writ- 
ings. 10 1 intend to begin, with some, prefatory remarks summaris- 
ing the essential features of Kant's ethical. theory before examin- 
ing the neo-Kantian analysis of the relation between social and 
natural science. 10 '.. ý 11 - 
Kant recognised that a moral agent. cannot be responsible 
when he is not free. If d man-' s acýbio_n were-governed by external 
factors beyond his control, then he could be neither morally 
free nor morally responsible. But if the category of causality 
applies inthe social world as it does in, the-world of nature, 
then human, actions-must, be determined by a Newtonian mechanicism. 
While one conceives of humanity-as-partýof nature or of the 
phenomenal world (constituted by-the-Kantian categories of the 
understanding) ethics has nowhere to stand. Because of this, 
severe difficulty, Kant adopted, a different mode of inquiry in 
his ethical studies. He employedýa noumenal rather than a pheno- 
menal method: he assumed. man toibe an ethical or spiritual being 
freely determining the moral ends of his own actions. Kant 
christened this noumenal conception of moral action as "causality 
through freedom". 12 . As long as a-man-succeeds, in guiding his 
actions according to moral, ends, he distinguishes himself from 
the. phenomenal world-where everything is determined by mechanical 
causes. Kant's philosophy roots itself,, -therefore in a dualism, 
in-which a voluntaristic and noumenal conception of-moral action 
c oexists with a mechanistic-notion of causality. ' As part of the 
subject matter of the empirical sciences, man can be subject to 
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the laws of nature, but as part of the world of morality the 
kingdom of endsp he is-free to determine the course ofýhis own 
actionsý. -If one chose to base social-science on-the latter 
part of Kant's philosophy and not the former, one, must. eschew 
any attempt to explain human action on the basis of the causal 
pattern of the natural sciences. This anti-positivist thesis 
is indeed the majorýtenet of the Heidelberg neo-Kantians. 
13 
will attempt to assess now, how far these theorists succeeded 
in formulating an adequate conception of scientific inquiry into 
social phenomena after they had rejected the idea of basing the 
social sciences on the*methods they believed were employed in 
natural science. - - 
Following Kant"s treatment of human duty, there have been 
several attempts to establish a distinction between social and 
natural science. ýI, intend to concentrate on'the contributions 
of Windelband and Rickert. 
14 According to Windelband, the 
natural sciences are characterised by a "nomothetic"-or genera- 
lising-method, -whereas history employs an "ideographic" or-in- 
dividualising method. * 
15 Windelband argues that natural scientistsl 
overcome the infinity of a chaotic extra-phenomenal "reality" 
through the method of generalisation which. constitutes phenomena 
in terms of their shared characteristics as members of a univer- 
sal class. Historians, on the other handf overcome this-chaotic 
infinity by establishing the uniqueness of an event as an in- 
dividuality. 16 Implicit in this. formulation, is the characteris- 
tically Kantian assumption that the phenomenal: world studied by 
science is a product of the application of the categories of 
human understanding. It just-so happens that the categories 
applied to the chaotic infinity of pre-conceptual' elements in 
social and natural science are methodologically different. The 
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demarcation between the sciences follows from these different 
rules of concept construction. Closer scrutiny, however, re- 
veals that Windelband's methodological distinction does not 
correspond to the practice of the empirical sciences. Hodges 
points out,, for instance,, that,, 
"There is an ideographic element-in geography and astronomy# 
Cý natural history and comparýfive psychology, as well as a search 
for laws; on the other hand, economics, aesthetics, philology 
and other Geisteswissenschaften have all a nomethetic aspect. " 
17 
obviously a more sophisticated theory of the demarcation 
between the sciences is required. 
According to Rickert, the domain of the social. sciences is 
not established by-the method of generalisation characteristic 
of natural science, but by the principle of "Wertbeziehunfl, 
(relevance to values). 
18 The, -"objects" which the "Geisteswissen- 
schaften" (human or social sciences) study are not pre-existing 
causal processes, they are rather phenomena created by organising 
a set of elements into a configuration determined by their rela- 
tion, to a set of ethical values. The "objects" constituted by 
the natural sciences, on the other handr do not enter-into any 
sort of relation with the values of the scientist, but are organi- 
sed according to, the causal relevance of the elements involved. 
In virtue of this indifference to ethical values implicit in 
the method of generalisation, this mode of inquiry is inappro- 
priate for social science. Historians, according to Rickert, 
should not strive to explain events in a causal sense; instead 
they should concentrate on establishing their cultural signifi- 
cance in relation to human values. This is an essentially 
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ideographic task in which tfie significance of'constituted con- 
figurations is determined'case'by case. -Insofar as the social- 
sciences as a whole conform to Rickert's conception of history, 
they are "individualising"'rather than' generalising disciplines. 
'Rickert distinguishes social'-sciences'from natural science 
in termsbf subject-matter, ', '- method and theoretical'aims. In the 
final analysis, all-of these distinctions are-reducible to the 
methodological role of the principle of Wertbeziehung. This 
principle constitutes the objects of social'science, as well as 
providing the means whereby their individuality and cultural 
significance is' established. * The principýe of "Wertbeziehung" 
ist however, fraught with-methodological awkwardness. In the 
course of social'events, men find themselves faced with choices 
between irreconcilable ethical values. Therefore social science 
would have to'-be founded on a value-relativism'which,, in con- 
junction with'the methodological role'of'"Wertbeziehungle, must 
culminate in'a methodological relativism. Such relativism is at 
odds with the idea of an'objective science. Rickert does re-- 
cognise'the tfieoretical'-importance of this problem and attempts 
to develop a solution. He argues that despite''appearances to' 
the contraryl humanity'-possesses a universal value system. 
If this were the case, then scientists would be-able to agree 
on the domain of social science, the"constitution of particular 
configurations and their cultural significance' "Wertbeziehung" 
would be a universal principle shared-by all social scientists 
because of-the underlying value-consensus in societies. ý- 
Rickert's social science would achieve a universality founded 
not on the objectivity of its theories# but'rather on the in- 
tersubjective agreement'of'its practioners. This ist of'courser 
a characteristically Kantian conception of "objectivity". 
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Weber renounces Rickert's idea of a universal value system 
by emphasising the inescapability of ethical relativism and the 
unignorable evidence of it, in social life. 
20 In reality, 
humanity is faced with a competition of ultimate values - the 
"war of the Gods" - vanishing only in an ossified culture. And 
even then, not all-cultures ossify into the same-stone. 
21 So a 
commitment to the, principle of., value-relevance together with 
implicit value-relativism in social science-cannot, be avoided. 
If social scientists proceeded according to Weber's conception 
of "Wertbeziehung", there could be as many attempts at theory 
construction as ýhereýare positions in ethics. Weber's stand- 
point on the methodological role of "Wertbeziehunall implies, in 
additiont that all of these, value-based theories constitute 
different objects of study. Social scientific theories formu- 
lated on this foundation are incommensurable and there are no 
objective criteria which can be appealed to when deciding between 
the-claims of competing value-based theories. If one accepted 
Weber's account of "Wertbeziehunq",, then one could not escape the 
the implication that social science is beset by an inescapable, 
methodological relativism alien to the natural sciences. - It is 
to Weber's credit that he embraces this relativism as a logical 
implication of the principle of "Wertbeziehung". 
22 But it remains 
to be seen, how far Weber can square the supposedly scientific 
character of social inquiry with this methodological relativism. 
He can no-longer appeal to a value-consensus to justify the 
universality of social science. Instead, he appeals to causality. 
Social inquiry-is to remain scientific even if it has the status 
of. value-relevant science! Weber argues that although the primary 
aim of historical explanation is to establish the cultural signi- 
ficance of an eventf historians cannot dispense with causal analy-, 
sis. Weber states, therefore,, that,, 
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"We wish to understand, on the one hand, the relationships 
and the cultural significance of individual events in'their con- 
temporary manifestations and, on the other, the causes of their 
being historically so and not otherwise. , 
23 
However, once Weber, in the wake of the neo-Kantians, has 
abandoned the assumption that history exists as an objective, 
causal processr it seems impossible that he should be'able- to 
develop a genuinely causal account of social inquiry. In other 
words., there seems to be a prima facie contradiction between 
the methodological role of "Wertbeziehung" and the demands of 
causal explanation. This contradiction between a neo-Kantian 
conception of social science and the presuppositions of a causal 
inquiry into history will now be examincd in the context of an 
analysis of Weber's methodology. 
2.3 WERTBEZIEHUNG AND OBJECTIVITY 
Weber insisted in his methodological writings that a*research 
qua scientist should strictly observe the norms and values of 
science and not allow ethical or political values to interfere 
with his scientific work. 
24 Social scientistst' Weber maintained, 
j 
must adhere to the principle of value-freedom (Wertfreiheit) if 
they are to aspire to value-free social u derstanding. A valu n e- 
free social science, on the other hand, should not interfere in 
ethical argument, but must confine itself to'interventions in 
25 
scientific disputes. According to Weber's methodologyr values 
transcend scientific research; consequently, no amount of 
scientific evidence can affect the balance of argument in an 
ethical dilemma. - Weber fully accepts the existence of a logical 
gap between "is" and "ought" ie. between the world of "fact" 
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where scientific results are decisivel and the sphere of human 
values where science-should have no say. Although there is 
little evidence to suggest that Weber's methodology establishes 
rules which intrude into disputes in ethics, it appears from my 
analysis of "Wertbeziehung" that his methodological basis permits 
the thorough intrusion of values into science. According to 
Webert the first moment in social scientific theorisation is the 
constitution of the object of study through the application of 
26 
the methodological principle of "Wertbeziehung" . The social 
scientist freely chooses his value starting point and then con- 
stitutes his object of study by selecting elements from a 
chaotic infinity according to their relevance to his value-orient- 
ation. The object of study is. openly constituted on the basis 
of ethical considerations rather than on neutral scientific 
principles. Nevertheless, Weber assumes the objectivity of 
social scientific theories is guaranteed by causal analysis. 
Even so, a causal investigation of social phenomena can only 
begin once the phenomena have been constituted by"Wertbeziehung. 11 
The nature and range of causal analysis is restricted from the 
outset by the prior application of ethical values to the material. 
This is not the only limitation imposed by "Wertbeziehung", 
since it also acts as a principle for selecting "relevant" causal 
connections from a supposedly infinite number of possible rela- 
tions associated with the genesis of the explanandum. Weber- 
argues this selective role is necessary because "the number and 
types of causes which have influenced any given event are always 
infinite and there is nothing in the things themselves to set 
them apart as alone meriting attention. " 
27 If, however, causal 
analysis is subordinated to "Wertbeziehung" in this way, then it 
is impossible for it to function as causal analysis at all. Both 
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the range and the nature of causal explanations are determined 
by ethical rather than scientific considerations. These ethical 
principles are not themselves subject to any sort of scientific 
determination. On the contrary, values are transcendental with 
respect to any sort of scientific results. 
28 Despite the fact 
that ethical values cannot be neutralised'or'modified by research 
they appear to govern every stage of investigation, including 
"scientific" testing. Value-based theories and hypotheses can 
only be "tested" against "facts" constituted by the same ultimate 
values which underly these theories. "Wertbeziehung",, therefores, 
dictates the constitution of the object of study, the "relevant" 
causal relations and the "facts" against which a social scientific 
theory will be evaluated. Even if Weber's methodology succeeds 
in establishing the freedom of ethics from scientific criticism, 
he evidently fails to free science from the intrusion of ethics. 
Weber's methodology ensures that ultimate values will dominate 
all stages of social inquiry. The principle of "Wertbeziehung" 
undermines the principle of "Wertfreiheit" and in this way 
Weber's methodology precludes the possibility of a value-free 
social science. 
2.4 IDEAL - TYPICAL EXPLANATION 
Weber's formulation of a. new type of theoretical termt the 
ideal-type, appears to be a response to two theoretical problems 
arising from a neo-Kantian conception of science. First' , it 
is an attempt to provide general concepts for history without 
undermining its status as an ideographic science. Secondly, 
generalisation from ideal types, for Weber, seems to suggest an' 
account of theorisation in social'-science which is compatible 
with a neo-Kantian view of concept formation'., 
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The first problem arises from Rickert's ideographic under- 
standing, of historical science. If. as Rickert maintains, history 
employs concepts which are exclusively individualisinge then it 
is no longer possible for it-to achieve even its limited aim of 
establishing the cultural significance of events. The specifica- 
tion of an event as unique involves differentiating it from other 
types of event', r and inevitably this requires general concepts., 
Hence, -as far, as--Weber is concernedi,, history must, have recourse 
to general concepts even. if it is an individualising science. 
29 
The ideal-type concept, therefore, was-created to, provideý 
historians-with the means to pursue their''ideographic aims. 
However,, these'general c oncepts are notýbe used to establish 
theoretical generalisations interpreted in either a positivist 
or realist manner. Theýideal-type only establishes generalisa- 
tions which are consistent with-, a neo-Kantian view of social 
inquiry. Weber's formulation of the-ideal-type ist it follows, 
an attempt to-come to terms with the problem of theoretical 
generalisation, when his neo-Kantianism makes it impossible for 
the cognitive significance of, scientific theories to be founded 
on either a relation to a. set of theory-neutral observation 
statements (positivism), or an objective causal process (realism). 
The principle of construction of Weber's ideal-types is 
again "Wertbeziehunq" and as such the selection of its elements 
30 
and relations need not be bound by scientific criteria. An 
ideal-type is not intended as either a direct description of 
reality or as a scientific hypothesis. Weber states'that the 
ideal-type "is no hypothesis, but if offers guidance for the 
construction of hypotheses. It is not*a description of reality, 
but aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a, 
description. , 31 The defining feature-of an ideal type is that 
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it should contain at least one term or relation having no 
direct reference to the constituted objectýof study. It cannot 
be directly observed, nor can it play an immediate role in 
explanation. Ideal-types, howeverr can serve as generalisations 
which help the historian fulfill his ideographic aims without 
transgressing neo-Kantian assumptions about the status of theory. 
The theoretical concepts which economics and sociologv 11supplv11 
to history can be used without fear of positivist or-realist 
reductionism because these concepts are ideal-types. This- 
generalising component is thought to be nevertheless "theoretical" 
because ideal-types can be formulated as if the-relations they 
express were universal. Theory, although founded on ideal-types, 
cannot be reduced to the inductivism of neo-Xantian historicism. 
On the other hand, Weber's conception of theory stays faithful 
to neo-Xantian history. The elements of the ideal-type are , 
social and historical; and ideal-types provide the indispensable 
means for the establishment of the cultural significance of 
historical events. It remains to be seen# however, how far, 
Weber's ideal-types can play a genuinely "theoretical" role in 
social inquiry. 
According to Hempelp idealisations, in natural, science may 
be either explanatory or heuristic'. 
32 They possess an explana- 
tory power when they are located in'a well corroborated theory, 
even though as extreme instances of a theory they are, incapable 
of any direct form of testing. The ideal-gas in kinetic theory, 
for instance, is a special case of the theory in which terms are 
given values without any known correlates. The relation posited 
between the terms follows from the theory; a theory corroborated 
in cases where the values'are known. The idealisationp as-a 
logical extension of the general theory, will possess an explana- 
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tory power in direct relation to the adequacy of the theory of 
which it is a part. Idealisations may, 'alternatively perform 
an heuristic rather than an explanatory role. In the early 
stages of theory developmentr they may be used to suggest rela- 
tions between ideal-values as a means whereby theory can proceed 
to the analysis of empirical relations by substituting concrete 
33 for ideal values. The success of the idealisation, in this 
case, would be in direct proportion to its success in promoting 
theory development. Such value as the idealisation has, in its 
explanatory as in its heuristic rolej depends therefore on the 
relation between idealisation and'theory or theory development. 
In the context of Weber's methodology, the ideal-type is 
neither heuristic nor explanatory. The social scientist cannot 
go beyond the elaboration of'a series'of value-based'idealisa- 
tions because there are no value-neutral elements capable of 
corroborating theories or serving as an objective criterion of 
theory development. Any descent from idealisation to theore- 
tical generalisation is blocked. Rather than promoting the 
development of scientific theorieso, Weber's ideal-ty I pes generate 
ersat - theories, where the methodology fails to provide a 
cognitive foundation for proper social scientific generalisation. 
34 
If ideal-types are at all conceivable and if they are to play 
a genuinely heuristic or explanatory role in social science, 
they would of necessity have to be cleared of their dependence 
on Weber's methodology. 
2.5 "VERSTEHENDE EXPLANATION", 
Weber develops the anti-positivist thesis of neo-Kantianism 
by expounding an essentially voluntaristic and teleological account 
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of social scientific explanation. According to this viewr the 
explanation of an action consists in specifying-its underlying 
meaning or motives. 
verstehende explanations. as versr-enenae expianarions are 
founded on a voluntaristic theory of-actiont Weber's sociology 
evidently descends directly from the Kantian account I examined 
earlier, but with important changes: Kant's conception of action 
had obvious metaphysical underpinnings; Weber attempts to develop 
his theory of action in a scientific manner. 
A "verstehende" explanation opens with the task of "direct 
understanding"., 
36 An action, must be placed in an immediate 
context of meaning as a necessary preliminary. to the isolation 
of the motive which precipitated the action. A "verstehende" 
account of action achieves adequacy at the level of meanin_q when 
it has been situated in a "typical complex of meaning. , 
37 
Adequacy at the "meaning". level is obtained through a rational 
understanding of the action according to its relation to ideal- 
types. Weber distinguishes four ideal-types of rational action - 
instrumentally-rational (Zweckrational)r value-rational, affectual 
and traditional. 
38 In the firstj rationality is evident in 
the choice of both the ends and means of action. In the second, 
rationality is limited to the means while the ends are determined 
by a belief in an ultimate value. In the third, the choice of 
ends and means is guided by feelingsl in the last by custom. 
Rational types of "action", are distinguished from "behaviour" 
which is deemed to be brought about by external causes and so 
lacks any sort of intentional or teleological element. In 
virtue of this it is-characterised as "irrational". 
Weber callp. such explanations of action 
35 ---. II ---. 
This typology of action is confused. In the first place# if 
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behaviour is non-teleological then it would be better to consider 
it non-rational, not irrational, since considerations of rationa- 
lity or irrationality do not apply. to behaviour brought about 
by involuntary causes. Irrational "action", could be located 
in a classificatory system which allowed for cases where an 
agent adopted either inconsistent or incoherent ends or crazy 
means to attain his ends. Weber, however, fails to make this 
fundamental distinction. It appears in addition impossible to 
square considerations of rationality with "actions" caused 
either by "feelings" (affectual action) or by customs (traditional 
action) sincer in both cases, the actions are not motivated by 
rational calculation at all. Unless, of courser the agent 
chose to act as his feelings directed him to do, or chose to - 
adopt a customary course of action. But in such cases the action 
is better subsumed under the first heading: it is a belief -a 
belief that feelings should be gratified or custom respected - 
which guides the agent. 
The point of Weber's argument, is not just, to lay down a typology 
of action, but to establish "zweckrational" action as the model 
for the explanation of all action. 
39 Here, the action is 
determined by a rational choice of ends and means: "Zweckrational" I 
action as a pure type of teleological action is the most ", calcul- 
able" of rational actions being-purged of 11irratiot7et. 1" considera- 
tions. A 7verstehende explanation",, based on a means/end, 
rationality of this sort, is nevertheless read, as a "causal 
explanation in absolutely the same sense as the causal inter- 
pretation of any concrete natural process. , 
40 Weber proposes 
that "verstehende" explanation must be adequate causally as well 
as at the level of meaning. Consequently, he states thatt i 
"verification of subjective interpretation by comparison with the 
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concrete course of events is# as in the case of all hypothesest 
indispensible. 
I" 41 
It soon transpires though that Weber's "verstehende. 1' , 
explanations are incompatible with what look very much like 
positivist criteria of Verification! 1 
Weber believes that a 
causally adequate I'verstehende" explanation can be achieved 
through empirical observation of actions and statidtical analysis 
arising from such observations. He states, . 
"Thus causal explanation depends on being able, to, determine 
that there is a probability, which in the rare, ideal case can be 
numerically stated, but is always in some sense, calculable, that 
a given observable event (overt or subjective) will be followed 
or accompanied by another event, , 
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Two important points must. be stressed. First no amount of 
observation positivists like to indulge, in can confirm or con- 
tradict the attribution of motives to actions. The imputation 
of motive depends not on observed behaviour, but rather on a' 
knowledge of a socio-cultural context. of meaning. -, 
And, again,,. 
the selection of motives is mediated by ideal. -types and these 
theoretical constructs/quite resistant to empirical interpretation-ýý, 
"Verstehendell explanations can never be "causally-adequate" in 
the Weberian sensel bec4use. they are "unverifiable" if one applies 
Weber's criteria of verification, or for that matter, standard 
experimental tests. 
Other contradictions also-stand out in Weber's "verstehende" 
account of sociological explanation. Weber insists, for. instancel 
that "Zweckrational" actions should form the. model of all 
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"verstehende" explanations becausel uninfluenced by external 
43 
causal factors# they have the status of pure telýlogical actions. 
He nevertheless concedes that relatively few actions are of this 
44 % type. If most actions are not purely teleological they must 
be causally determinal at least'in part,, by features which 
are comprehensible only when referred to causal mechanisms. And 
these are altogether outside the domain of Weberian social 
science. For a social science to attempt to "explain" these 
levels of non-teleological determination, as if thdy were results 
of essentially free action, would be self-ýdefeating. The non- 
teleological elements of action ought to be explained in their 
own terms. A move from an idealý-type of teleological-action to 
a non-teleological theory of action would be the natural route 
for theory-development to take. Weber's "verstehendell pattern 
of explanation, however, contains a prescription against the 
development of such a theory by concentrating s ol I ely on the 
teleological factors and by insisting they must function as 
direct or indirect elements in all attempts at sociological 
explanation. 
The absurdity of the absolutisation of this previous assump- 
tion is demonstrated paradoxically by Weber's own theoretical 
investigations. Weber concludes, in his substantive work, that 
bureaucratisation as'the-culmination of the process of rational- 
45 isation is the inevitable fate (Shicksal) of the West. 
Bureaucratisation ensnares individuals in an iron cage from 
46 
which there is apparently no escape. If this process were 
as inevitable as Weber supposes, then, it would be absur to 
stand the hypothesis on the pedestal of a theory of action which 
was voluntaristic! If, however, Weber -amended his 
nethodology in'the light-of this curious result, he 
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would have to abandon the teleological assumption. Weber does 
not modify his methodologyr instead he hangs on to his voluntaris- 
tic theory of action regardless. Any modification, he probably 
feared, would have committed him to the naturalistic positivism 
against which he polemicised. In the final analysis, one can 
conclude that Weber's I'verstehende" sociology,, despite its verbal 
concessions to positivist criteria of scientificity, depends 
on a neo-Kantian humanism; 1t is committed to a voluntaristic 
theory of actionj despite the fact that such a conception is 
contradicted by the-results of Weber's own research. 
What must be guarded against, howeveris scepticism 
concerning the applicability of reason or 
motive-explanations in social science just because there are 
evident weaknesses in Weber's ", verstehende" sociology. Unless 
one adopts a dogmatic positivism, there is. no reason why one 
should deny such factors a role in the explanation of actions. 
Explanations in terms of reasons, and motives, howeverl would 
have to be based on adequate criteria of imputation and verifi- 
cation. Such criteria could not be supplied either by positi- 
vistic social science or by Weber's "verstehende" sociology. - 
In the first instance, motives or reasons cannot, in the positi- 
vist sense, be nakedly observed; in the second, there can 
according to Weber be no descent from idealisation to theory or 
from teleology to causality. Consequentlyr a social science based 
on explanations of actions in terms of reasons and motives would 
be obliged to construct a methodology stepping beyond the limita- 
tion of Weber's neo-Kantianism as well as those of a dogmatic 
positivism. 
- -- 
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2.6 WEBER'S METHODOLOGICAL INDfVIDUALISM"' 
Weber's "verstehende" sociology is committed to a thorough- 
going methodological individualism. Macro-concepts such as the 
state, class etc., "must be treated as solely the resultants and' 
modes of organisations of the particular acts of individual 
persons,, since these alone can be treated as agents in a course 
,, 47 of subjectively understandable action. In a letter to 
Liefmann, Weber leaves no doubt as to the importance he attaches 
to individualist methods in social science. 'He writes, 
"If I have become a sociologist ..... it is' mainly in order 
to exorcise the sphere of collective conceptions which still 
lingers amongst us. In other words, sociology itself can only 
proceed from the actions of one or more separate individuals 
I1 48 
and must, therefore, adopt strictly individualist methods. " 
"Verstehende. 11 explanations. 7as has been said, must be adequate 
at the level of meaning. If meaning is not to be abstracted 
from social life, then it might be analysed in linguistic terms. 
Language-is, howeveri, a social phenomenon par excellence whose 
existence is inexplicable if one abstracts it from a community 
of speakers. Language contains a socio-conventional level of 
meaning dependent on a set of rules whose existence nature and 
evolution cannot be accounted for by reference to isolated 
homunculi. The meaning of any phrase of a. language cannot be 
reduced to a set of speaker's intentions. A socio-conventional 
understanding of meaning cannot fall back'on either an intentionalý 
theory of meaning or individualist concepts. Insofar as 
"verstehende" explanation's are adequate at the level of "meaning" 
th6y depend, therefore, on an implicit or explicit reference to 
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socio-conventional structures of meaning which can only be, 
4 9' 
understood at a macro-level. " . If Weber's. methodology were as 
strictly individualistic as he supposes, then the ground on whi. ch 
'overstehende" sociology is based would. sink beneath it. Emphasis 
must be accorded to the point, that the much mentioned contradic- 
tion between Weber's macro-sociology and his micro-methodology, 
has an equally crucial and damaging counterpart in the. methodology 
itself. It is not, simply a contradiction emerging only when 
Weber is engaged in substantive, research, but rather one found 
at the very heart of his methodological programme. 
There are still further, shortcomings for an individualist 
conception of social science. Weber's "verstehendell sociology 
assumes the individual actor, to be the real starting point for 
the construction of a theory of social life and social develop- 
ment. Any attempt to explain the actions of an agent, or 
ascribe motives to him which pays no-attention to the enveloping 
social contexts, necessarily falls, short of a full explanation 
of both what the action is and the intention behind its per- 
formance. In addition, no explanation is offered of the social 
contexts which limit the kind of descriptions an interpreter of 
the action-might wish to apply to it. For example, even though 
the pursuit of wealth is common to many epochs, it is only when 
the labourer becomes separated from the means of production that 
the general pursuit of riches can take the form of capitalist 
accumulation. 
50 
The decisive factor from the viewpoint of a 
science of history is not the motivations of individual actors, 
but the understanding of the development of the socio-economic 
conditions which enabled industrial capitalism to, flourish. 
These conditions cannot be explained as a result of the actions 
of individual homunculij since they form the contex t. of. thought 
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and action which specifically limits the. free choice of ends 
and means. The individual is as much a. product of this social 
development as is the form of society in which he exists. It 
would be self-defeating to explain this social development, by 
drawing on individuals and their, actions alone,, if these same 
actions could only be understood to be the actions they were in 
terms of the process they purport to explain. On the contrary, 
it would seem that social development should be explained at its 
own level and this implies the use of =cro-concepts. Indeed, 
both Weber's methodology and his sociology seem to. requireýthe- 
development of a macro-sociology..,. This is confirmed by. Weber's 
implicit reference to macro-factors when elucidating the nature 
of social processes. Lukes, for instance, commends Weber for 
overriding his methodological-precept-in key-areas of his, 
analysis of social development. He states,, 
"Fortunately,, Weber did not systematically follow this 
principle (methodological individualism) in his substantive work; 
consider for example his theory of stratification based on 
structural rather. than subjective. factors; his account of the 
decline of the Roman Empire in terms of structural changes in 
Roman agriculture; and his explanation of the rationalisation 
of the modern world in terms of such structural factors as the 
separation of the house-hold from the business enterprise. , 
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Weber failed to remove the micro-macro. contradiction#-how- 
ever, either from his methodology or his sociology. He did not 
reject methodological individualism in the light of his practice 
as a sociologist. 
- 
Thatthe Adentification of 
. -all 
maerg-concepts with 
a naturalistic objectivism prevented him from conceiving of 
alternative theoretical, possibilities 1ýý 
., 
is the most. likely explana 
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tion for this blind spot. Weber's 
science would appear to imply that 
with certain alterations, form an 
social psychology with the limited 
actions, it will remain hopelessly 
understanding social development. 
rejection of a macro-social 
while his methodology might' 
adequate foundation for a 
aim of explaining individual 
inadequate as a means for 
2.7 WEBER'S METHODOLOGY AND UNIVERSAL HISTORY 
I have argued throughout this chapter that Weber's methodologyli 
as a logical"oýitcome of a neo-Kantiafi epistemologyris incapable 
of developing either*'a universal or a scientific understanding 
of history. It will be interesting to examine Mommsen's defence 
of Weber, Mommsen asserts that Weber' s methodology does form the basisýj 
for a genuinely universal understanding of history. He puts 
forward three major arguments supporting this view. First, he 
argues that Weber's theory "rested on a specific, conception of 
the world historical process or to use a more general phrase 
52 
world history. " Consequently, Weber's studies, according to 
Mommsent "always reflect the socio-cultural significance of the 
respective social phenomena in a truly universal historical 
perspective. " 
53 
Weber's specific conception of "world historyllitied to value- 
relevanceris unfortunately partial and limited. Weber's metho- 
dology cannot present social phenomena in a truly historically 
universal perspective, because history itself is not conceived 
as an objective causal process, but is rather constituted as a 
series of value-relevant objects. A universal history could- 
only be a genuine aspiration if Weber#, like Rickert,, -'asserted 
the dogma of a single value-system. Yet"Weberls'det-ermined'in- 
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sistence on the methodological role of "Wertbeziehung" and on 
the persistence of ethical relativism, straightforwardly precludes 
the possibility of a truly universal understanding of history. 
Mommsen advances a second argument which concedes the 
reality of different value-frameworksj, but nevertheless maintains 
that it is possible to "knit together" a universal conception of 
history out of the various value-relevant theorisations., 
Mommsen argues accordingly thatt 
"Max Weber's later work was essentially an attempt to knit a 
variety of "partial pictures" of culture into a general framework 
of ideal-types to get as close as possible to a comprehensive 
perception of culture. , 
54 
If, however, the value-premises actually constitute the 
object of study, then different value-relevant theories and their 
"objects" are essentially incommensurable and resist incorpora- 
tion into a single theoretical framework. Weber could only have 
achieved such a universal conception of history by transcending 
the limits of his methodological relativism. In the absence of 
such a revisiont Weber's idealisations would be logically tied 
to particular value-premises and these do not extend the 
possibility of developing a universal conception of history. 
Finally, Mommsen suggests that Weber's sociology embodies a 
universal philosophy of history. 
55 There is an eternal struggle 
between the individual who aspires to be a free subject and the 
rationalisation of social life which conspires to deprive him of 
his freedom. Weber's sociology may well contain such a model, 
but if-the arguments of the previous sections are justifiable, it 
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has no scientific credentialst it'merely happens to be his 
Weltanschauung. The principle reasons for this failure can be 
traced back to the neo-Kantian insistence that "reality" is 
constituted by concepts of science and not an objective causal 
process. Once it is assumed, however# that a'scientific theory 
constitutes the reality it studies as well as the concepts pur- 
porting to explain this "reality"j, it seems inevitable that, 
science will be trapped in idealisation where its "explanations" 
are not subject to any determination by an extra-theoretical 
process. This indeed is the case with Weber's theory of concept 
formation and, in particular, with his notion of the ideal-type. 
If, in addition, it is accepted that the idealisations of theory 
are value-relativer as is supposed to be the case in social 
science, then the theories of social science are not only devoid 
of any sort of empirical interpretation (in virtue of their 
status as ideal-types), but they also suffer the extra handicap 
of being an expression of an implicit methodological relativism. 
Little wonder that once Weber had accepted the neo-Kantian re- 
jection of the assumption that-reality - the social world being just as 
real as nature - exists as an objective causal processr he failed 
(despite his persistent worrying of the topic)? to develop an 
adequate methodology of social science. 
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Chapter 3. FROM REALISM TO HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 
In this chapter, I intend to analyse the contribution of 
classical German philosophy to Marx's formulation of the general 
principles of historical materialism. The starting point is a 
critical exposition of Hegel's absolute idealism and of FeuerbachIf 
materialism and humanism. I then attempt to trace týe theoretical' 
links between Marx's complex critique of these two philosophers 
and his subsequent understanding of social development. Dis- 
cussion throughout the chapter is limited mainly to the original 
texts of Hegel and Feuerbach, and Marx's critique of classical 
German philosophy contained in the "Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts". 
3.1 HEGEL'S DIALECTIC 
In this section I intend to argue that there is a contradic- 
tion between Hegelian dialectical logic and the principles of 
scientific history. Hence, there is no possibility of developing 
a scientific view of Marxism on the basis of Hegel's philosophy; 
and I do this regardless of whether a quasi-Hegelian philosophy 
can be developed, as Colletti has shown in diamat and Soviet 
Marxism or the theory which takes its inspiration from Lukacs 
and the Frankfurt School. 
1 Marx certainly regarded Hegel as 
the first thinker to make important discoveries by the use of a 
dialectical method - there being more than one method - about 
the nature of history; and Marx gave him due credit for this. 
' 2 
However, the insights Hegel elaborated, when their theoretical 
scaffolding is examined, are seen to rest on logical nonsense. I 
do my best to present this logic - but in certain important 
respects it almost defies presentation. Marx's development of 
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these insights does not depend in the least on such a "logic". 
Indeed# as I hope I have succeeded in demonstrating, Marx trans- 
forms them into a science. 
Hegel's analysis of historical development, in "The Pheno- 
l 
menology of Mind", takes the form of an analysis of the development 
of consciousness; it is a logical outcome of his philosophical 
commitment to an absolute idealism. In order to analyse the 
relationship between Hegel's view of social development and that 
of Marx, it is necessary first to locate Hegel's conception of 
history in the context of his general philosophy. 
3 So my dis- 
cussion of Hegel commences with an exposition and analysis of his 
general dialectic of nature (as elaborated in his "Science of 
Logic") i. e.,, with his most abstract formulation of "absolute 
idealism". 
For Hegel,, philosophy is identical with idealism, the doc- 
trine which denies that the finite has any true existence "in- 
itself". The task of philosophy is to demonstrate this proposi- 
tion. Hegel claims that, 
"The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than 
4 in recognising that the finite has no veritable being" 
If philosophy is to be true to its idealist destinyt then 
it must renounce the materiality of the finite. Hegel states, 
"A philosophy which ascribed veritable, ultimate, absolute 
being to finite existence as such, would not deserve the name of 
5 
philosophy. 
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The idealists categorically state-that only the. ideal, the 
infinite, or-in theological terms "God" is true. The, infinite 
can only be a true infinitep however, insofar as it exists in- 
itself. The. task of idealism is to establish a true infinite 
in-and-for-itself. According to Hegel, the idealist philosophers 
of the past have consistently failed in this task on account of 
their adherence to an incorrect method. They have adopted the 
method of the understanding (Verstand) which slavishly follows 
the rules of classical-logic as if these rules-were appropriate 
for idealist philosophy. 
6 These logical rules include,,, first,, 
the principle of non-contradiction (Vx) - (Ax &- Ax) which 
asserts that nothing can be both A&-A; secondly, the law of iden- 
tity (Vx) (Ax = Ax) which claims nothing-can avoid being identical 
with itself; thirdly, the law of excluded middle (Vx) (Axv-Ax) 
which states that everything has to be either true or false. 
These rules are quite evidently fundamental to scientific and 
philosophical inquiry. But Hegel maintains that from the point 
of view of idealism they are self-defeating, because, they are 
rooted in an implicit materialism. It should be noted, however, 
that individual principles of classical logic have been questioned 
by logicians. The law of excluded middle, for instance, is 
abandoned by intuitionist logicians who do not believe that every 
statement must be either true or false - some statementst those 
which are undecidable., fail altogether to-possess truth-values. 
7 
But even though doubt hasI. in this wayt been thrown on-individual 
logical laws, there has been no serious scepticism concerning 
logic as a whole. Hegel's position, on the other hand, is. one 
in which such a wholesale rejection of logic does occur;, and this 
paradoxically, would seem to prohibit an exposition of his philo- 
sophy. From the point of view of some philosophical schools, the 
collapse of logic would infact imply the collapse of language: and 
this would be for therm, the strongest possible reason for 
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rejecting Hegel Is dialectical-, logic. 
8 
-To continue-. the me-thodOý'Vers tan 
is stigmatised as-the method of 11, Unphilosophie". Moreover the 
problem of this method for idealism is that it logically separates 
the finite from the infinite. It necessarily-implies, "that the 
finite is irrecoocilable with the infinite and cannot be united- 
with it# that the finite is utterly opposed to the infinite. " 
9 
This leads to a fundamental inconsistency for idealist philosophy. 
The infinite cannot become a true infinite, because it is finitised 
by being one of two i. e., an infinite-only in relation to the 
finite. The infinite is finitised and-the finite is infinitised 
because itr in turn, "remains absolute on its own side. "JO The 
method of I'Verstand", therefore, leads idealism into the paradox 
of --proving the finite absolute and the infinite finite. Hegel 
notes,, therefore that, 
"While thought thus believes that it has elevated itself to 
an infinite, just the opposite happens i. e., it attains to an in- 
finite that is only a finite, and it retains the finiter which 
was to have been left behind, making it thus into an absolute. " 
11 
Hegel believed it necessary to progress beyond the method of 
"Verstand", if idealism is to develop a method appropriate to its 
task. He solved this problem by developing a dialectical logic 
which was intended to be the method of "reason"(Vernunft). This 
"logic" replaces the principles of classical logic by asserting 
the principle of "dialectical contradiction". Hencer A is not A 
per se, but rather is A and -A. A and -A together constitute a 
unity "XII in which neither term can be defined without reference 
to týe other. This unity, however, is not a simple unity in 
identity, but a unity of opposites i. e., a contradictory unity. 
12 
It is only within this contradictory whole-, that A negates -A and 
vice versa. Hence, it seems that the formula for dialectical con- 
-- --------- 
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tradiction should be A and -A in "X", where 'IX" is the unity con- 
stituted by the opposition. 
Hegel applies his dialectical logic to the problem of realis- 
ing a true infinite. He asserts that the "finite is ideal". The 
finite is, therefore,, itself ("AII)and not itself ("-A"). It is 
both finite and infinite. The finite no longer has true reality 
in-itselff but, on the contrary, it only has true re ality in 
relation to the "other" - the infinite. The implications of this 
are crucial for the realisation of an absolute idealism. It now 
follows that the finite really is itself when it is not itself, 
but the other - the infinite and that it is not itself'when it 
is itself i. e., the finite. Hence, by making the finite ideal, 
Hegel is able to demonstrate the absolute in the finite in such 
a way that it becomes evident that the finite and infinite together 
constitute the totality posited by the absolute itself. 
From the viewpoint of the "other7,, the infinite, this is the 
dialectical process of its progressive coming into--being in-and- 
for-itself. As it stands in the A and -A relation, the absolute 
is itself when it is not itself, and not - itself when it is it- 
self. But, through the dialectical process of the negation of 
the negation, i. e. the negation and supersession of the finite? 
it will finally exist in a form appropriate to itself i. e. in-and- 
for-itself as absolute. 
In Hegel's philosophy, the development of nature and'cons- 
ciousness is understood as part of the dialectical unfolding of 
absolute mind as it negates forms not appropriate to its real i. e. 
ideal nature. The dialectical contradiction between the finite 
and the absolute is the principle of movement of all things. Hegel 
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notes,, therefore, that this contradiction: 
... "is not to be taken merely as an abnormality which only 
occurs here and there, but is rather the negative as'determined 
in the sphere of essence, the principle of all self-movement, 
which consists solely in an exhibition of it. External sensuous 
motion itself is contradiction's immediate existence. Something 
moves, not because at one moment it is here and at another there, 
but because in this "here"j, it at once is and is not. " 
13 
Philosophy must abandon the principle of non-contradiction 
because, "everything is inherently contradictory,, and in the sense 
that this law in contrast to the others expresses rather the truth 
and the essential nature of things. " 
14 
All forms of motion and development are governed by the 
dialectical contradiction between the finite and infinite. This 
is a conception of the movement of nature and history which para- 
doxically recurs in the guise of a supposed materialism viz the 
dialectical materialism of Engels and the third international. 
15 
For the momentr however,, I wish to concentrate on the nature of 
Hegel's dialectic rather than on the interpretation of Marxism. 
The dialectical unfolding of the absolute, which culminates in 
the annihilation of the finite and the achievement of a true - 
consciousness of the absolute in and-for-itself, is both a dia- 
lectically determined process of absolute mind and the concrete 
achievement of Hegel's own philosophy. Hegel's dialectic is 
simultaneously a dialectic of knowledge i. e., a logical movement 
as well as a dialectic of matter i. e.,, an ontological movement, 
The logic is ontological and the ontology is an embodiment of the 
movement of the categories of Hegel's dialectical logic. 
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The dialectic of knowledge'as simultaneously a logical and 
ontological processroperates through a series of oppositions 
between consciousness on the one side and the object of conscious- 
ness on the other. The mediating term of this opposition is mind 
or self-consciousness which changes consciousness by superseding 
the limitations of the object'of consciousness as'an'objectifica- 
tion of itself. It thereby posits a new object of consciousness 
more adequate to its self-conception. 
16 One can re . present this 
dialectical opposition and it'S mediating term thus: - 
-A 
x. 
Consciousness Self-consciousness Object of, 
or mind consciousness 
Consciousness and 'the object of consciousness are'self- 
distinctions of absolute mind and therefore distinctions-within 
a'dialectical unity mediated by mind itself. The supersession 
of the object of con'sciousness " occurs because the object of 
consciousness must be recognised not as an object "in-itself",, 
but rather as an objectification of self-consciousness or mind. 
Hence,, Hegel notes that "only-in its n'otion'does something possess 
actuality and to-the extent that-it is distinct from its notion 
it ceases to be actual and is a'non-entitý. , 
17 
The 'object of 
consciousness must',, therefore, be recognised as self-consciousness 
"in-and-for-itself. 11 Hegel notes that "it is only'as it is in 
thought that the object is truly in and for 'itself; in intuition 
18 
or ordinary conception it 'is only an appearance. " 
The essential'truth of the finite and of mattei! consists in 
its sUblation and, ' hence, 'the reco4nition of its true ekistence 
as absolute mind. Hegel states, 
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"It is the very nature of the finite to transcend itself#, 
to negate its negation and to become infinite. " 
19 
The process of the supersession of the finite reality of 
nature and forms of consciousness is simultaneously the coming-to- 
be of the absolute in-and-for-itself. It is the "achievement" of 
Hegel's absolute idealism. 
Although I have-acknowledged the possibility of a direct logi- 
cal linkýbetween Hegel's dialectic and dialectical-materialism as 
developed by-Engels and the third international, one should be 
awarer from my exposition of Hegel's philosophy, that there is a, 
fundamental contradiction between Hegel's dialectical logic andý 
any form of scientific activity. Scientific practice would collapse 
if it relinquished the principles of classical logic; Yet1rom 
Hegel's viewpoint, these principles absolutise the finite and 
finitise the absolute and have to be thrown aside. In addition, 
the method of anomaly generation and supersession central, to the 
process of theory-development in science depends on the inter- 
Id 
relation prid beýween conflict between .. objective causal processes 
and the theories-which endeavour to grasp their nature. A scien- 
tist cannot regard his object of study as a mere objectification 
of consciousness. Naturally, for Hegell, there can only, be one 
form of "science"-that of absolute mind; so the loss of empiri- 
cal science is no loss for him. Insofar as Marx was, involved in 
developing a scientific understanding of history, there could be 
no connection with Hegelian idealism. Marx maintained, neverthe- 
less,, that Hegel's philosophy contained important insights into 
the nature of social, development. Before I investigate this claim, 
I wish to emphasise that whatever value Heg-e-'l's philosophy may 
have for an historical science, it can only be utilised once his 
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"estranged insights" into the nature of. history have been freed 
from their dependence on his absolute-idealism., 
3.2 FEUERBACH'S MATERIALISM AND HUMANISM 
In the "Economic and Philosophical-Manuscripts" Marx observed 
that the Young Hegelians or Critical School, as they were termed, 
had not once voiced so much as a suspicion of the need for 
a critical debate with their progenitor, the Hegelian dialectic. " 
20 
Only Feuerbach, Marx emphasised, conducted a critical debate with 
Hegel's dialectic. 
21 By basing his philosophy on the principles 
of materialism and humanism, he pressed forward a-critique of Hegel's 
absolute idealism. As far as Feuerbach is concernede the finite 
is a positive ground in-itself; ýit-is neither a negation nor an 
22 
alienation of the infinite. The finite is nott thereforeg, -ideal,, 
but material. Man too is conceived. as a reality in his own right 
to be explained as he is in himself, as it were, rather than in 
terms of an incarnation of a divine being. He should be under- 
stood according to his inherent characteristics as a species-being 
Feuerbach regarded his philosophy as a means 
whereby the self-estrangement or self-alienation of man and nature 
could be overcome by grounding the properties ascribed to deities 
and their equivalents in "natural" and "human" characteristics. 
Feuerbach sought to demonstrate how Hegel's negation of the 
negation, which purports to bring "alienation" to an end, is in reality 
23 
a reaffirmation of the estrangement of man and of nature. 
That Hegel started from the estrangement of substance or the fin- 
ite was important. Fort in logical terms he began not'with the 
finite but with the infinite. Theologically speaking this is 
begin with God. Hegel then supersedes the infinite and posits 
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the actual or the finite. The final movement of the dialectic, 
the negation of the negation, is, however,, the supersession of the 
finite and a restoration of the infinite through the'self-negation 
of the finite. Feuerbach regards Hegel's negation of the negation 
as a contradiction of philosophy with itself since it supersedes 
the infinite in its first movement only to re-ihstate it'in'its 
final conclusion. If the absolute remains a self-estrang6ment 
of man and nature, as Feuerbach maintainedr then'Hegel's negation 
of the negation does not truly eradicate alienation. On the ý 
contrary, it reaffirms the self-estrangement of man and nature in 
its final movement, and does not trouble the existence o'f*humdn ali- 
enatign, which 15 masked by the forms of religion and of idealist 
philosophy. The conditions of human self-estrangement are re- 
affirmed in Hegel's dialectical logic. So the task*of philosophy, 
according to Feuerbach, was to overcome this self-estrangemeht by 
returning the estranged properties expressed in religion and 
philosophy to the finite being of man and of nature. 
Feuerbach conceives of rian and nature as-realities in their 
own right - grounded in-themselves. For Marx, I precisely this, an 
abstract conception of nature and manj can be held responsible 
for Feuerbach's failure to understand how man and -nature are 
historically related, and accordinglyr Marx criticises Feuerbach's 
materialism for its lack of an historical dimension. 
24 
Feuerbach, 
Marx claims, conceives reality only "in the form'of object or of i 
contemplation. , 
25 
-In the "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts",, 
ý, 
Marx argues that as far as history 'is concerned oneshould regard 
nature not only as a material pre-condition of "real objectifica- 
tion",, but also as its historical result. Hence, through his 
development of social production, man increasingly masters nature 
by transforming its "estranged" form (estranged that is, from man) 
Gar. - 
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so that it might become suitable for the production of objects 
26 
nurtured or designed for human consumption. Although nature 
still exists as an objective realm, as far as history is concerned, 
one should understand it as an interdependent element in historic 
socio-productive totalities. Feuerbach's materialism, by separa- 
ting nature from human activity, fails to show in the act'of 
social production the necessary mediation of man and nature. To 
isolate either man from nature or nature from man, is to abstract 
them both from the productive process in which they are united. - 
If history consists, as Marx maintained, in the development of 
forms of social production, then the abstraction of man and nature 
from the productive process is bound to lead to an ahistoricity 
in Feuerbach's humanism as well as in his materialism. This is 
indeed the case. For example, Feuerbach overcomes religious ' 
alienation by resolving the religious essence back into the "human 
essence". But if this "human essence" is anything beyond an 
abstraction inherent in each individual, it must be, as Marx 
observes, "the ensemble of social relations. , 
27 There is, in 
Feuerbach's humanism, an inversion'of the historical process; he 
explicates social development with reference to a set of human 
attributes which are, in reality, results of the process they 
purport to explain. Feuerbach's supra-historical conception of 
man and nature, unsurprisingly, does not possess sufficient 
resources for a methodologically acceptable means of understanding 
historical development, because it must always abstract a factor 
from the social totality and transform it into an immanent explana- 
tory principle of the whole. Marx states, 
"This doctrine must divide society into two parts, one of 
which is superior to society. , 
28 
! Mt- 
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Feuerbach's humanism and his materialism remain, isolated,, 
detatched principles, incapable of arriving at an historical under-ý 
standing of socialldevelopment.. Marx argues that, 
.. '. 'as far as Feuerbach 
is a materialist he-does, not, deal with 
history and as far as he considers history he is not, a materialist, 
with him materialism and history diverge completely. 
29 
Even though Feuerbach singularly failed to base the under- 
standing of man or nature on scientific principles, his importance 
in the historical materialism is unquestionable, and should not be 
underrated. Marx. only began to transform, Hegells insights into 
social development after he had brushed away the rubble of dialec- 
tical logic; and there is no doubt his efforts in this direction 
were significantly guided by the critique developed previously by 
Ludwig Feuerbach. 
3.3 FROM REALISM TO HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 
Marx's critique of the Hegelian dialectic, although super- 
ficially similar to Feuerbach's, differs fundamentally in, stressingl 
the positive contribution of, Hegells philosophy to an understanding 
of history. Marx concurs with Feuerbach in believing Hegelian 
philosophy incapable of generating a genuine criticism of reality. 
Marx perceived that if all ofl"reality" is the self-estrangement 
or alienation of absolute mind, then being a divine objectification,, 
30 it is vindicated because it is beyond criticism. In addition 
if the finite world is always grasped not in, its own terms - the 
principle of realism - but rather only in relation to the "other" ýf 
i. e., the infinite, the principle of idealism then there can be 
no critical analysis of its, development. For this reason Marx 
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sees a logical connection between Hegel's acritical idealism which 
forms the premise of his philosophy and the acritical positivism 
which is its necessary counterpart and result. Marx claimsýof 
the "Phenomenology of Mind" that inj, "the uncritical positivism 
and equally uncritical idealism of Hegel's later works, the philo- 
sophical dissolution and restoration of the empirical worldIs 
already to be found in latent form, in embryo, as a'potentiality 
and secret. , 
31 
In order to achieve a critical understanding of historyl and 
a genuine supersession of "alienation",, it is necessary to begin 
by developing a-method whereby one can'grasp social development 
as a real process in-itself. In developing such a conception of- 
history, Marx attempts to transform-the "estranged" discoveries- 
of Hegel's dialectic so as to make them conpatible-with the 
principles of scientific inquiry. 
Marx emphasised two fundamental and interrelated points about 
Hegel's philosophy. First, it contains an estranged-insight into 
history as the development of social production'or, inýthe term- 
inology of the "Manuscripts",, "real objectification. " Marx 
claims 4* that Hegel's dialectic, " is the'estranged insight 
into the real objectification of mant into the real appropriation 
of his objective being through the destruction of the estranged 
character of the objective world through the supersession of its 
estranged mode of existence. , 
32 Secondlyr Hegel's estranged 
discovery of the process of real objectification conceives of 
this development as one characterised by dialectical contradic- 
33 tion. This analysis, I shall arguer forshadows in certain 
ways Marx's own understanding of the mechanisms of social change 
which are conceived as operating historically through the re- 
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production and development of contradictions"between the social' 
forces and relations of production. ' Before providing'textual 
support for my claims, I intend to-demonstrate the existence of 
these "estranged'insights" in Hegel's philosophy. 
In 3.1 1 analysed the general principles of Hegel's absolute 
idealism and tried to emphasise the logical unity of his philosophy. 
In this section, I intend to analyse some of the most important 
insights Hegel achieved into the historical process. These are, I 
believe, expressed'principally in Hegel's-analysis in the "Pheno- 
menology of Mind",, of forms of consciousness,, and they are given a 
classical exposition in his analysis of the'relationship between 
Herr and Knecht (variously translated-r-laster/slave, Lord/bondsman 
etc. ) 
34 As far as Hegel is concerned, however,, -the Herr/Knecht 
relationship is merely , one stage in the development of a true ' 
self-consciousness brought about by absolute Mind's' negation of 
forms of consciousness not appropriate to itself. ''The relation- 
ship is analysed, therefore'l as part of the general Hegelian 
dialectic outlined in 3.1. Hegel's "Phenomenology, of Mind",, 
merely elucidates this dialectic with respect of the development 
of consciousness rather than of nature. Marx describes the move- 
ment of Hegel's dialectic in this'analysis in'the following terms. 
He statest 
"Finally mind, whiých is thought returning toý'its birth place 
and which in anthropological, phenomenologicalt psychological, 
moral, artistic-religious mind is not valid for itself until it 
0 finally discovers and'affirms itself as absolute knowledge' and 
therefore as absolute -ie- abstract mind, receives its conscious 
and appropriate existence. , 
35 
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The "Phenomenology of Mind" is the pinnacle of Hegel's philo- 
sophy. because the dialectic outlined in the "Science of Logic" at 
last realises its true destiny viz absolute knowledge or a true 
self-consciousness. Although this is a philosophical achievement, 
Hegel presented it as a, necessary result brought about by the 
dialectic of absolute mind. 
one condition for the existence of self-consciousness, Hegel 
argues in the "Phenomenology of Mind", is recognition by another. 
He claims this struggle for recognition motivates a life, and death 
contest between combatants. Hegel notes that if one party, happens 
to eliminate the other then the survivor would fail to achieve 
recognition; he would be robbed of his vIctory in the moment of 
his triumph ("abstract negation").. 
36 The initial life and death. 
struggle, to circumvent this danger4is resolvpd, in a manner which 
preserves the existence of both parties. By forcing, the vanquished 
to recognise the victor's superiority. and power to determine 
whether he, the defeated party, should live or die,, the victor 
attains recognition. At this point, when the. victor forces the 
vanquished into slavery the Herr/Knecht relationship emerges. 
The opposition. between the Herr andthe Knecht is from its 
inception one of dialectical contradiction. 
-,, 
ýeither the Herr nor 
the Knecht can be defined in isolation and yet-they stand ina 
relationship of opposition. This, relationship, of opposition is 
double or reciprocal because any change, in either term would , 
pnacipitate a change in the other and,, vice versa. The liberation 
of the Knecht would not only, free the Knecht but would also end 
masterhood and terminate the Herr/Knecht relation. Thus# the 
opposition forms a dialectical totality 'IX" which is the unity 
of the relationship of Opposition. 
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According to Hegel this relationship is inherently unstable 
and, as such, is only a single step towards the development of, a 
true-self consciousness. The Herr, so Hegel continued, strives to 
attain a consciousness of himself as an independent being, but 
his consciousness is limited because qua'Herr he cannot attain a 
consciousness which does not involve a reference to the Knecht. 
The connection between the Herr and Knecht isp in the first 
instance, simply one of domination and subordination. The Herr 
dominates the Knecht and forces him to serve his needs through 
the act of service ie production. The Knecht is forced intoý 
labour by the Herr who threatens to eliminate him if he refuses 
to subordinate his activity to the Herr's wishes. This inter- 
personal relation of domination and subordination-compels the 
slave to establish a relationship of production with nature. How- 
evert once this state of affairs is established, the reproduction 
of the Herr's self-consciousness depends on the Knecht's service, 
since the Herr can only perpetuate his existence as Herr insofar 
as he is able to appropriate the products of the Knecht's labour. 
The interpersonal relationship is, consequently, mediated by the 
relationship to nature,, in the same way as the relationship of 
production is mediated by the interpersonal relationship. The 
Herr/Knecht opposition forms a dialectical totality in which the 
interpersonal relationship determines the Knecht's productive 
activity, but where in turnýthe labour of the Knecht determines 
the reproduction of the relation between Herr and Knecht. Inter- 
personal and productive relationships are indissolubly fused in 
the Herr/Knecht opposition. The mediation of production through 
the relationship and of the relationship through production takes 
place only in the context of the dialectical unity of the whole 
which explicitly prohibits a dualistic separation of the produc- 
tivd from the interpersonal relationship. 
I 
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I have shown already how Hegel noted that one precondition 
for the development of a true self-consciousness is the recogni- 
tion of one self-consciousness by another. But in the Herr's 
case the consciousness is false because although he is recognised 
by the Knecht, he is unaware of this recognition since lie does 
not recognise the Knecht as a sel f-consciousness. The Knecht is 
merely a means for the production of the objects necessary for 
the Herr's survival. The Herr's consciousness is false because,, 
"for recognition proper there is needed the moment when what 
the master does to the other he should also do for himself, and 
what the bondsman does to himself, he should do to the other 
, 37 also. However, the Herr cannot recognise the Knecht as an 
equal self-consciousness or achieve recognition himself until the 
Knecht ceases to be a Knecht, but in such an eventuality the Herr 
ceases to be a Herr. A true self-consciousness can only be 
achieved through the destruction of the Herr/Knecht relationship. 
Hegel recognises that the Herr is doomed to false-conscious- 
ness and lacks the possibility of development. The true self- 
consciousness must be developed by the Knecht. It appears, at 
firsti, "outside itself"j, that is in the Herr/Knecht relationship 
which it eventually supersedes. The Knecht is forced to recognise 
another self-consciousness in the person of the Herr, without 
in turn being recognised by the Herr. The Knecht must achieve 
recognition, and this he can only do by dissolving the Herr/Knecht 
relationship. 
According to Hegel, two aspects of the Herr/Knecht opposition 
help the Knecht realise his aspirations. The Knecht lives in fear 
of death because the Herrr at all times, holds the Knecht's life 
at his disposal. The fear of death shakes the Knecht out of his 
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particularr secular existence and forces him to contemplate the 
universal, whereas the Herr, who is comfortably assured of his 
existence,, lacks the impetus to think beyond his everyday-life. 
Secondly, the Knecht is forced into servitude. This thrusts. him 
into an immediate relation with nature. The Knecht must overcome 
the alien nature of the objective world and transform it by his 
labour into an objectification of his own consciousness. Nature 
must be, transformed and superseded by the Knecht's labour before he" 
can satisfy his own, wants as well as those, of the master. Work 
stimulates a change in the Knecht's self-consciousness because he 
gradually sees, in his own objectification, a reflection of him- 
self as a universal being. The Knecht's self-recognition comple- 
ments the recognition he is compelled to give the Herr. He needs 
only to achieve recognition by another self-consciousness to 
develop a true consciousness of himself as a universal being or 
as absolute mind. The condition for the Knecht to achieve this, 
consciousness is the dissolution of the Herr/Knecht relationship; 
he has to liberate himself-from his consciousness of being Knecht 
and, at the same time, end masterhood and the consciousness it 
generates. The Knecht ceases to be a Knecht and the Herr-ceases 
to be a Herr;, they supersede-the dialectical totality 11X11 which 
they previously constituted. A new relation based on mutual 
recognition is established. If the supersession is genuine, then 
it can only be founded on an interpersonal and productive relation 
between. equals who recognise in the other a true reflection of 
their equality as universal beings. 
The dialectical totality constituted by the Herr/Knecht 
relationship, *in Hegelian terminology, supersedes itself in the 
dialectical process of the coming-to-be of absolute mind. Both. 
the interpersonal and the productive aspects of the relationship 
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are essential parts of this development. -Hence, fear of, death, 
which expresses, the interpersonal aspect-,,, and service'l which 
encompasses the productive element, are indispensible moments in 
the realisation of a true self-consciousness. 
38 Without the 
fear, of death, service would only result in a vain and futile 
consciousness incapacitated except in its attitude of bondage. 
The fear, of death without the necessity of service would be merely 
formal and not all encompassingý Both elements are-required for 
the dialectical supersession of the master/slave relation. 
One can see in this exposition of Hegel's analysis of forms 
of consciousness an "estranged" discovery of history as a con- 
tradictory or dialectical development of forms of social produc- 
tion. It should be evident in my analysis of the-Herr/Knecht 
relationship, that the relationship of consciousness depended on 
the interpersonal relationship of domination and subordination and 
that this, in turn, depended on the Knecht's productive relation- 
ship with nature. In additiony all these aspects of the relation- 
ship formed elements of a totality constituted by the Herr/Knecht 
opposition. In the-context of Marx's understanding of history, 
such a totality, in, which forms of consciousnessi, social, -relations 
and relations of Production exist as interdependent elements, 
would be termed a socio-economic formation. This isf however, to 
run momentarily ahead of my argument. At this, stagey I wish 
merely to emphasise that-Hegel's philosophy contains not-only, 
the estranged'discovery that history consists in-the development 
of social productiont but also the simultaneous, insight into the 
mechanism of development through contradiction which governs the 
reproduction of. socio-productive totalities and their transitions 
into new forris. 
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The purpose of Hegel's analysis, which is confined to an- 
examination of forms of consciousness, is not to establish scien- 
tific principles for the study of history, but to explicate the- 
process whereby absolute ftnd becomes conscious of itself as, the 
subject of the dialectical development of nature and history. The 
insights into history contained in Hegel's philosophy must be re- 
interpreted and, as they stand, cannot-further the cause of a,. 
science of history. On the contraryr they merely illustrate 
certain aspects of Hegel's absolute idealism. It is for this 
reason that Marx emphasises that Hegel discovers only the specula- 
tive i. e., metaphysical expression of the movement of history and 
not yet its real movement. He states, 
"But since he conceives the, negation of the negation from 
the aspect of the positive relation contained within it as the 
true and only positive and from the aspect of the negative rela- 
tion contained within it as the only true act and self-realising 
act of all beingr Hegel has merely discovered the abstractp logical 
speculative expression of the movement of history. This movement 
of history is not yet the real history of man as a given subject, 
it, is simply the process of his creation, the history of his 
emergence. , 
39 
It was Marx's intention, however, to achieve a critical 
understanding of the real movement of history. This unavoidably 
involved a scientific transformation of the estranged insights of 
Hegelian philosophy. And, indeed, I shall argue in the next 
chapter that just such a transformation is evident in Marx's work 
if one interprets historical materialism. as. a dialectico-causal 
science. 
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Chapter 4. COLLETTI AND ALTHUSSER ON MARXISM AND CONTRADICTION 
In the last section of Chapter 31 1 suggested that a dialectico- 
causal conception of history is a logical outcome of a-scientific 
approach to the development of a theory of social change. I 
intend to substantiate this thesis in Chapter S. In this chapter, 
howeverr I wish to demonstrate how alternative interpretations of 
Marx's methodology expounded by Colletti and Althusserr which 
begin from distinctly non-realist positions in epistemologyr fail 
to develop a scientific interpretation of-Marxism and its distinc- 
tive notion of a causal process which develops through 11contradic- 
tion. 11 
4.1 COLLETTI ON MARXISM AND CONTRADICTION 
Colletti. in a'recent article on the Marxist notion of con- 
tradiction, attempts to make a fundamental distinction between 
an Hegelian idea of dialectical oppos"itionj, which is evidently 
inconsistent with classical logic and science, and the Kantian 
notion of contrariety or real opposition which "does not violate 
the principles of identity and (non) - contradiction and hence 
is compatible with formal logic. " 
1 Collettils discussion begins 
with Kant's analysis of real and logical contradiction. 
According to Collettir Kant distinguished between two types 
of opposition. Oppositions areg, "either logical,, involving con- 
tradiction (durch den Widerspruch), or real ie. devoid of con- 
tradiction (ohne Widerspruch). " 2 Colletti, argues that Hegel's 
formula for dialectical contradiction is identical with the 
formula for logical contradiction: a compound statement which 
asserts one thing to be true and at the same'time denies its truth 
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cannot be true. Colletti concludes thatj since relationships of 
dialectical contradiction imply the truth of contradictory state- 
ments about the world, the notion of dialectical contradiction must 
3 be logically absurd. Dialectical contradictions aref in realityv 
a logical impossibility. For science to avoid such absurdities, 
insofar as it is involved in the study of contradictions at all,, 
these must be instances of real rather than Hegelian dialectical 
4 
opposition. It is important to be aware of"the nature of real 
oppositions, and I will now deal with them in detail. 
Colletti maintains the relation of contrariety or real opp'osi- 
tion is expressed in the formula "A and B" where ea'ch of the 
opposites is "real and positive. " There is no relation of dialec- 
tical contradiction involved; rather, 
"Each of the opposites is real and positive. Each subsists 
for itself. Since,, to beitselff each has no need to be referred 
to the other, we have here a'case of a relation of mutual repul- 
sion. This is an exclusive opposition, instead of an inclusive 
opposition. Thust just as before we spoke of the attraction of 
opposites', here we must speak of mutual repugnance or Real'r'e'pug- 
nanz. 11 
5 
Real oppositions always involve relationships between positive 
forces which can be defined'independently. If these forces 
through their mutual opposition annul each other, this will not 
be negation in the Hegelian sense. Rather Colletti maintains 
that, 
"The negation which each exerts on the other consists only in 
the-fact-'that they mutually annul their effects. Briefly, in a 
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real opposition or relation of contrariety (Gegenverhaltnis), the 
extremes are both positive, -even when one-of them is indicated as 
,, 6 the negative contrary of the other. 
A good example of the sort of relationship Colletti has in 
mind would be the opposition brought about by the collision of 
billiard balls. In this instance of oppositionj each ball could 
be defined in terms of its own mass and velocity prior to the 
collision with the, other ball. The ensuing clash of billiard balls 
would be a case of mutual repulsion calculable in terms of the 
respective mass and velocity of each ball. The understanding of 
this sort of opposition would not depend on a notion of dialectical 
interdependence and opposition)since this'event can be grasped 
entirely by a knowledge of the, individual mass and velocity pro- 
perties of the two balls involved'in the collision. 'The under- 
standing of the properties of one ball does not depend on a know- 
ledge of the properties of the other. Clearly, relationships of 
real opposition do not require the conceptual interdependence 
suggested by a dialectical account of opposition. "In the case, of 
opposition between billiard balls, "negation" is evidently absolved 
of the, need to refer to the supposedly "non-being" of a given 
object. - And, hence, with respect to Hegelian contradiction,, ' Colletti 
can conclude, 
.. "there do not exist things which are negative in themselves,, 
i. e. things which are negations in general, and hence non-being 
as far as their inner constitution is-concerned. Whatever negates 
or annuls the consequences of something is itself-a "positive 
cause". So-called negative quantities are 'not a negation of quan-- 
tity; in other words they are notmon-quantity and hence non-being 
or absolute nothingness. Thingst objectsi, factual data are all 
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positive, i. e. existing and real, elements. The things which in 
mathematics are called negative quantities are, in themselves, 
positive quantities, even when they carry the minus sign. ,7 
In the context of such an analysis of contradiction, it is 
obvious that Colletti should draw the conclusion he does: that in- 
sofar as Marx is a scientist, he must study real oppositions rather 
than dialectical contradictions. I will discuss this interpreta- 
tion of Marx's theory below, after I have clarified my criticisms 
of Collettils treatment of the problem of contradiction in Marxist 
science. 
Collettils discussion of contradiction is theoretically con- 
strained by his underlying Kantianism which stops him conceiving 
of the possibility of, a notion of dialectical opposition which is 
neither Hegelian nor an instance of logical contradiction. I 
intend to call this distinct concept of contradiction dialectical 
opposition proper, in order to distinguish it from the Hegelian 
notion of contradiction and the Kantian notion of contrariety. 
(During the remainder of this discussion, whenever I mention 
dialectical oppositionl-I intend to refer to my concept, not 
Hegel's). In additionj the concept I employ refers not to logical 
statements asserting one thing and-its contradictory, but rather 
to relationships between interdependent yet opposing elements 
or forces in the world. 
The conceptual interdependence 
_required 
in theory to, explicate 
these sort of relationships occur in a variety of guises; so I need, at 
this point,, to distinguish between them and the concept I am concentra- 
ting on here, dialectical opposition. In the first place I do not 
warýt to confuse dialectical opposition with functional inter- 
dependence, as has been worked out by structural func- 
-- 
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tionalistst since this is tied to an ahistorical notion of the 
social whole and a mechanistic'idea of causality. 
8 The second 
distinction is less painstakingly worked through. Certain natural 
processes might well be best described in terms of such a concep- 
tual opposition, as, perhapsp the relationship of germs to the 
healthy organism. Given that they can be so described, it could 
then also be asked whether or not they require explanation by a 
conception of causality analogous to the one I ascriber in sub- 
sequent chapters, to Marx. 
9 However, these are'further questions,, 
which I do not intend'to examine here. Be that'as_it may,? there 
is no reason why such relationships, if they do exist, should not 
be analysed by scientists since they do not violate, as the Hege- 
lian notion unhappily didr the principles of classical logic. 
I have said already that Collettils Kantianism'prevents him 
from considering even'the possibility 'of developing this sort of 
notion of dialectical opposition. The reasons for this are the 
following. In the Kantian system there can be no category of 
dialectical opposition because such'a category apparently under-- 
mines the principle of non-contradiction and consequently the in- 
ternal coherence of a-system of categories based on the principles 
of classical logic. If the categories., of the understanding play'' 
an indispensable role in producing the objective world of phenomena, 
then it follows that the absence of a category'of dialectical 
contradiction necessarily implies' that these dialectically opposed 
relationships cannot exist'. From this philosophical standpoint,, 
it would not be possible to develop a notion of dialectical opposi- 
tion which did not automatically imply a commitment to a dialec- 
tical logic of the'type -developed by Hegel; This, as I have noted 
above, would involve the dissolution of Kant's epistemology. An 
acceptance of Kantian philosophy, therefore, necessarily implies 
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the rejection of the notion of dialectical opposition proper as 
well as the legitimately proscribed Hegelian-dialectic. The same 
conclusion will follow from any philosophical viewpoint whose 
conceptual structure committed it,, to a mechanistic causality. 
10 
Only the Kantian version is, -rigo2r ously discussed here. It should 
not be-assumed that dialectical oppositions fail to exist just 
because they, are outlawed by a Kantian system of categories. The 
a priori exclusion of such relationships from the world only 
follows if it is assumed that the principles suggested by Kantian 
concepts for the structure of statements in argument are ipso facto 
correctly characteristic of the relations between things and 
people in the world. Given that they are, relationships of dialec-, 
tical interdependence are conceptually impermissable. If, however, 
one rejects the a priori assimilation of. conditions of existence 
to the combined canons of logic and conceptual scheme and, instead, 
allows that logical truths alone do not predetermine, in isolation 
from a conceptual schemef anything substantive, about the world, 
then one can appreciate that there is no logical reason for the 
exclusion of instances of interdependent yet opposing forces from 
being at work in either nature or history. But a discovery of 
such relationships in the world definitely would not involvea 
commi ent to Hegells, dialectical logic. Hegel himself conceived tým 
of the world in terms of developmental conflicts analogous to the 
kind I investigate; but his most dangerous error, from the view- 
point of this thesis, was to suppose that in order to represent 
them he needed to decimate, classical, logic. 
I, have stressed that there is no a priori reason why relation- 
ships between in+-erdependent yet opposing forces cannot exist in 
the world. On, the other hand, there are good a posteriori reasons 
why one should claim such relationships do exist-- at least with 
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respect to the-understanding of social relationships. The 
existence of such a relationship Of dialectical opposition was# in 
fact# demonstrated in our analysis of the relationship between 
Herr and Knecht. In this,, relationship neither the Herr nor the 
Knecht could be defined without reference to the other and yet, 
they stood in a relationship of, opposition to one another. In 
the circumstancest this relationship could not, be explicated as 
one of contrariety because it would be impossible to define either 
the Herr or the Knecht in isolation from the other. -Rather, each 
term in this relationship is reflected in the expression of the 
other. In the context of this relationship# therefore# an action 
by 'either-party, as Hegel notesp "has itself-the double significance 
of being at once, its own-action and-the action ofýthat other as 
well. " This quotation is not entirely transparentf. and is in 
need of a little clarification. When, for Instancei, the Knecht 
is involved in labourp his actions and their motives. can only be 
adequately descriptivly identified-when some reference to Herr is 
included-within them; in the absence of such factorsýthese actions 
and their motives arej in an extremely important. respectp in- 
complete. In this sense, I thinkjýthe Knecht's actions- though 
not, when strictly considered, the Herr's-actions too - do require 
mention of him before one can be said-to, have fully understood 
them. 
The great, weakness of Hegel's conception. of, the Herr/Knecht 
relationship rests not so muchd-Chl'Canalysis of the relationship as 
one of dialectical opposition, but, rather his assimilation of all 
such relationships to-the contradiction between the finite and 
infinite. If one managed to separate concrete relationships of 
dialectical. opposition-from a dependence on Hegells, absolute idea- 
lismlit would be, possible to expound them as relationships charac- 
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teristic of finite or material processes or relations. This sort 
of transformation is indeed one which I'credited to Marx and have 
already briefly described. This transformation is one which 
Colletti is unable to effect because of his Kantian approach to 
the problem. Colletti believes that to attribute a dialectical 
interpretation to historical materialism is to succumb to logical 
contradictiong yet this is evidently not the case. There is no 
logical contradiction behind the suggestion that Marx Is view of 
social development involves an understanding of history which is 
characterised by the generation and supersession of relationships 
of dialectical opposition between the social forces and relations 
of production in historic socio-economic formations. Whether or 
not such an interpretation of history is justified is a matter to 
be decided by scientific argument based on the practice of histo- 
rical science and not by a, priori, legislation. There are noý- 
logical grounds for rejecting this conception of history so long 
as it is distinguished,, as *_ indeed it can be, from-Hegells dialec- 
tical logic. Rather than rejecting this interpretation of Marxism, 
it would be more logical to reject Collettils apriori exclusion 
of the possibility of relationships of dialectical opposition. 
Once Colletti has rejected a dialectical interpretation of 
opposition as a logical impossibility, it would seem that he must 
have recourse to an interpretation of Marxism based-exclusively 
on relationships of contrariety. If one were to treat the-con- 
tradiction between the forces and relations of production as an 
instance of contrariety, then one would be compelled to define 
them in isolation; and such definition would have to be individuallyý 
consistent and complete. One consequence of this would be, that 
if either the forces or relations were determinant in the process 
Of s' ocial developments, --it would have to be in virtue'of their 
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intrinsic causal properties and not because of their relation to 
the social totality. Possibly one could construct a reciprocal 
model of causation involving relations between the social forces 
and relations of production and also, perhaps, the social whole; 
but, in the final analysis, the ultimate causal role must be 
attributed to one factor'otherwise this interpretation would, but 
in an underhand way, be founded on relations of dialectical rather 
than real opposition. Regardless' of which particuiar factor is 
given this ultimate causal role# the real opposition interpretation 
of Marxism wouldlit seemss, abstract this factor from itSs'Ocial' 
and historical location. This factor would then be held respon- 
sible for its own development as well as for the development Of 
the whole. Society would, as in Feuerbach's philosophy, be divided 
into two partsr one I of which would be supra-social and supra- 
historical. An interpretation of Marxism based on Kant's concep- 
tion of contrariety'does then seem to culminate inevitably in a 
'N I 
crude single factor determinism founded on an'essentially Newtoýqn- 
ian idea of causation. 
Colletti holds back, 'however, from drawing out the I logical 
implications of hisýreal opposition interpretation of 2ýarxls 
notion of contradiction. Indeed, he rejects the idea of atotal 
commitment to contrariety as fundamental to Marxism. While he 
openly declares that relationships of real opposition determine 
social development in pre-capitalist societies, he believes that, 
"The contradictions of capitalism - from the contradiction 
between capital ana wage-labour to all the others - are 
3 no I tj for 
Marx, "real oppositions" (as I too, following Della*Volpe, believed 
until yesterday), i. e. objective but "non-contradictory" OPPOsi- 
tions, but are dialectical contradictions in the full'sense of 
the word. " 12 
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He maintains that only positivist Marxists like KautskYr 
Bernstein and Della Volpe would accept that contrariety renders 
the Marxist concept of contradiction exhaustively. 
13 As far as 
Colletti is concerned, these theorists thereby fail to come to 
terms with the uniqueness of capitalism as a socio-economic forma- 
tion or with'the subtlety of Marx's theoretical position on con- 
tradiction. Colletti develops instead a novel, if contradictory, 
conception, of Marx's dialectic which supposedly combines a con- 
ception of real and dialectical oppositions. He argues that Marx 
the scientist studf6s social change as an undialectical process 
characterised by real oppositions. This leave's him with the 
residual problem of account for the undeniably dialectical compon- 
ent of Marx's theory. Colletti,, ' to substantiate ihisp invents 
Marx the "philosopher" who studies capitalism as a totality 
characterised by dialectical contradictions. 
14 According to 
Colletti, Marx is not mistaken in this intellectual venture, 
because capitalism, unlike other socio-economic formations, is a 
product of fetishism and alienation, and these somehow transform 
real oppositions into dialectical contradictions. 
15 Capitalism 
has to be accorded special status as a society because it is "an 
upside down reality". It is unique in virtue of'combining real 
and dialectical oppositions in a social totality. However, as 
Edgley points outj the relation between these two types of opposi- 
tion must in turn'be either real or dialectical. 
16 If this 
relation of'opposition were ultimately "real"t then Marx's account 
of capitalism would only appear to be dialectical. Colletti in 
this case would be-unabl-b2to develop a- log-i eb lly. -- dons fat erit 
, ol--coherent Acdount 'of -thd, - dialecti I cal element in Marx Is 
theoretical corpus; But if this opposition'were irreducibly and 
truly dialectical, then Marx's theoryt not capitalism, would be 
culpably "contradictory" since Colletti elsewhere argues that 
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dialectical contradictions are logically impossible. 
Colletti faces, therefore, a theoretical dilemma. If he 
continues to insist that capitalism contains dialectical opposi- 
tions, then he would, by sleight of hand, have to accept Hegel's 
dialectical logice a logic he ostensibly rejects. If, alterna- 
tively he finally reduces this relation to one of real oppositionr 
then his treatment of contradiction becomes indistinguishable from 
the positivist Marxism he criticises in Kaut7ýy, Bernstein and 
Della Volpe. His exposition of historical materialism would then 
be doubly inadequate. In its own terms, it would fail to explain 
the apparent uniqueness of capitalism as a socio-economic formation. 
And he would be committing Marxism to-a supra-historical theory of 
social change by ascribing to either the forces or relations of 
productionýan unmediated causal effectiveness. Collettils Kantian 
treatment of contradiction condemns Marxism to an unresolved 
dualism between a Hegelian dialectic, on the one hand, and-a 
Newtonian mechanicism based on relations of contrariety on the 
other. 
Collettils failure to explicate historical materialism as a 
science is heavily ironic in virtue of the-fact that, in the final 
analysis, he falls prey to the very shortcomings he exposes in 
his critique of positivist and Hegelian Marxism. He develops a 
trenchant critique of Hegelian-Marxism,, both-that of Soviet 
Marxism and "diamat" and of Lukacs and the Frankfurt School. 
17 
Yet,,, despite this, his conception-of the dialectical contradictions 
of capitalism is indistinguishable from the Hegelian notion he 
ostensibly rejects. Again, Collettils failure to give an adequate 
account of dialectical contradiction means that his idea of Marx 
the. scientist who studies real oppositions or relations of con- 
82 
trariety, is indistinguishable from the theorists like Kautsky and 
Della Volpe whom he criticises, 
If additional evidence of Colletti's commitment to Kantian 
epistemology is requiredt then it, is provided by his early treat- 
ment of Marx's notion of social causality which predates his 
recent articles on contradiction. According to this interpretation,. 
the uniqueness of Marx's account of causality is to-be found in 
the "Theses on Feuerbach". Colletti argues that in those texts 
Marx discovers that "as a product of objective material causation, 
man is also the beginning of a new causal process opposite to the 
first,, in which the point of departure is. no longer the natural 
environment, but the conceptl-the idea of man the mental project. 1118 
Colletti maintains#, therefore,,, that the process of natural, 
evolution gives rise to a new teleological or, final causality, in 
which the end or intentional goal "determines the efficient cause 
which in turn becomes simply the means to accomplish it9II 
19 
Final causality is uniquely social and does not abolish the 
efficient causality of nature, since natural causality functions 
as the indispensible means whereby man realises the ends of his 
teleological project. -Colletti claims that. I 
..: 'the simultaneity-of these two processes,, each of which is 
the inversion of-the other, but which, together form the "umwalzende 
or revolutionare praxis" referred to in the These Feuerbach" is.. S/ 
the secret and key to-historical materialism in its double aspect 
I 
of causation (materialism) and finality (history). " 
20 
The causality of nature and the finalism of history are ýN 
supposedly linked in social productiont which is both a production 
- 83 - 
of things and a production of social relationships and ideas. If. 
however, efficient causality were dominant, then final causality 
would be illusory because mechanical or naturalistic laws would 
ultimately determine both the ends and means of all human action. 
If, converslyr a truly Kantian and voluntaristic account of final 
causality were adopted - as Weberf for instance, advocated - then 
there could be no real (or in Kantian termsp phenomenal) causality 
involved and one would have to adopt a conception of man as an 
essentially free being who could choose and formulate, without any 
restriction whatever,, the ends and means of his own action. The 
foundation of this freedom would not lie in a knowledge of the 
world; instead it would be founded. on a conception, of --mýLn whose 
essential nature had somehow transcended completely the constraints 
of nature and society. Colletti,,. when discussing revolutionary - 
practice, doesl. not specify in any way the conceptuaLlinks. between 
causality and teleology and hast in-fact, no satisfactory analysis 
of action and its relationship to history. And so his treatment 
of social causality merely reproduces the Kantian dualism analysed 
earlierlin which the, causality of nature is opposed to the freedom 
of man as a noumenal subject. 
II 
have shown already, in the context of Weber's methodology,, 
how the voluntaristic assumption is neither tenable on, its own, 
ground norf even if it were, would it be able to form*the founda- 
21 tion for any sort of scientific,. inquiry into history, If, on 
the other hand, one. were. to develop the, mechanistic or naturalistic 
side of Colletti's account of social causality, then one would 
encounter again the supra-historical implications of a real opposi- 
tion account of the causal, relationships analysed, above. In 
short, neither, the mechanistic nor the teleological side of Colletti Is., 
theoryl is capable of providing a foundation for a scientific 
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approach, to the study of, social change. Thus, it is possible to 
regard Collettils opposition between a naturalistic causal pro- 
cess on the one hand, and,, a humanistic voluntarism on the other,, 
as one result of his failure to perceive how man and nature are 
interrelated in a_, unitary dialectico-causal process. It is appa- 
rent that Collettils exposition of Marxism does no more than oppose 
and occasionally "combine" an essentially Hegelian notion of con- 
tradiction and a Kantianism which is sometimes based on contrariety 
and at other, times on Kant's voluntaristic account of human. duty. 
What Colletti patently fails to do, however, is to show how Marx 
transformed,, Hegell. s idea of dialectic to the point where it became 
compatible with an historical science. -In virtue of this, sympto- 
matic lacuna in his theory Colletti can best be classified as a 
theorist rooted in an essentially Hegel/Feuerbach problematic, even 
though his treatment of "real opposition", and teleology is mediated 
by his alliegance'to Kantian philosophy rather than to Feuerbach's 
materialism and humanism. -, 
4.2 ALTHUSSER ON MARXISM AND CONTRADICTION 
Althusser's interpretation of Marxism is constrained by an 
epistemology ýqhich is no more, realist than Colletti Is Kantianism. 
In fact, Althusser-tries to pass off a, distinctly idealist posi- .-, 
tion in epistemology-as if it were the essence of Marx's 
"materialism". This can, be demonstrated bya critical exposition 
of Althusser's attempt-: to specify the uniqueness of. Marxist 
epistemology. 
According to Althusser, the uniqueness of Marxist epistemology 
is to be found in an epistemological break which consists in the 
supersession of a philosophical problematic based'on opposition 
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22 between empiricism and idealism. The empiricists, Althusser 
argues, do not r6cognise that knowledge is dependent on theory. 
Reducing the object of knowledge (concrete-in-thought) to the 
supposedly real object (concrete-real)lthey do not realise their 
understanding of the real object is merely a product of underlying 
philosophical assumptions. The idealists, commit the converse 
error of reducing the real object to the object of knowledge. They 
imagine that the theoretical conditions through whichde-) construct 
bkpýc- object of knowledge are also conditions for the existence of 
the real object. Where the novelty of Marx's epistemology lies 
is in its avoidance of either of these reductive paths: it can 
recognise the cognitive relationships of science to be based on a 
23 dualism between thought and reality. 
In my realist theory of science the, method of anomaly genera- 
tion and supersession provides the necessary link between an in- 
depende nt object and a the ory de I pendent object of knowledge 
?4 But 
Althusser does not specify any such a link. He assumes science 
can succeed in appropriating an independent object through the 
mechanism of 
ihe knowledge effect" without ever specifying the 
25 
nature of this mechanism. His account of the theoretical 
practice Of historical materialism helps to explain why he con- 
siders it unnecessary to account for this "mechanism". Theoretical 
practice,, the practice of a science, transforms a given raw material 
into a determinate product through an act of labour or transforma- 
tion which employs determinate methods. The crucial moment of any 
practice whether economic-, political, ideological or theoretical - 
is the labour of transformation. Althusser claims, 
"In any practice thus'conceived, the determinate moment (or 
element) is neither the raw material nor the product, but the 
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practice in the narrow sense: the moment of the labour of trans- 
formation itselff which sets to work, in a specific structure, 
meni, means, and a technical method of utilising the means. , 
26 
The specific product of theoretical practice is supposedly 
the knowledge-effect. In the case of historical materialismr 
the knowledge-effect achieves a knowledge of the society-effect 
which, in turnt is produced by the other practices: material pro- 
duction which transforms raw materials into use-values, political 
practice which transforms old social relations into new ones, and 
ideological production which transforms old into new ideas. The 
veracity of historical materialism is guaranteed, not by an under- 
standing of the world through developing theories in response-to 
anomalies, as in our theory of sciencer but, as Glucksmann per- 
ceives, by the homology of the logic of productions as productions? 
The conditions pertaining to the construction of the objects of 
knowledge of the science are "quite simply" conditions which also 
apply to the existence of the social whole! Althusser claims, 
"We can set out the "presuppositions" for the theoretical 
knowledge of them (productions) which are quite simply the 
conditions of their historical existence, , 
28 
The correspondence between the theory of historical 
materialism and. the real object is established therefore by the 
structure of the different practices as productions. Glucksmann 
notes that "the articulation of production determines both the 
order of nowledge and the order of the real. " 
29 
The homology of productions assumption, implies that the - 
categories of theory can be projected as existential conditions 
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of the real-object. The supposed dualism between thought and 
reality dissolves into a realm which is exclusively determined 
by theory. Althusser's epistemology seems to be based on an im- 
plicit transcendentalism which assumes an essential homology be- 
tween the order of theory and the order of the real. This assump- 
tion is partly Kantian in both its spirit and form, since it 
appears that production "determines" theory - "in the last instance" 
- only to be, in turn, reduced to a sub-category of theory. This 
is also a recrudescence -of a form of the coherence theory of truth; 
and an additional source for this may well be Spinoza, whom 
Althusser frequently quotes and leans on with a somewhat irres- 
ponsible eclecticism; but is is not my purpose to enter this area 
of aetiology. Sufficient to sayl many of the familiar difficulties 
coherence theories of trtith face., must be born by this variant. Not 
the least being that, in an important sense, coherence theories 
give up all notion of reliance on a world,. And this is what I 
endeavour to expose. 
If one were to accept Althusser's account of the knowledge 
effectr it is theory - and theory alone - which determines the 
conditions for the existence of the real object. Instead of theory 
being conceived as a moment in the development'Of historyothis 
philosophical idealism has the consequence that history becomes 
30 
a moment in the elaboration of theory! This is far from being 
the only significant conse'quence Once it is acce I pted that the 
categories of theory produce historical reality as well as the 
theories which study it, then, if this reality is to be contradic- 
toryi the theoretical categorie's must include one of dialectical 
contradiction. One-is led to, a"now familiar theoretical dilemma. 
Either the system ofcategor'ie's is dissolved by the'category"'of 
dialýctical contradiction a la Hegel, or else the categories remain 
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a coherent structure, but can only do so insofar as they prohibit 
not only an Hegelian notion of contradiction, but also the quite 
separate idea of dialectical opposition. It is possible to trace 
first one side of this dilemma and then the other in Althusser's 
account of the materialist dialectic and in his explication of 
the specificity of historical materialism. 
Althusser develops his accountlof Marxist epistemology in his 
attempt to explicate the nature of the materialist dialectic. 
31 
Thereo, he distinguishes between three levels of theory: theory may 
be a theoretical practice of a scientific character; the theore- 
tical system of a real science - its basic concepts; ort at the 
highest level of abstractiony the theory of theoretical practice. 
The materialist dialectic (the general theory of theoretical 
practice) expresses "the essence of theoretical practice in general 
and through it the essence of the transformations of the "develop- 
ment" of things in general. 
32 
1. 
At the level of epistemology, dialectical materialism must 
embody a philosophical consciousness of the break from the 
idealist/empiricist controversy, a break which is a. supposed 
general condition of theoretical practice. However, it is also 
apparent that Althusser's exposition of the materialist dialectic 
has metaphysical implications. Althusser assumes reality to be 
"dialectical", in advance of the results, of the empirical sciences. 
It may be the case that natural scientists, like historical 
scientists unearth cases of dialectical oppositions which do not 
contradict the-law of, the non-contradiction; even so there is an 
evident distinction here-between asserting reality to be con- 
tradictory in an a priori manner -a notion leading to an Hegelian,. 
logic and the destruction of science - and pointing to the 
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a posteriori results- of empirical science. Hencer when Althusser 
blandly asserts that the empirical sciences study the contradiction 
in the essence of every object, he seems to relapse into a Hegelian 
metaphysic-which regards all "reality" a's contradictory. In facto, 
Althusser's fo I rmulation I of the materialist dialectic is'reminis'' 
cent of Hegells'statement which claimed "everything is inherently 
contradictory, and in''the sense that this law in contrast to the 
others expresses-rather the truth and the essential nature of 
things. " 
33 
Althusser's notion of dialectic,, it seemso, ' owes more to 
Hegelian'idealism than-it does-to any of-the'scientific I aspirations 
of Marxist th*ought. Be that a's it mayp having arrived at this 
paradoxically Hegelian 'interpretation of the I "materialist" dialec- 
tic'at the most abstract level of his supposedly'm I ateri'alist 
philosophy, Althusser proceeds to purge historical materialism 
of any sort of concept of'developmentý through"con'tradiction. In 
fact, one encounters'ohce again the opposition'between I an. Hegelian 
dialectic expressed here in Althusser's exposition of dialectical 
materialism - and a real opposition or"me-chanistic conception of 
causal . it Iy --evident. in Althusser's notion of "overdetermination". 
Although the "materialist" dialectic sUp'posedly defends' 
historical materialism as a science among sciences', it does not 
spe'cify, the uniq'ue'ness . of Mariism. Althusser claims'that uni4u'e- 
ness of historicalrriaterialism can only be'underst'ood once one 
has grasped the nature of Marx's epistemologi6al break from H'egel 
and Feuerbach. '' 
34, 'A6cording to Althusser,, 'at some stage of his'- 
intelle'ctlu'al dev61op"ment, Marx succeeded in distinguishing his 
theory fr6in a "Feiu'erbachianýhumanism" and an "Heg'elian-historicism" 
Mari then r-ecognised"that history'could neither'-be explained 
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through an abstract set of human attributes (Feuerbach), nor on the 
basis of a simple linear process (Hegel). Althusser maintains 
rather that, for Marx,, "there is no history in general, but only 
specific structures of historicityr based in the last resort on 
specific structures of the different modes of production. , 
35 The 
methodological task is to explain how relationships of social 
causality operate through specific structures of historicity in a 
complex totality. 
Althusser attempts to expound this uniquely Marxist concept 
of causality by specifying a new relationship of determination 
between base and superstructure which supersedes the controversial 
crux ofýeconomic determinism and historical empiricism. He attempts 
to bring within. the scope of his theory simultaneously the dis- 
tinctness and-irreducibility of the ensemble of productions to 
one another, and-the determination of the whole, in the last in- 
stance, by the economy. Althusser seeks to specify "the type of 
dependence which produces relative independence and whose'effects 
we can observe in the histories of the different "levels". , 
36 
This brings us to an analysis of Althusser's notion of contradic- 
tion in a complex totality.. -,,,. 
Althusser distinguishes 
sive totality"An which all 
sofar-as they are all expre 
totality, Althusser argues, 
dominance". 37 One level in 
Marx's totality from Hegel's "expres- 
moments-are of equal importance in- 
ssions, of absolute mind. The. Marxist 
is rather a "complex structured in 
the whole is a.. "dominant instance". 
This dominant-instance appears to govern the relationships, between 
the moments, of the whole. However, this appearance is deceptive 
because the, "dominant instance" is assigned its causal role by 
the^economy; it is the economy which is always determinant, in-the- 
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last-instance. Althusser terms this underlying effectiveness 
that manifests itself in the displaced form of a "dominant in- 
38 
stancell, "overdetermination" . The contradictions of a totality 
are rarely if ever expressed in a simple contradiction between 
the forces and relations of production. On the contraryl this 
contradiction takes on an "overdetermined" character expressed in 
the complex interrelation of the moments of the whole. Althusser 
asserts that the contradictions which are internal to the diffe- 
rent levels reflect this overdetermination of the whole and take 
on an uneven-and overdetermined character. Complex and uneven 
relationships arise between the different productions and between 
the different contradictions expressed in the levels of the 
totality. 
39 Neverthelessr he maintains that "determination-in- 
the-last-instance" remains an invariant property of the totality, 
even if it can only-manifest itself in a hidden form through the 
play of variables of the superstructure which appear to govern 
the whole. His notion of overdetermination can thereby explain 
how the economy-is determinantj, even if this determination-is not 
expressed openly-in the complex totality. 
If Althusser is to reconcileýrelative autonomy and determina- 
tion in-the-last-instance by the economyt then he must, as 
Glucksmann'notes, develop a concept which will testify to'the 
existence of the structure in its effects even in cases where its 
presence is not phenomenally apparent. Althusser discovers such 
a concept in Marx's notion of the "Darstellung". (form or represen- 
tation) which is "the key epistemological concept-whose object is 
to designate the mode of presence of the structure in its effects 
and therefore to designate structural causality itself. ,40 The 
"Darstellung" concept expresses the meaning of the form or represen- 
tatibn of value which appears not directly as an expression of 
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social labourl' but rather in the estranged form of commodity value. 
The "Darstellung" thereby disguises the true nature of value and 
41 
the source of surplus-value in surplus labour. For Althusser 
the "Darstellung" should reveal the nature of structural causality 
in the complex'whole. The Darstellung concept is responsible for 
explaining the process of the self-determination of the reproduc- 
tion of the economy as well'as the economy's determination of the 
42 
reproduction of the whole. However, even when the economy is 
the dominant instance as in capitalism, 'it'does not appear in a 
true form. Glucksmann notes, for instance, that Althusser's 
analysis of the reproduction of the'economy in capitalism ""refers 
us to the absent cause, the relations of production. " But this 
reference is-itself ambiguous'for when the phenomena'manifest 
"the effectiveness of the relations of production" they do so "in 
43 
a specific distortion". " 
Althusser's project renders inconceivable his distinction 
between the true and false appearance of the economy. In pre- 
capitalist societies, the appearance of .1 the economy'is'"false" 
or disguised-because it does not exist as the dominant instance, 
and in'capitalism the fetishism of commodities implies that the 
economy can only ever appear in a distorted form. If, however, 
Althusser fails to account for the self-reproduction of the economy, 
-a seemingly'mechaniStic'th'esis'- the-attempt'to demonstrate the 
determination in-the-last-instance thesis cannot proceed. The 
whole problem is, in'fact,, caused by a deeper. theoretical weakness. 
Althusser attempts to find a priveledged causal: role for the 
economy conceived as material production per se. It is production 
as a separate sphere which supposedly determines'the articulation 
of the moments in the totality. If, -however, production is always 
detdrmined by its relationship to the social totality, then it is 
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absurd to assume it possesses some sort of privelega-t- causal 
role. To do so would be to fall into a real opposition or mechan- 
istic theory of the relationships between the moments of the whole. 
If, therefore, Althusser continues to attribute an ultimate causal 
role to production, his failure is double: the superstructures 
cannot be relatively autonomous since production mechanically 
determines the specific effectiveness of the superstructural levels; 
and, since superstructural levels cannot effect the sphere of 
productionj there can be no non-mechanistic explanation of the 
reproduction of the economy; it stands as a supra-social sphere. 
Determination-in-the-last-instance collapses into a simple form 
of economic determinism. If, on the other hand, Althusser wishes 
to defend the relative autonomy of the superstructures, he can 
only do so by denying the determination in-the-last-instance of 
the base; in the absence of such a denial, the specific effective- 
ness of the superstructures is no more than an epiphenomenal 
expression of an unmediated productive base. In this context the 
defence of relative autonomy would ascribe to the non-productive 
moments an unbridled autonomy unfettered by the economy and would 
be akin to the historical pluralism and''empiricism against which 
Althusser polemicised. 
Althus'Ser attempts to iorge a theoretical link between 
relative autonomy and "determination in-the-last-instance" with 
his concept of structural causality. He ostensibly rejects 
transitive causalityO, which is mechanistic, and also expressive 
causality,, which is teleological', and then claims to have dis- 
covered structural causality which somehow brings together deter- 
44 
mination-in--the-last-inst'ance and relative autonomy. The 
concept of structural causality is used to indicate either the 
presence or absence of the'ultlmatýe`c'ause - which will be'economic 
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of the development of the complex whole. Designating the presence 
or absence of the cause, however, does not provide a foundation 
for reconciling "determination-in-the-last-instance" with relative 
autonomy. On the contrary, the concept not only does nothing to 
resolve this tension, but also fails to provide a foundation for 
any sort of empirical inquiry. Glucksmann observes, therefore, 
that "just because it can say everything itinaugurates no actual, 
type of analysis.; it is possible to-appeal to "correspondence" or 
"non-correspondence", cause or abse nce of cause. ,45 Here Glucks-, 
mann encapsulates the fundamental theoretical weakness of 
Althusser's Marxism. His conceptions of overdetermination, 
structural causality and the complex totality do not serve as 
tools for any sort of scientific analysis. Their fundamental 
purpose is to demonstrate how in every totality the economy is 
ultimately determinant despite appearances to the contrary. This 
is a thesis that can never be established empirically; it has 
nothing whatsoever_, to do with the world. It is impossible first 
of all to define production in isolation from the social totality 
without arriving at an empty ahistorical abstraction. And then, 
even if one took the thesis at its face-value, historical evidence 
shows that oth er factors besides the sphere of_production deter- 
mine social reproduction. Althusser's thesis is entirely metap- 
hysical and without scientific foundation. 
Althusser's concept of overdetermination in the complex 
totality is not a dialectical account of contradiction. On the 
contrary, 
-it 
is still. founded on a relationship of realopposition 
between the economy and the other moments of the whole; one in 
which the economy as an essentially autonomous sphere determines 
the rank and influence of the other moments. However, it is 
evident that, as in Collettils treatment of causality, this mech- 
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anistic conception of the causal relation rests uneasily alongside 
an implicit indeterminism. Whereas with Colletti this indeterminism 
took the form of a voluntarism of the human subjecto in Althusser's 
Marxism, it is expressed in the polarity between a mechanical 
determinism of the economy and an indeterminism of the super- 
structures. Either the economy is wholly determinant and there 
is no relative autonomy, or relative autonomy supersedes the 
determination of the economy. In the latter case, the super- 
structures would be without any causal influence at all since it 
is ultimately the economy and only the economy which assigns the 
other levels their relative autonomy and causal roles. Regardless 
of how this theoreticaldilemma is resolvedf i1thuss'er's Marx - ism 
would fail to provide an adequate theoretical foundation for a 
science of history. 
If Althusser's woýk is"assessed as a wh ole, then it I seems that 
he,, like Colletti, fails to perceive the way in which Marx trans- 
formed the estranged insights of Hegel's philosophy into an inter- 
pretatio n of history. Althýiser_O_ffers' twoconceptions of dialec- 
tical contradiction which'arer in fact, contradictory. Accounting 
for the materialist dialectic1he develops an essentially Hegelian 
conception of the movement of matter in which a contradiction 'is 
ý4 
expressed in the 'essence of-every oloject'. In unresolved tension 
with thislis an explication'of historical mate rialism, like 
Collettils", predominantly founded on a real opposition or mechanis'- 
tic interpretation of "c'o''ntradiction; f. Such - mechanical I reductio'nisu 
can be discovered in Althusser's notions of overdeterminationo,, the 
complex totality'and structural causalitys' One encounters yet 
again the gap between Hegelian dialectics and'a mechanical deter- 
minism (or anindeterminism). Althusser's failure to understand how 
Marx transformed Hegel's philosophyis of paramount importance, 
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since it is the major contention of this thesis that it'is precisely 
this transformation which makes possible the development of an 
historical science. 
4.3 VARIATIONS ON-THE "TTIO-MARX" THESIS 
In the'two, preceding sections5I have put forward the contention 
that the versions of Marxism offered by Colletti and Althusser are 
founded on an implicit contradiction between an Hegelian notion 
of dialectics and an essentially mechanistic idea of science. Now 
I intend to investigate the "two Marx" theses developed by these 
theorists on the basis'of their respective explications of Marxism 
and contradiction. 
Colletti's distinction between Marx the philosopher and Marx 
the scientist presupposes a preliminary account of scientific 
practice. My contention throughout this thesis has been that the 
Kantian philosophyP to which Colletti can be shown to, adhereact- 
ually fails to include an-adequate explication of scientific 
inquiry. The problem-with the Kantian view of science is that the 
categories of theory are. not only responsible for explaining the 
nature of causal processes, but must also and simultaneously-be 
responsible for constituting reality itself! -From this stand-' 
pointf the theories constitutive of science remain responsible, 
only to themselves-and their, particular rules of concept construc- 
tion. To develop the sort of realist account of science I favour, 
where the relation between theory and the world is determined by 
the method of, generating and superseding anomalies, would lie 
outside the locus of such an approach. 'Hencer as Ruben observes 
of Collettils Kantianism, 
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"If our recognition of reality is wholly determined by our 
a priori concepts (and here'in'is supposed to lie Marx's affinity 
with Kant)f then we can give no'description of,, nor justification 
for, our beliefs about the other side-of the supposed duality, 
the determination of thought by being. , 
46 
This sort of position in philosophy culminates in either a 
Kantian transcendentalism or a conventionalist relativism, depend- 
ing on whether'the categories are attributed a socio-conventional 
or transcendental status. Regardless of whichposition Colletti 
espouses here, I have'shown that neither the transcendental or 
conventionalist'variant of Kantian philosophy succeeds in rendering 
scientific'inquiry comprehensible. An evident failure in'this task 
will,, as'a matter of courseF undermine any attempt by Colletti to 
distinguish between a scientific and unscientific Marx. 
Althusse'r', like Colletti,, attempts to distinguish bet-ween a 
scientific Marx viz the mature Marx and the young Marx who is yet 
to achieve*the epistemological break from Hegelian historicism 
and Feuerbachian humanism. This samedichotomy between an ideo- 
logical'pro'61ematic based on historicism and/or humanis , in'and a 
laterr mature scientific Marxism is then deployed by Althusser in 
his exposition and ' defence of the scientificity of historical 
materialis6and his exposure'of "unscientific" Marxism which still 
works, self-consciously orlunwittinglyý, in an ideological proble- 
matic, and'does so'because-it fails to appreciate the sig . nificance 
of the epistemological break. However, the interpretive problems 
associated with establishing the moment at which the mature Marx 
emerged notwithstanding I therels the familiar and prior problem 
of establishing adequate criteria of scientificity. Not that I 
suggest, that a'criterion of the scientific can be established out- 
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side of and prior to the practice of the empirical sciences; but 
from Althusser's epistemological standpoint the only criteria to 
emerge are no more well-founded than those to be found in con- 
ventionalist or positivist accounts. Without such indispensable 
criteria, Althusser would be unable to sustain his distinction 
between scientific and ideological practices and would not justify 
his conception of the epistemological break. From my analysis, 
one can see that Althusser's failure to account for-the mechanism 
of the knowledge-effect by anything beyond the postulation of a 
transcendental unity of the structure of productions in the tota- 
lity, lays at the root, of his failure to, account for the objectivity 
of scientific inquiry. - Above allp he fails to develop an account 
of how scientific theory is subject to any limits in its theorisa- 
tion by real causal processes: the material, -real world is thrown 
away with the bathwater of empiricism. As with Colletti, theory 
is dominantly responsible for determining the, nature of reality as 
well as the for the construction of theories about this constituted 
reality. The consequence of this essentially Kantian approach to 
the problem of'scientific knowledge is that nowhere do adequately 
demarcating criteria occur sufficient to discriminate between 
scientific theory and philosophy or ideology. 
47 All of these 
practices are judged cognitively equal,,, insofar as the theories 
they construct are governed by rules entirely determined by these 
theories themselves rather than#, for'instance, by their capacity 
to generate and supersede anomalies. For this reason, Althusser, 
like Colletti, is unable to sustain any sort of meaningful dis- 
tinction between a scientific and an unscientific Marx. 
My critique of Colletti and Althusser by no means implies 
that an inquiry into the scientificity of Marxism and its formation 
is in any way invalid or inappropriate., On the contraryo, ' one should 
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be alive to the fact that no new science comes into the world 
fully developed and that all sciences may contain elements which 
are ideological. Though one can say, with certainty, that there 
is a significant difference between a theory of the development 
of historical materialism which explicates Marx's success or other- 
wise in founding an historical science, and a theory which, because 
of the polarities of its own problematic, imposes an unsatisfactory 
dualism on Marx's theory in the guise of either a dubious distinc- 
tion between "scientific" and "unscientific" Marxism or an equally 
dubious description of the formation of "scientific" Marxism. The 
"two Marx" theses developed by Althusser and Colletti impose a 
polarity on Marx and Marxism consisting of a dichotomy between an 
Hegelian idea of contradictiont on the one side, and contrariety and 
"real" opposition on the other. This dualism superimposed by their 
own treatment of Marxism, disguises and stands in the way of the 
discovery of any genuine duality in Marx's theoretical work. 
Further, if their distinction between the scientific and non- 
scientific rests on erroneous conceptions of epistemology, then 
the unavoidable and natural conclusion will be that they not only 
mistake the point at which Marx's studies can be said to have 
become rigorously scientifict but that their whole account of 
Marx's development will be shot through with misconceptions. 
Their projected polarity between an Hegelian Marx, who is a 
"philosopher" or "historicist",, and Marx the "scientist" is one 
which arises from a failure to understand how Marx succeeded in 
transforming and recasting Hegelian insights until they became 
compatible with historical science. I have shown how this failure 
is determined, in both casest by a committment to distinctly non- 
realist positions in epistemology. I feelf therefore, that I 
am justified in concluding that whereas a realist position in 
epistemology may help to explain science andf in addition, the 
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scientific nature of historical materialism, the epistemological 
positions adopted by Colletti and Althusser fail to develop 
adequate theoretical accounts in either area. 
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Chap ter HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AS SCIENCE 
The'next stage of my argument involves a demonstration of 
how a dialectico-causal interpretation of historical materialism 
successfully realises Marx's project of understanding history 
in realist terms. I argue that general criteria for any scienti- 
fic theory are met by historical materialism; and then I go on 
to suggest, what is'a far stronger thesisp that onl"y the sort 
of approach advocated here fully measures up to the additional 
and special conditions inherent in historical science. Laterl 
show how such a theory guides the practice of historiography; 
and I do this with special reference to the originsf development 
and demise of socio-economic formations. 
The f irst. problem is metatheoretical: historical materialism 
is shown to possess the form that any well-founded theory of 
history must have. The'second problem is of a more general and 
practical nýture; it answers 'the question-- what are the con- 
sequences of a theory of this form for actual historical analysis? 
Whereas the theory might have the correct formal properties, that 
is to say, be the right kind of th - eory, it'may'still not be the 
correct theory. Only the perspective achieved through an analy 
sis of history in the raw can be of help when answering this 
question: a theory of history which could not lay bare the 
character of its subject matter would be useless. This, of 
course, is a view which is quite the reverse of that taken by 
those who imagine-the actual flesh and blood of history a con- 
1 tamination"of historical theory. Such a position, I believe,, 
is sterile; and all the more so when it is offered in the name 
of Marxist historical materialism. 
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I close the chapter by arguing that the conditions which the 
science of historical'materialism meets are notmet by various 
schools of s'ocial science : viz positivism,, humanism and structural 
functionalism. 
5.1 HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND DIALECTICAL CAUSALITY 
have argued, in the previous chapter, for a concept of 
dialectical opposition which cannot be reduced to Collettils con- 
cept of "real opposition". My conception of the dialectic in- 
volved'the"ided'of'interdependence and opposition - an idea whicht 
although'emphasise'd by Hegel., does not'need to be formulated in 
Hegelian terms. Indeed, it seems to be more convincing to 
suppose that dialectical relationships can be understood in a 
manner which does not violate the logical principle of pon-con- 
tradiction. " Notwithstanding this'conclusiont' the position arrived 
at in my critique of Althusser and Colletti was only a preliminary 
step on the way towards a more'comprehensive, account of the '' 
Marxist niotion of'causality. 
The concept'I believe to be implicit and central in Marx's 
theory involves more than'conceptual interdependence"and opposi- 
tion between a pai-r of people or things or forces: 'dialectical 
relations must not be-limited to'binary relations. Such-a con- 
cept of dialectic must'be capable of expressing 'relations-of 
interdependence'and opposition within a totality a totality 
which is a unit y of many"'mOments". So in this-respect"the'Herr/ 
Knecht example, which I used to illustrate the centralhotion 
behind dial6cticalt relationships, is `L-kioret-ir-ý11ý incomplete 'from 
the standpoint of Marxist historical science. Historical science 
must on'my'interpretation of Marxism - involve holistic explana- 
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tion, explanation in terms of the relati 
I 
onships which subsist 
between the "parts" and the "whole" in a totality; and it must 
also do justice to the dialectical interconnections between 
these parts which constitute that totality. Not only must the 
explanationsIbe holistic in formt they must also be dialectical 
in short, explanations must be dialectically holistic. A theory 
of history must satisfy both of these adequacy conditions. 
At this point I must bringl in an additional qualification. 
The holism, required by a dialect ico-caus al science has nothing to 
do with attempts by "structuralists" or "functionalists" to under- 
stand causal relationships. Indeed, their conception of causal 
relationships between parts and whole seems to violate an impor- 
tant principle of dialectical holism, since they ultimately ascribe 
predominant causal significance to either the whole vis a vis the 
parts or the parts, vis a vis the whole. Even though holistic 
requirements can be'satis, fied if social causality is explicated 
on the basis of relations ofl"contrariety",,, without relationships 
of dialectical opposition, holism can be reconciled with some 
formof mechan, istic"ca, usali, ty,. This is an inadequacy I have 
already diagnosed in Althusser's notion of the Marxist totality 
a notion which eventually succumbs-to almechanistic relationship 
between the economy and the whole or to an indeterminism where 
itlis impossible to. establish any-causallconnecti ons at all.,. 
The same theoretical weakness can be ascribed to Godelier's 
Marxism,, even though Godelier ostensibly claims that he can re- 
concile a dialectical approach to the understanding of capita- 
lism with a structuralist method. 
2 It will prove instructive 
to illustrate this theoretical shortcoming since, at the same 
time, p the logic, al'impossibility of combining a "structuralist" 
and a "dialectical"account of social change can be demonstrated. 
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To elucidate Marx's notion of contradiction on the basis of 
the structuralist assumption of a social totality atomised into 
social structures governed by self-subsistent laws)inevitably 
culminates in a "real opposition" account of'social change 
Godeliert, however, in his account of the contradictory develop- 
ment of capitalism, tries to amalgamate real and dialectical 
opposition. As far as he is concernedy the capitalist mode of 
production !, -consists of two structures, "the forces of production 
and the-relations of production. ý` It'isi possessed by two con- 
tradictions; first, a contradiction internal to the-relations of 
productions structure ies, dialectical''opposition between capita- 
list and wage-labourer; secondly, the contradiction between the 
two structures constituting the mode of production. 
3 The con- 
tradiction between these two structures'can, 'be interpreted as 
one of, either real or dialectical'opposition. '' For Godeliert how- 
ever,, there is no-doubt that, only a-'real opposition 'interpretation 
is consistent with his structuralism, since he maintains'that a'',, ' 
necessary condition*for the overcoming of the contradiction in 
the relations of production depends on the auto-developMent of 
the forces of production structure. He maintains: 
"The relation between the contradictions thus shows that the 
first contradiction does not contain within itself the set of 
conditions-for its solutiono, 'The material'conditions for this'' 
solution can only exist outside it'as the productive forces are ý- 
a reality completely distinct from relations of production and ý' 
irreducible to them,, a-real'ity which, has"its own internal'con- 
,4 tradictions of development and its own, temporality. " 
It is true that"the initial impetus for, the development of 
the'forces' is to be found in the (mechanical) causal influence of 
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the relations structure, but once this initial stimulus has been 
delivered, the forces structure develops according to its own 
laws of evolution and even possesses its "own temporality". 
5 
The "superstructural" conditions for the transition to socialism 
are also generated by laws internal to their structures. 
arguest 
Godelier 
"The other conditions of the solution of the contradiction 
in the relations'of production are found at the level of the 
political, cultural superstructures, and these structures are 
equally'irreducible to the relations of production and have their 
own modalities of development. ,6 
Godelier's whole consists of parts which are essentially 
autonomous, where all'the relations between the discrete structures! 
must be understood on the basis of the relationships of contra- 
riety and not dialectical opposition. This is made crystal clear 
when Godelier blandly asserts: 
of 01o. we must start from the fact that each social stru'cture 
has for Marx its own content and mode of functioning and evolu- 
-,, 7 tion . 
Despite the verbal concessions to Marx's dialectic, Godelier 
develops a mechanistic account of the relationships between parts 
and whole in the totality'. At thiS'stage of my argumentrit will 
be worthwhile to re-emphasise the'point made earlier about 
dialecticb-causality: tfiat'analysis must go beyond explicating 
relationships of oppositions between dialectical partners and 
extend the range of its analysis to encompass relationships 
between all the parts and the whol, e in the totality. In the"ab- 
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sence of such analysis relationships of dialectical opposition 
may occur within structures hermetically sealed, while the whole 
itself, the product of these structures, when combined, may be 
undialectically united and made subordinate to an ahistorical 
mechanism of the type suggested by Godelier's Marxism -a mechan-- 
icism abstracting the elements of the whole from their causal 
interdependence in the totality and hence from their historical 
context. This is reflected in structuralist method by the logical 
priority of "synchroniclllover "diachronic", method ie. 0, structural 
as opposed to historical analysis. Hence, Godelier maintains that 
"the study of'the internal functioning of a structure must pre- 
cede and illuminate the study of its genesis and evolution"# 
8 
as 
if it were possible to arrive at a satisfactory understanding of 
the "structure" of a socio-economic formation, independently of 
direct historical investigation. This is an assumption I challenge 
later, both as an interpretation of the methodology of-social 
science and also. of historical materialism, In the first, place 
it is not possible to claim, as Godelier does, that-his structu- 
ralism has captured-the essence of Marx's dialectic. Now it, may 
well be that contradictions exist between, incompatible "systems" 
and that social scientists should attempt, to, elucidate their . 
nature. Butjýfrom a dialectical point of, view, such a situation 
exists only in the opposition between rival socio-productive 
totalities as in the case of,, --. for examplep capitalism and feuda- 
9 lism and alsoj; perhapsl, capitalism and socialism., The purpose 
of Godelier's theory is not, however, to clarify the articula- 
tion and/or opposition between different socio-economic formations# 
but ratherjýis to reduce the Marxist, notion of a dialectical. 
totality to a structuralist-whole -a whole characterised by 
mechanical relationships between its constitutive and autonomous 
parts. Clearly, Godelier cannot have it both ways:, either, -rela- 
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tionships of dialectical causality subsist between parts and 
whole - in which case''he subscribes to a dialectical analysis 
excluding structuralism; or else only mechanical relationships 
occur - in which case he subscribes to a pure structuralist analy- 
sis excluding dialectic. The two forms of analysis are not merely 
different they are incompatible and mutually exclusive -a 
-'A 
committment to one implies a rejection of the other. Rather than 
IL, - 
attempting to clarify the'basis for a choice between these two 
rival methodological programmes, Godelier attempts to structuralise 
the dialectic,, and of course this leads to wholesale fudging of 
the issues. 1', hope that the analysis of this confusion will 
provide a solid foundation for a decision between'structuralism 
and a'dialectico-causal methodolo4y and their rival approaches', 
in social science, to"the problemlof concept formation. 
There"is'-a -q 6 st importantiriplication ofthis last*discus. ýion: 
a dialectico-causal view of the totality precludes discussion of 
the "structure" in isolation'from the historical processes which 
one seeks"to'desCribe and explain. ''One can only talk of structure 
in abstraction'from process if one assumes it is possible to 
attain a description of i'socio-productive whole'-which does not" 
imply a reference to the historical process which determines its 
development. ' The very idea that such a 'criýtion'6an'be'achieved 'des - 
reveals, itwould seem, an implicit acceptance'of'the"independence 
of the parts from-the-whole-and vine vprqa; in'addition"it7would 
seem'poSsible to'separate a discussion of the'structUre of''a- 
socio-economic formation from a discussion of its historical 
location and geneology" The close connections between "contra- 
riety", structuralismýand'ahistoricity'areI therefore, apparent. 
To avoid-these connectionsj, 'a dialectico-causal understanding of 
thb7'totality--must be historical; it must not separate'ýthe tota- I 
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sence of such analysis relationships of dialectical opposition 
may occur within structures hermetically sealed, while the whole 
itself, the product of these structurest when combined, may be 
undialectically united and made subordinate to an ahistorical 
mechanism of the type suggested by Godelier's Marxism -a mechan- 
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interdependence in the totality and hence from their historical 
context. This is reflected in structuralist method by the logical 
priority of I'synchronic" over I'diachronic" method ie., structural t 
as opposed to historical analysis. Hence, Godelier maintains that 
"the study of the internal functioning of a structure must pre- 
cede and illuminate the study of its genesis and evolution", 
8 
as 
if it were possible to arrive at a satisfactory understanding of 
the "structure" of a socio-economic formation independently of 
direct historical investigation. This is an assumption I challenge 
later, both as an interpretation of the methodology of, social 
science and also of historical materialism. In the first place 
it is not possible to claim, as Godelier does, that his structu- 
ralism has captured the essence of Marx's dialectic. Now it may 
well be that contradictions exist between incompatible-"systems" 
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nature. Butr from a dialectical point of view, such a situation 
exists only in the opposition between rival socio-productive --I 
totalities as in the case of, for exampler capitalism and feuda- 
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9 The purpose 
of Godelier's theory is not, however, to clarify the-articula- 
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parts. Clearly, Godelier cannot have it both ways: either rela- 
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whole - in which case he subscribes to a dialectical analysis 
excluding structuralism; or else only mechanical relationships 
occur - in which case he subscribes to a pure structuralist analy- 
sis excluding dialectic. The two forms of analysis are not merely 
different, they are incompatible and mutually exclusive -a 
committment to one implies a rejection of the other. Rather than 
attempting to clarify the basis for a choice between these two 
rival methodological programmest Godelier attempts to structuralise 
the dialectic, and of course this leads to wholesale fudging of 
the issues'. I'hope that the analysis of this confusion will 
provide a solid foundation for a decision between structuralism 
and a dialectico-causal method6lo4y and their rival approaches, 
in social science,, to-the problem'of concept formation. 
There is a n6st important im'plication of -this last`*discusý§ion: 
a dialectico-causal view of the totality precludes discussion of 
the "structure" in isolation from the historical processes which 
one seeks"to describe and explain. - One can only talk of structure 
in abstraction'from process if one assumes it is possible to 
attain a'description'of i'socio-productive whole which'-does not' 
imply a'reference to the historical proces's which determines its 
development. The very idea that such a-description 6an'be'achieved 
revealst itýwould seem, an implicit acceptance"of'the independence 
of the parts from the'whole'and'Izice versa.; in'addition'itlwould 
seem possible to separate a discussion of the-structure of a' 
socio-economic formation from a discussion of its historical 
location and geneology. ' The'61ose connections between "contra- 
riety", structuralism'and-ahistoricityare, 'thereforeflý apparent. 
To avoid these connections, a dialectico-causal understanding of 
the7totality must be historical; ' it must not separate the tota- 
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lity from its process of development. Only such an approach 
would be likely to meet the requirements set down for dialectical 
holism and, by implication, for a well-founded social science. 
The account of the totality, as conceived by Marx, should not 
only be sensitive to the conceptual interdependence of parts and 
whole, but should also reveal how social scientists are able to 
conceive the structural relationships characteristic of a tota- 
lity and its developmental dynamics as two aspects of a single 
causal process. Such, a conception must be sufficiently powerful 
to grasp "every historically developed social form in a fluid 
movement" taking into account "its transient nature no less than 
its momentary existence. " 
10 
In this sense adialectico-causal 
view can achieve the realist aim of elucidating history in terms 
of its own development rather. than by reference to supra7histo- 
rical principles. 
I may have given the, impression so far in this exposition, 
that a dialectico-causal interpretation of Marxism seeks to. 
elucidate relations of causality in a social totality. As it 
stands, such. a formulation is dangerously misleading-and seriously 
incomplete. Marx is not concerned with-any totality generated 
by relationships between people, but with a particular type of 
totality -a socio-economic formation., It-is illegitimate to 
describe productive relations in isolation from social relations 
or the converse, when understanding the process of social change. 
From a dialectico-causal point-of view, it would be wrong to 
suggest that production or, society-can, be understood as separable 
spheres each determined by-self-subsistent and internally cohe- 
rent laws. 
11 The proper understanding of history has to involve 
a, method which prohibits the dualism of economy and society; and 
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I have already gone into the methodological reasons why this is 
so. To cite economy and society as separate objects of social 
scientific study commits one to a dualistic understanding of 
history: history is, on this viewr seen to consist of a disjunc- 
tion of causal processes - and social scientists are faced by'a 
seriously incomplete account of history. But the pursuit of 
specifically "social" and specifically "economic" laws is more 
deeply suspect. By dividing the socio-economic formation into 
separate spheres, one implicity commits oneself to a mechanisti- 
cally reductive understanding of history which will, finally, cul- 
minate in an ahistoric method. It can be added that Marx's con- 
ception of a totality as a socio-productive whole has real claims 
to meet the requirements of understanding social change historic- 
ally -a claim which structuralistst Colletti and'Althusser and 
all those who adhere to similar. '-ideas of causationpseem unable to 
justify. 
The conception of the socid-productive totality as dialectical- 
12 ly holist is one'which Marx evidently held. That'the forces 
and relations of production are conceptually interdependent is 
central to Marx's project: the social 'relations of production'j, 
which express the' relationship betwe IeIn producers (and appropria- 
tors) and nature in the productive process (and the process of 
surplus extraction)l involve implicit reference to the forC'6s of 
production. In the absence of such a reference the whole process 
of the social organisation of production and surplus a'ppropria- 
tion organised by 'the social relations of production would'not 
only be inexplicable; it would be inconceivable. The productive 
forces, in turn, involve implicit reference to the relations of 
production since the concept of the forces of production implies 
the existence of a social organisation of the labour process. ' 
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The organisation of the labour process? however, is itself 
determined by the social relations of production. 
I have stressed throughout my analysis so far that a dialec- 
tico-causal interpretation of Marx's totality involves an under- 
standing of the relationship between the parts and the whole as 
one of causal interdependence. Nowi whatever these relationships 
of interdependence are methodologically and substantively estab- 
lished to be, they will have to be conceived as properties of 
a holistically interconnected wNale., The 'Marxist 
totality is fundamentally characterised by the dialectical unity 
of the forces and relations of production. It has to follow 
that an interdependent moment of this whole will only be signi- 
ficant from the viewpoint of Marxist science insofar as it affects 
the development and reproduction of the unified forces and rela- 
tions. This is a major premise of Marx's materialist conception 
of history. It should be noted that, -in this regard Marx's stress 
on the key'role of the forces and relations of-production as -- 
constituting an object of social science (defined conceptually) 
as well as real historic socio-econorrtic formations, implies al- 
ready a specification ofthe central mechanism of social-develop- 
ment; and other "factors" viz ideology, the form of the state 
etc., are related to this in a dialectico-causal manner, In 
other words, an explanation of the relationship between parts 
and whole and whole and parts should be such that a reference to, 
a totality "X" involves implicit reference to its constitutive 
parts, just as reference to its-parts involve reference to the 
totality IIXII. 
It may appear, at-first sight that dialectico-causal explana- 
tion nullifies the claim that any particular causal claim can be 
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made at all; and that this might be a ground for denying that it 
meets a fundamental requirement of all scientific theories. As 
all moments of the totality are to be-regarded as interdependentr 
it is impermissable to treat one element'as if it possessed 
independent causal properties. Also, if the phenomena to be 
explained and the causal mechanism exist in a, relation of causal 
interdependence in'a dialectical totality,, thenf, on-one view-of 
causality, a cause and its effect could not be isolatedf each 
being mutually determining., This claim runs counter to the 
empiricist claim that a cause and its effect ought to be indepen- 
dently specifiable. In this contextr however# an empiricist 
approach to historical analysis'would culminate in-a mechanicism 
of the type discussed above. I have argued already that there 
are no logical'objections to-the,, supposition that dialectical 
oppositions occur,., And, by parity of reasoning, there seem to 
be no logical reasons why'such'relationships should not, also - 
characterise a, totality. -, If one, rejects the implicit mechanicism 
of the empiricist account of causalityr the question, as, to whether 
a relational account of causality of thisýtype is possible, or'not, 
does not'run into any dpriori objections. Indeed, I attempt to 
show, below just how suchýan, analysis: is-possible. "However'. to 
return to the-empiricists''objections to dialectical, causality. 
There would,, I suppose, be'some, grounds for accepting the, -empiri- 
cists' criticisms if it could be shown that they succeed in 
elucidating the nature of causal explanations in natural science. 
But far from succeeding in this task, " it can, be shown how-any 
analysis of causation proceeding on the'basis of positivist or''- 
empiricist criteria of cognitive significance fails-, to-account 
for causal explanation at all. This,,, failure isýunderlined by the 
fact that, the supposed', independence of cause and effect does not 
bring understanding of-causality in the natural sciences any ' 
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closer. Benton notes, for instancer 
"On the classical empiricist ("Humean") conception of 
causality, a cause must be identifiable independently of its 
effect (this is supposed to follow from the contingency of causal 
connection). But when unobservable entities and their behaviour 
constitute the causal mechanism which generates observable, macro- 
level happenings and relationships, the unobservable entities 
themselves are not identifiable or even independently 
of the phenomena they are supposed to cause. " 
13 
Without wishing to suggest I have'solved all-the problem S 
which a dialectical account of causality might generate, I want 
to emphasise that if the classical empiricist account of causality 
cannot cope with natural scientific explanation, then there are 
grounds sufficient for discarding it as a possible alternative to 
a dialectico-causal account. Hence, if the objections are only - 
given credence by an account vihichr for other reasonsl,. one wishes 
to reject, then here,, 'at least,, there are no a priori, reasons why 
dialectico-causal explanations cannot be adequate. Even if the 
pattern of explanation in social science differs significantly 
from that adopted in natural'science (where objections against 
mechanicism do not apply) this will be no reason for refusing to 
adopt it. 
The Marxist view of causality does not suppose equal relations 
of causal determination between interdependent moments of a'whole 
and between whole and parts; instead, it stresses the central 
importance of the linkage between the forces and relations of 
production; they are the key element in explanations of the 
development'and reproduction of socio-economic formations. -It 
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is no secret that Marx regarded dialectical oppositions between 
the forces and relations of production as the prime instigators 
of social change. 
14 However, there is a prima facie contradic- 
tion between asserting that relationships of dialectical causality 
characterise the whole and then claiming what looks like a 
priveleged causal role for the forces and relations of production. 
In this regardp a dialectico-causal conception of history would, 
it seems, encounter objections not just from the empiricists but 
also from Marx himself. Certainlyr the 1859 introduction to the 
"A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economý"' might appear to 
contradict a dialectico-causal view by suggesting just such an 
overmastering causal role for "production" in the totality. 
15 
So it is essential to discover an interpretation, of the "primacy 
of production" which does not also reinstate the rejected mechan- 
ical conception of causality and remains in harmony with the 
dialectico-causal account. I intend to demonstrate both how 
"primacy of production"can be reconciled with dialectical causality 
and why the moments in the totality have always to be analysed as 
interdependent but causal factors in the development of social 
production. 
The solution to this problem is not as intractable as might 
first appear. If material production is a dialectical moment of 
a totality then it. can only exercise a causal influence as an, 
interdependent factor of a single causal process and, not as an 
autonomous event. It is nevertheless the case that material 
production always remains a precondition of human history. There 
is a reflection of this necessity in Marx's theory when-he in- 
sists on the primacy, of. production for concept construction in 
social science. It would seem logical? therefore, to-ipterpret 
Marx's insistence-on the primacy of production in a conceptual- 
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sense. According to this view# production is primary not because 
of its an autonomous causal character - but because its inclusion 
represents the first step towards an adequate conceptualisation 
of social developmen't. It remains, howeverf a first step. A 
dialectico-causal view of history, does not ascribe "production" 
a privileged causal role in explaining social change; instead it 
recognises causal connections-to be dialectically determined in 
the socio-productive whole. Here I wish to emphasise a point I 
have already made: for a dialectico-causal science the social 
totality is always a socio-productive totality. This represents 
a second sense one can give to the notion of "primacy of pro- 
duction. -" For my interpretation of Marxism, relations of dialec- 
tical causality are only conceivable in'the context of a socio- 
productive whole which neither separates the analysis of pro- 
ductive relations from social relations nor vice versa. It is 
possible to interpret the primacy of pro duction precisely in 
this sense: production'is primary insofar as the object of a 
dialectico-causal science of history must be the reproduction 
and development of socio-productive'totalities. In this formt 
however, the primacy of'production is not'only consistent with 
dialectical-causality, but. actually implies its existence. , 
I have mentioned already that the crucial momentum behind 
social development is, in Marxist Science, thought to be-gener-, 
ated by the relationship between the forces and relations of 
production. The key moment in this process is the extended 
reproduction of a socio-economic formationt which involves an 
extended and perhaps modified reproduction of'the labour process 
andt of course, also of the forces and relations of production. 
is 
This process has to be interpreted in the dialectico-causal manner 
already described. In the first place production and hence the 
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reproduction of the productive process on an extended scale can 
only take place in the context of the unity formed by the rela- 
tions and forces of production. The concept which expresses this' 
unity is that of a "mode of production". Extended reproduction 
is only conceivable in this context. Remembering the conceptual 
interdependence of this wholer it is nevertheless possible to 
conceive of the different although related aspects of this process. 
The relations and forces totality will determine the reproduction 
of the labour process. This is the first point. Insofar as the 
productive process goes beyond reproduction in an identical form 
(simple reproduction) it will, in turn, condition the reproductionl 
of the productive relations and forces totality, This result 
will then become a condition for further development. Hence, ' it 
is possible to present this movement thus: the totality formed 
by the forces and relations of production determines the activity, 
that is to say. -the activity of material production; and'in so 
doing, the activity determines the reproduction of the totality. 
This "extended reproduction" is conceived,, therefore,,, as a unitary 
dialectico-causal process. Thisf thoughf does not deter us from 
scrutinising the totality's various moments in order to under- 
stand the movement of the whole. The same should apply, so it 
seems, to any analysis of the causal role of moments in the 
totality. Having arrived at this point in my analysis, it'is 
necessary to digress and discuss the Marxist concept of contradic- 
tion before returning to my substantial analysis of dialectical 
holism. 
I have emphasised throughout my exposition so far that a 
dialectico-causal interpretation of Marxism, must conceive of 
the relationship between the forces and relations of production 
as one of interdependence in a dialectical totality. In cases 
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where there is a relationship of antagonism or opposition between 
the forces and relations this totality would represent a 
contradictory unity,,, and in the absence of such an antagonistic 
relationship the totality would form a non-contradictory unity. 
The relations internal to the totality are in both instances 
dialectical in the sense of being interdependent, but only the 
former is# in addition, dialectical in the sense of expressing 
a dialectical contradiction. 
According to this view of the dialectical relationship between 
the forces and relations of production, historical materialism 
should be capable of understanding at least three distinct types 
of social development: first the development of production in 
a non-contradictory totality, secondly the development of produc- 
tion within a contradictory totality, thirdly the development of 
production through a transition from one totality to another-. 
All three examples assume an extended reproduction of the 
productive process, but only the latter two involve an understand- 
ing of development through contradiction. 
accounts of development as follows: - 
One can symbolise these 
R= the social relations of production 
the social forces of production .I 
X 1. the mode of production formed by R& -P 
2. the productive process @ determined by''R, -& -F', 
x 
and (b) determining the reproduction of 'R & -F- 
x 
In the case of simple reproduction the totality R&F would 
x 
be. reproduced without a change in R&F. If extended reproduction 
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took place in a non-contradictory totality# then R&F would be 
produced on an extended scalep but without generating a contradic- 
tion between the forces and relations of production. If# on the 
other hand, contradictions were generated by extended reproduction, 
or if production were determined by a dialectical opposition 
between R&F. then two developments would be possible. First 
the R&F totality may be reproduced in a modified form, but in 
x 
a totality which preserves its integrity as a distinct mode of 
production ie., the relations and forces, despite modification# 
would still be identifiable as constitutive elements of, this 
particular mode of production. Secondly, the extended reproduction 
of the R and F totality may lead to a transition to a-, new mode ' 
of production. 
It should be noted from my exposition above that a'dialectico- 
causal conception of history does not assume social, development 
to be universally characterised by development through contradic- 
tion. Rather, this type of development would be prevalent only 
in cases of modified reproduction of a totality and in cases of 
transition f"o, rm one mode of production to another. Although I 
will argue later in this section that Marx believed these two"ý 
types of development to be the most significant ones, from-the 
view point of historical science, it should not be assumed that 
historical materialism either precludes the possibility of-an"- 
empirical analysis of non-contradictory socio-economic'formations 
(if they exist)y or that it is by definition a methodology based 
exclusively on the idea of dialectical contradiction. On the 
contrary, according to my interpretation, Marx's idea of con- 
tradiction as dialectical opposition is not an, a priori, formula- 
tion true of all socio-economic formations by definition. Rather,, 
Marx's idea of contradiction should be regarded as a contingent 
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one which applies only to those socio-productive totalities, that 
can be shown by empirical research to embody a dialectical opposi- 
tion between the forces and relations of production. 
Marx's idea of. development through contradiction is not an 
a priori notion. Rather, it is only applied to those, -socio- 
productive totalities which provide empirical evidence ofIrelation- 
ships of contradiction between the forces and relations of pro- 
duction. Even where the concept of development through contradic- 
tion is applicable, the actual form of the contradictions between 
the forces and relations of production remains to be establishedr 
but only by historical investigation. This will be demonstrated 
by example later in the chapter. Marx did not require the-con- 
cept of contradiction to be universally applicable prior to 
historical investigation; dialectically causal processes 4o, not 
require the presence of contradiction before they, are,, admissable. 
On this account it becomes the task of the Marxist historian to 
demonstrate the legitimate historical scope of the Marxist notion 
of contradiction; theory cannot do so in advance of research. It 
remains the historian's obligation to offer-a dialecýico-causal, 
understanding of socio-economic forms in either case, --both-where 
contradictions are in evidence and where they are, not. While 
explaining how the a posteriori conditions of application of the 
concept of contradiction works in practice, one can move in the 
direction of a solution to two persistent problems of Marxist 
historiography: the problem of the Asiatic modecof production and 
problem of primitive communism. ýý1, 
I will begin with a brief outline of the so called anomalies 
which beset Marxist theory in the Asiatic mode of production. 
16 
The principal "problem" for a Marxist approach here, is that it 
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appears from empirical research that these socio-productive 
systems fail to generate contradictory development between the 
forces and relations of production. It is inferredr therefore, 
that either Marxism is invalidated as a general theory of social 
change or at least that its historical range meets its limit in 
the understanding of what appear to be non-contradictory socio- 
economic formations. These conclusions would only follow, -how- 
ever, if it were assumed either that contradiction*characterises 
all cases of dialectical development or alternatively that his- 
torical materialism is only capable of representing instances of 
social development which are contradictory. Dialectico-causal 
interpretations make no assumption as to the social universality 
of development through contradiction. On the contrary, I have 
shown how they are capable of understanding a dialectico-causal 
development of social production in a non-contradictory, but 
nevertheless dialectical totality based'on an-interdependence of 
the forces and relations'of production. Societies characterised 
by the Asiatic mode of production would not cease to embody , 
relationships of dialectical interdependence even if-they failed 
to develop relationships of, dialectical antagonism and opposition. 
Ands, if one wishes to avoid the ahistoricityý, of -the- "real opposition" 
interpretation'of these'relationships,, then it. would seem that 
one has still to elucidate the'development of-social production 
in these historic formations, in a dialectico-causal manner. --, 
There could only'be a sustained objection, to this'procedure 
if it were concluded that development"through contradiction is an 
absolute for Marxism. Such-l-an, assumptioni,, however,, -contradicts 
Marx's own analysis oft for example, communism which he guarantees 
to be free of contradictions between the forces and relations of 
production on account of its rational'and collective means,, of 
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planning the productive process. 
17 If one rejected the absolute 
demand for contradiction, and adopted a contingent interpretation, 
which seems to be more consistent with Marx's own view, then the 
existence of non-contradictory formations would be quite consis- 
tent with the claims of a dialectico-causal science. Non-contrad- 
ictory socio-economic formations would remain a legitimate object 
for a Marxist history. dialectico-causal 
he, interpretation of Marxism, would be compatible withMistence of 
non-contradictory socio-economic formations. So the existence of 
this type of socio-productive totality would not bring the metho- 1 
dology into question. 
A similar problem for Marxism I which our interpretation of 
historical materialism helps elucidate, is that of the possible 
existence and dissolution of a primitive communism. Marx seems 
to postulate that all forms of social production have emerged 
from an historically prior mode of production which he termed 
primitive communism. 
18 Such a socio-productive form would be 
characterised by communal relations of production since the low 
development of the productive forces would not allow for any 
distinction between producers and appropriators of a surplus. 
Rather, all members of the commune would be involved in a common 
production and appropriation of subsistence products. The 
historical evidence for the existence of such a state of society 
is scant, but it seems to be a plausible way of avoiding an 
Hegelian account of the beginnings of social production where 
production only comes into existence as part of a struggle for 
recognition brought about by the dialectical development of 
absolute mind. 
If primitive communism has existed then it must have been 
14V 
planning the productive process. 
17 If one rejected the absolute 
demand for contradiction, and adopted a contingent interpretation, 
which seems to be more consistent with Marx's own view, then the 
existence of non-contradictory formations would be quite consis- 
tent with the claims of a dialectico-causal science. Non-contrad- 
ictory socio-economic formations would remain a legitimate object 
for a Marxist history. cl dialectico-causal 
interpretation of Marxismr would be compatible with'ý, 
txistence 
of 
non-contradictory socio-economic formations. So the existence of 
this type of socio-productive totality would not bring the metho- 
dology into question. 
A similar problem for Marxism I which our interpretation of 
historical materialism helps elucidate, is that of the possible 
existence and dissolution of a primitive communism. Marx seems 
to postulate that all forms of social production have emerged 
from an historically prior mode of production which he termed 
primitive communism. 
18 Such a socio-productive form would be 
characterised by communal relations of production since the low 
development of the productive forces would not allow for any 
distinction between producers and appropriators of a surplus. 
Rather, all members of the commune would be involved in a common 
production and appropriation of subsistence products. The 
historical evidence for the existence of such a state of society 
is scant, but it seems to be a plausible way of avoiding an 
Hegelian account of the beginnings of social production where 
production only comes into existence as part of a struggle for 
recognition brought about by the dialectical development of 
absolute mind. 
- If primitive communism has existed then it must have been 
planning the productive process. 
17 If one rejected the absolute 
demand for contradiction, and adopted a contingent interpretation,, 
which seems to'be more consistent with Marx's. -own viewr then the 
existence of non-contradictory formations woU 
ýld be quite consis- 
tent with the claims of a dialectico-causai science. Non-contrad- 
ictory socio-economic formations would remain a legitimate object 
for a Marxist history. ýývraeyielý_) -- 
/_ 
a dialectico-causal 
interpretation of Marxismp would be compatible with existence of 
non-contradictory socio-economic forrýations. So the existence of 
this type of scicio-productive totality would not bring the metho- 
dology into question. 
A similar problem for Marxism I which our interpretation of 
historical materialism helps 'elucidate,, is that of the possible 
existence and dissolution of a primitive communism. Marx seems 
to postulate that all form s of social production have emerged 
from an historically prior mode of production which he termed 
primitive communism. 
18 Such a socio-productive form would be 
characterised by communal relations of production since the'low 
development of the productive forces would not allow for any 
distinction between producers and appropriators of a surplus. 
Rather, all members of the commune would be involved in a common 
production and appropriation of subsistence products. The 
historical ev 
I 
idence for the existence of such a state of society 
is scant, but'it Seems to be a plausible way of avoiding an 
Hegelian account of the beginnings of social production where 
production only comes into existence as part of a struggle for 
recognition brought about by the dialectical development of 
absolute mind. I 
If primitive communism has existed then it must have been 
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a non-contradictory mode of production because of its failure to 
develop a surplus and distinctions between producers and appro- 
priators. A contradiction between the forces and relations of 
production only emerges if the productive forces develop beyond 
the point where they remain compatible with the prevailing rela- 
tions of production. Unless one assumes, therefore, the historicali 
reality of an extended and hence modified reproduction of primi- 
tive communism, there can be no explanation of why such a society 
should disappear. In this context, extended reproduction solves 
a problem for Marxism by suggesting a mechanism whereby non- 
contradictory socio-productive wholes can in fact generate con- 
tradictions in the course of their development. This interpreta- 
tion of historical materialism, therefore, is capable of solving 
the "problem" of primitive communism. If historical evidence 
confirms such a society existed, then the interpretation of its 
extended reproduction would be consistent with the fact of its 
dissolution. If, on the other hand, early forms of society were 
already contradictory, then even though one would reject the idea 
of a primitive communism on empirical grounds, one would never- 
theless need access to a dialectico-causal methodology to explain 
the development and demise of those early modes of production. 
In both cases, it would not be the interpretation of history 
which is brought into question. Rather, it would be a matter of 
evaluating the empirical evidence for or against-the existence of 
a taWtl-ý: based on Marx's- idea of a primitive communism. ' So 
regardless of whether a dialectico-causal process is contradictory 
or not it still lies open to explanations of the kind offered here. 
Having removed this potential problem I will attempt to link to- 
gether my previous observations about the relationship between 
the parts and the whole and explicate this in more detail. 
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I have argued already that dialectico-causal relationships 
exist only in the context of a unitary causal processýsuch that 
no moment of a socio-productive totality can be abstracted from 
the whole in order to explain its own development or the develop- 
ment of the totality. Now I am in a position to draw attention 
to the fact that this interpretation of Marxism avoids the sim- 
plistic base/superstructure model which ascribes an independent 
or priv eleged causal role to e. g. the forces of pro duction or an 
independent productive base. On the contrary, a dialectico-causal 
science must interpret the base/superstructure distinction as a 
merely conceptual differentiation of aspects of a single causal 
process viz the reproduction and development of socio-economic 
formations. Causal relationships, for this view of Marxism, are 
internal to a single dialectico-causal process: and this must be 
reflected in the conceptual interdependence of the concepts of 
Marxist theory. 
I have noted that whereas Hegel's totality assumed all 
moments to be of equal significance insofar as they were all 
equally self-expressions of absolute mind: a dialectico-causal 
19' 
science requires no such assumption. On the contrary, some 
moments of the totality may be irrei-evant-for the explanation of- 
the historical process, some of major importance and others of 
lesser significance. In the absence, however, of an a. priori 
history, the specific role of moments in the reproduction and 
development of socio-economic formations must be established 
empirically case by case. In this sense empirical analysis on 
the basis of Marx's theory seems to follow the pattern of any 
scientific theory. 
The moments of a totality viz ideology, law, the State# 
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science etc., play a causal role in social development as 
interdependent moments of a causal process. Factors relevant to 
the understanding of social development can be neither autonomous 
nor epiphenomenal for a dialectico-causal science, since both 
these conceptions relapse into a mechanistic view of causality 
based on relationships of contrariety between moments of the whole. 
It may be that some features of the totality do not affect his- 
torical development one way or another. If this were the caser 
it would not imply that such factors are in some sense autonomous, 
but rather that they are irrelevant insofar as the study of social 
change is concerned. The historically significant moments, are 
those which exercise all influence as interdependent moments of 
the dialectico-causal development of social production in socio- 
productive totalities and through. transitions from one to another. 
A dialectico-causal understanding of relationships within a 
socio-productive whole overcomes, the oppositions evident in the 
Hegel/Feuerbach problematic analysed in chapter 3 and the same 
opposition between a dialectical logic and a mechanical deter- 
minism or voluntarism as reproduced in, the Marxism of Colletti,,, 
and Althusser. While it is evidently the case that a dialectico- 
causal view of history breaks fundamentally from Hegelian philo- 
sophy, it needs-to be demonstrated. how this view of causality 
differs from the mechanical, causality/humanistic, voluntarism 
dualism Marx discovered in Feuerbach's materialism and. humanism. 
The treatmentl_, of Feuerbach, however,, was not, Marx's, last word on 
the subject,, -since he tackled the methodological shortcomings of 
amindividualistic conception of social development, again-at a 
higher theoretical,, level in the "Grundrisse". It should be noted# 
in this regard, that the opposition between Weberian humanism, 
and-Durkheimian naturalism -a central dualism of sociological 
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theory - is analogous to the mechanistic materialism and humanism 
Marx criticised in Feuerbach's philosophy. 
20 In the former 
dualism, however, it is no longer nature and man who are opposed 
but society and the individual social actor. Despite this shift- 
ing of terms the logical character of the opposition is identical 
since a naturalistic objectification of society - the ali-determin- 
ing Durkheimian whole - is counterpolsed against a social actor 
who seems to have escaped causal processes altogether. The 
difference to be appreciated in the case of Durkheim and Weber 
can then be specified according to whether the social whole or 
the social actor is given pivotal status as causal agent. How- 
evert just as Marx criticised Feuerbach's philosophy for its 
ahistoricityrit is appropriate to point out the same lines of 
argument apply to the analogous positions-in subsequent social 
science. 
In the"Grundrisse"Marx criticises-the abstract individualism 
of the eighteenth century political economists who reduce the 
causal order of the social world to an expression of the free 
21 
actions of atomistic individuals. Marx argues that the appea- 
rance of such apparently free individuals is inreality a'' 
result of a long historical developm6nt'in which 1. the means of 
production become separated from the labourer so' that they can 
be appropriated as the individual private pro I perty of c-apitalists 
and commodity producers. It i. s only at thi Is stage I of s- ocial 
development'that production I appe'ars'to be th Ie result of private 
decisions made by . indiv idual"commodity I owners I It is I not'ilie 
abstract individuali which explairi'this social developmentr but' 
rather the development of social production which explains the 
historical appearance of private commodity producers and their 
corresponding social consciousness. It would be'self-defeating, 
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from the point of view of historical science, to attempt to 
explain social development on the basis, of abstract "homunculi" 
whose very characteristics are results of the, historical, develop- 
ment they are supposed to explain. It is for this reason that an 
individualist or voluntaristic model of explanation, cannot 
account for the development of social production. This does, not 
mean that ipso facto it-is inadequate for the explanation of 
individual actions. The explanation of social action may, 
-well, 
involve a teleological dimension, but as far, as historical science 
is concerned, the explanation of social change by abstract human 
characteristics, is either circular ) in that historical elements -, 
are smuggled into the abstract individuals ) or else itlattempts to 
explain social development on the basis ofýa supra-historical 
anthropology and therefore fails to understand the, process at 
its own, level. 
22 
Asýfar as a dialectico-causal, science is concerned, the ý 
rejection of a voluntaristic theory, of action does not imply the 
acceptance of a mechanical, objectivism-in which inexorable laws 
govern history. - Social phenomena may not. be explicable on-the 
basis of a-voluntaristic teleology,,, but they are not epipheno-, -. 
menal either: a dialectico-causal historymust., transcend. the 
autonomy/epiphenomena-, polarity, by, developing'a conception of, the 
moments of the whole consistent, with a notion of dialectical - 
causality... The-moments of a socio-economic formation, should be 
analysed with respect to their generation by socialproduction; 
as such they-, are at once determined by'and, in-turn determine-the 
reproduction and development of the social totality in the manner 
described above. 
'This type of analysis can be illustrated, in respec, t, -_to. Marx's 
126 
treatment of class formation and class conflict. Social classes 
are divided over the production and appropriation of a surplus. 
Their existence is dependent on the development of social produc- 
tion and cannot be reduced to an interpersonal relation of domina- 
tion and subordination. Marx considered one of his most impor tant 
discoveries to be that class conflict is associated with the 
development of social production. 
23 
Many other theorists stressed' 
the historical role of class conflict in social clidngel but only 
Marx demonstrated how class conflict is generated by and in turn 
generates social development. In the first place, social classes 
are thrown up by the development of social production. TheIr very 
existence as classes leans not only on the existence of a surplus, 
but also on the social and political reality of the mode of its- 
appropriation. The conflict between classes - regardless of its 
phenomenal expression - has as its fundamental historical founda- 
tion the struggle over the appropriation of a surplus. Once 
the domination of a class has been established, however, this 
relation which is generated by social production helps-determine 
the future development of production, and-the-reproduction of 
the relation between the dominant and subordinate class. The 
development of social production is, therefore, partly determined 
by the class structure as expressed-in a political form e. g. of 
a state and by the conflict between social, classes. Thereýis a 
double dialectic or double determination involved. The develop- 
ment of social production generates the conditions for the 
existence of classes expressed'in concrete social relations, of 
production and these social relations determine the, development 
of the productive-forces, via for instance a mechanism--like the 
feudal lordl, drive for rent and the capitalist's drive for pro- 
fit. 24 This in turn provides a modified basis for class rela- 
t16ns. The existence of specific relations of production of 
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which social classes are an examplef is, therefore, both a premise 
and a result of the development of social production in a totality, 
just as the development of the productive forces is in turn a 
premise and a result of the relations of production generated in 
25 the course of social development. The extended reproduction 
of social production is now revealed as a process which simulta- 
neously reproduces and develops the class structure of a socio- 
economic formation. It followsr therefore, that class-formation 
and class-conflict should be understood as causally relevant and 
interdependent moments of a general dialectico-causal process. 
A dialectico-causal conception of history reveals the objec- 
tive basis for Marx's claim that class conflict plays a key role 
in historical development. The objective f6undation'for this 
claim is, of course, the fact that social classes are an integral 
element in the process of the development of social production. 
The importance'lof their historical role becomes manifest in times 
of social revolution where a class thrown'up by'the development 
of social'production in one socio-economic formation, seeks to 
establish new conditions for'the productive process'which cul- 
minates in a transition from one mode of production to'another. 
This sort-of development#' however, involves determination-by 
other factors'like, ideology and political intervention inýsome 
sort of structured form of'relationships of political power. - So 
class conflict, however objective its foundation, is bound up 
with'the consciousness of social classes-vis-a-vis-each-other. 
Any adequate--theory-of the'development of social production 
depends on a theory of class formation and class conflictl'and a 
proper understanding of'the latter requires a theory of ideology. 
The relation between idea and idea expressed in ideology 
I 
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presupposes the existence of social relations. Social relations 
form the essential precondition of the formation of language in 
general and'also influence, the form and content of specific ideo- 
logies. If the relation between ideas presupposes social -relations, 
then ipso'facto it also presumes the existence of a productive 
relation to nature. ' Even, if one began with the analysisýof ideas$, 
one would arrive, via a detour, back at'Marx's methodological 
starting"point. -Marx gives this point of view its'classical 
formulation, when he arguesp 
"Each, principle has had its' own century in which to manifest 
itself. -, -The, principle of axithority, ýfor exampler had the eleventh 
centuryp just as the principle of individualism had the eighteenth 
century. In other words it was the principle which made the 
history,, and not the history which madeý-the principle. ýWhen, 
consequentlyl in order--to save-principles as much as'to saveý 
historyt we-ask"ourselves why"a particular principle was mani- 
festedýin the eleventh, or, in, the eighteenth century rather than 
inany other,, we'are-'necessarily'-forced'to'examine-minutely'what 
men'Were, like'in the eleventhicentury, 'what they were'like in the 
eighteenth, -what were'their respective, -needs,, their,, 'productive 
forces, their'mode, of production, the raw materials'of-their'' 
production - in'short,, what were the relationý'between man and 
man which resulted from'these conditions'of existence. ' To'-get 
to the bottom of'all'these'questions - what'is, "this but to draw 
upýthe realo, profane history of men in every - century'andýto-ý 
present, these men as both the authors and'actors of'their own 
drama? But 'the moment',, you present men'as the actors and the 
authors of their own history, you arrive - by a detour - at the 
real starting pointt,, because you have'abandoned those eternal ' 
principles of which you spoke at the outset. , 
26 
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The corre'ct methodological procedure, evidently, is to analyse 
social consciousness as a moment of a dialectico-causal process. 
Social existence "determines" social consciousness but not in any 
mechanistic sense; what is meant by this claim is the assertion 
that ideology should be analysed exclusively in the context of 
the socio-economic formation of which it is a part. According 
to this view the'development of social production and classes 
generates an ideological consciousness which determines In'turn 
the mutual relations of social classes. Class consciousness, in- 
fluences the development of class relations and political, struggle.; i 
It thereby affects the future development, of social production 
and class formation and the future development of class con- 
sciousness itself. -1 
At this point it will be"instructive'to comment on'Edgley's 
concept of contradiction. For Edgley, dialectical contradictions 
are a species of logical contradiction; he'wishes to preserve, 
their logical character and not restrict'them to causal opposi- 
tions and interdependences. 
27 The-logical character, of dialec---- 
tical contradiction is preserved', by Edgley, because people 
and by extension institutions - hold and express contradictory 
beliefs. '- These contradictory beliefs are, genuine contradictions 
of a logical character; they are real contradictions, even if 
as must-be-the case unless logic,, is overthrown - they are false. 
While not denying that real logical contradictions'are obviously 
possible, I think some of the implicationsýof Edgley's position 
need drawing out; of coursep these are not implications that 
Edgley would-actually want-in view of his at-owed recognition 
that the Marxist"dialectic-is realistýand not idealist. 
F-Irst" 
this' conception of contradiction seems to, "limit dialectical-con- 
tradictories to'--ideologies - ideologies which express contradic- 
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tory beliefs and the institutions founded on the basis ofýsuch 
ideas. Howeverf-for my dialectico-causal-conception of history#, 
contradictions are not solely-characteristic of. beliefs, but 
rather are constitutive of certain historic socio-economic forma- 
tions. Secondly, if contradiction. lis reduced 
to belief in this 
matter, then one arrives at an, idea of contradiction quite dis- 
tinct from that, required by, Marx! s materialism. For Marx,, 
ideology must be analysed as, an interdependent-moment-in the 
totality. Insofar as it contains contradictory beliefs these 
should be, related to the class structure-and contradictions 
between-the forces and relations of production. The Marxist, idea- 
of contradiction does not need to postulate. the existence, of-con- 
tradictory-beliefs in order to understand the contradictory'nature 
of, social development. Indeed, it is conceivable that a ruling 
class might achieve ideological hegemony and eliminate rival 
conceptions. ý If-it is successful in the matterj, it might, 'well 
have expunged the possibility of contradictions, being expressed 
within, that society (no social conf lictis will ever be expressed) 
but-the brute fact that-there are-contradictions between the rela- 
tions and forces of production cannot be, extirpated --unless, 
of course, there is a social revolution. - From. Edgley, 's point of 
view,,, howeVer,, such a. society, would be non-contradictory: since 
there are no expressionsýof contradictionr even private expres- 
sions, contradiction, -would not be a-fqature of such, -a society.. -- 
This is a culpably idealist implication, of his-. position - the- 
idealism of. theoretical humanism. If objective, contradictions- 
are possible only insofar as, they areý, embodied in human, beliefs 
then, ipso facto,, it is these beliefs-. which, are responsible for 
the instantiation of contradiction and not objective,, material 
conditions. On the Edgley-, conception of contradiction, contradic- 
tory ideas expressed by human, beings would be,, the, ultimate--explan- 
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atory principle behind-the positing and supersession of con- 
tradictions in social development -a position reminiscent of 
Ltikacs "Marxism. 
28 This, again. is idealism; and it can be 
avoided if the dialectico-causal conception. of contradiction is 
adopted where the logical character of dialectical contradiction 
is abandoned and only its conceptual character preserved. It is 
Marx's conception of ideology (in my interpretation)and not 
Edgley's which displays the greatest fidelity to-the, materialist 
concept of history. Edgley places what are best regarded as 
symptoms of social conflict - the expressions of contradiction 
in the place reserved-for their causal origin: he mistakes symptoms! 
for causes. I intend now to give a brief summary of the way, Marx 
brings together the various interdependent elements in,, a dialec- I 
tico-causal analysis. 
Marx's analysis'of the struggle, over the shortening of the 
working-day provides-. a fine illustration of, an analysis of social 
development based on dialectical causality. 
29 The development 
of the process-of capital, accumulation leads toýthe-attempt to 
maximise surplus labour by, on the one handfýlengthening the-, 
hours of-surplus labour, and on, the other#, reducing necessary 
labour. time during, which the labourer-producers the value of his 
'0, 
wages. The, classes generated by capitalism become engaged in 
an economic and-political,, struggle over the--production and appro- 
priation of surplus-valu-e-which takes on a concrete expression 
in the struggle over,, the length-of the working-day. -,, The working- 
class sought to impose a statutory-limit on. the hours,, of-labour 
whereas the industrial bourgeoisie overall., wished to exploit 
labour without legal interference. -This conflict-took on an 
ideological dimension in which opposing political--outlooks and 
programmes confronted-one another. Once. -a legal-limit to the 
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working-day had, been imposed and the working-class had - with 
the aid of a split between landed and industrial interests in 
parliament - achieved its immediate political aimp its victory 
affected the further development of capitalist production. The 
capitalists were now compelled to develop the productive forces 
if they wished to accumulate more surplus-value. This in turn 
affected the formation of classes. The development of the forces 
of production inevitably-led to a concentration, of capital and 
to the concentration of workers in-large-scale enterprises. -This 
rendered possible a more intense form of political struggle which 
became expressed in the conflict between class-based ideologies. 
The struggle over the working-dayl, an outcome of the development 
of social production and class conflict, thereby precipitated a 
future conf lict. 
If this modified reproduction. of capitalismlas, a socio- 
economic formation is to be grasped as a causal process in-itselft 
then, in consequence,, one, is, compelled to elucidate the modifica- 
tion of the factors of the totality-viz the forces of production,, 
the class-structur, er ideology etc., - as results, of the unitary 
dialectico-causal development of the-socio-economic formation,, 
which generates them. _It. would appear that social scientists,. 
should adopt this methodological starting point as if they are 
to explain social development, as a process generated by history 
itself, rather than by a priori principles. However. it is 
necessary to show1how it-is possible for a dialectico-causal 
approach to, establish empirical claims when it might. appear as 
if the, content of historylit-self is, prejudged by the formulation 
given, to. the methodology. If the content of,, history can be 
deduced fromýthe methodology, alone, then thelmethodology must 
lose all claim to. science:, being a priori it is a-purely meta- 
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physical history. I intend to show how Marxism, in its attempt 
to grasp the causal process of social developmentr steers clear 
of this flawed conception of history; while avoiding empiricism - 
the converse error - it can still stay responsive to, and be held 
up against empirical data. 
Although certain methodological implications follow from a' 
dialectico-causal interpretation of history both for the analysis 
of socio-productive totalities and their constitutive moments, 
I have additionallyargued that these are necessary implications 
if historians are to achieve the realist aim of understanding 
social development in its own terms. Even though it is correct 
to maintain that historical materialism prejudgesp in certain 
respects, the content of hist6ryand only then tries'to confirm 
",,, 't- of' a' 'roach need prove its presuppositions,, this circular sI or pp 
no more vicious than,, 'for instance',, 
" ýkormulating the' law of 
gravity and then con'iirming its workings in the various solar 
systems. Before embarking on any scientific study of phenomena, 
it is necessary to make theoretical assumptions. The "tests" of 
these assumptions, from the viewpoint of science, is that they 
lead to a scientific practice analogous to that described in my 
first chapter. For a theory to aspire to this level. its truth 
conditions should not be'determined by considerations entirely 
circumscribed by the theory, but instead should be open to'some 
sort of empirical testing. A scientific theory must have empi- 
rical content. Forturiately'r a dialectico-cau . sal ap 
I pr I oach to 
history does possess empirical content. There is nothing'in its 
general conception of social'development which furnishes in 
advance - in advance of empirical scrutiny of history the con- 
tent of historical socio-economic formations, their particular 
combinations of causally relevant elements, and the manner of 
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their originsf development and demise. 
30 As has been shown by 
Balibar's singular failure at this juncturef it is not possible 
to deduce the nature of all historically possible modes of pro- 
duction from considerations of their abstract form. 
31 Indeed, 
Marx travelled even further in the opposite direction when he 
suggested that the nature of any socio-economic formation would 
be beyond comprehension abstracted from an historical analysis. 
True, analysis cannot be other than guided by a methodology, yet 
it is still the empirical investigations and not the methodo'lo- 
gical principles which add the flesh of empirical content to 
historical inquiry. As Marx firmly averred in the third volume 
of Capital: 
"The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus labour 
is pumped out of direct producers,, determines the relationship 
of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production it- 
self and in turni reacts upon it-as a determining element. Upon 
this, however, is founded the entire formation'of the economic'' 
community which grows up out of the production relations them- 
selves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form. It 
is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions 
of production to the direct producers -a relationship always 
naturally corresponding to a definite'stage in the development 
of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity 
which reveals the innermost'secretl, the hidd'en''basis of the 
entire'social structure,, 'and with it the"'p , olitical'form 'of the 
relation of sovreignty and dependenceo, in short, the correspond- 
ing social form'of the state. This does n'ot'-prevent the same 
economic base - the same'from the'stan'dpoint of its main'condi- 
tions -due to'innummerable different empirical circumstancest' 
natural environment, racial relations, external historical in- 
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fluences, etc. p from showing infinite variations and gradations 
in appearancel which can be ascertained only by an analysis of 
32 
the empirically given circumstances" 
Through guidance by its theoretical conception of its "object",, 
historical materialism proceeds in the way, in which all sciences 
approach their object of study. The empirical details of a. 
historical analysis of this sort, whether they be concerned with 
problems of classificationt periodisation or whateverl are by 
no means reducible to the bare methodological precepts which 
inspired the inquiry. The historical relationship of the forces 
and relations-of production which actually constitutes a mode of 
productionvýsdeterminable only by empirical investigation. It. - 
is importantf therefore, not to confuse the. conceptual exposition 
of Marx's theoretical framework with the historical analysis. 
Marx's abstract theoretical concepts may be a precon. dition of, 
achieving historicity but in themselves they remain merely ab- 
stract methodological, tools. It should be remembered. that these 
theoretical concepts, are not the real substance of history itself, 
but are simply concepts for elucidating-the nature of the hiS7, 
torical process. 
The points outlined. briefly above apply equally to Marx's 
general understanding of social development. Nothing in the 
general, idea of history. as a. progressive development of social 
production is going to reveal specific key features historically 
predominant duringo-for example,, a, process of socio-economic 
transition. The combination of factors in the totality acting, in 
the most crucial roles, cannot be decided outside-the domain, of 
historical, investigation. The methodology will set-the form of. 
the-question, and thus, by extensiont, the formýof the answer; it 
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is powerless, however, to provide those answers. Empirical 
investigation alone can do that. 
According to this interpretation of Marxism, although history 
may be articulated as an objective development expressed in 
man's increasing mastery over nature as socio-economic formations 
develop their productive forces, this theory of "progress" ought 
33 
not to be interpreted on a unilinear model. On the contraryf 
the course of social development may involve retrogressions as 
well as progressions. The historical course of social develop- 
ment is something to be determined by empirical investigation. 
A dialectico-causal interpretation expounds historical materia- 
lism as an a posteriori theory of development. While he rejected 
a unilinear idea of social progress, Marx nevertheless maintained 
that a progressive development of social production in certain 
socio-economic formations" was not an arbitrary assumption, 
but an historical reality. He illustrated this thesis in an 
analysis of the history of Western Europe. 
34 It is apparent 
from his analysis? that whatever the. nature of social development 
may have been in the East, at least in Western Europe this pro- 
cess must be grasped as a dialectico-causal development operating 
throuqh the generation and supersession of contradictions between 
the social relations and forces of production. 
In the context of-this analysis, Marx traced the origins . 
of capitalism back to the dissolution, of feudalism and the ori- 
gins of feudalism back to, the development and demise of ancient 
society. Even though this analysis is limited to the historical 
experience of Western Europe which Marx could study most com- 
prehensively, it is a process1which-is evidently one of universal 
significance because this process , 
_, 
produces world history as a 
single interrelated process. World'history quaworld history,, 
rather than as the predominantly discrete history of separate 
socio-economic formations appears to be brought about as a result 
of the contradictory development of social production, in Western 
Europe. 35 While the elucidation of this process is of tremen- 
dous scientific value, it should not be assumed that historical 
materialism can not serve as a means for studying the develop- 
ment of social production in other contextS., 5inc6 I have also 
suggested a dialectico-causal approach is appropriate for the 
study of all socio-economic formations regardless of whether 
dialectical causality operates throughr or fails to operate 
through, the generation of dialectical contradictions. A dialec- 
tico-causal interpretation of historic al materialism has therefore 
a double'claim to being a universal-science of history. First 
it elucidates the concrete development of production which pro- 
duces world history as an integrated and unitary'pro6esso Secon- 
dlyf it remains the methodological means for grasping the develop- 
ment of production in places outside-of or chronologically prior 
to this development in Western Europe. ' 
If,, as I have argUed,, 'the order of soci6-economic formations 
is determined by social development itselfj, then it-would be' 
illegitimate to, attempt to'dete'rmine this"order-in advance I of 
empirical investigation'. It"would b6-incorr6ct, 'for exampler 
to insist'that-socio-econom: Lc'formzitiOns Must have a-well deve- 
loped capitalism before they can proceed to the establishment of 
socialism, '" Marx's comments on the possibility of a socialist 
or bourgeois evolution of the nineteenth century Russian agricul- 
tural commune demonstrate an acute awareness of the contingent 
nature of types of transitione 'He states#,, 
"The dualism within it permits of an alternative: either 
the property element in it will overcome the collective element, 
or the other way round. Everything depends on the historical 
environment in which it occurs.,, 
36 
However, if the basis of transition is contingent, then 
historical materialism cannot serve as the predictive apparatus 
required by some interpreters of Marx. 
37 1 intend to demonstrate 
this in Marx's discussion of the extended reproduction of capi- 
talism and the possibility of a transition to socialism. 
I noted how Marx regarded the history of social production 
in Western Europe to be part of a general dialectico-causal 
development characterised by the generation of contradictions in 
socio-economic formations culminating in transitions from one 
form of production to another. So it is not surprising that 
Marx should regard capitalism as, yet another internally con- 
tradictory and hence transitory socio-economic, formation. Accord-ý 
ing to Marx, the development, of, the productive forces in this 
society is governed by-, the process of capital accumulation-whereby 
capitalist enterprises strive continually to valorise their 
capital. Capital accumulation develops not only the total social 
capital in society, but also the size of the individual capital 
necessary for realising an average rate of profit in the cut- 
throat world of capitalist competition. Marx observed that, 
., "the development of capitalist production-makes, it 
necessary constantly to increase the amount of capital laid out 
in a given industrial undertaking, and competition subordinates 
every individual- capitalist-to the immanent laws of capital pro- 
duction, as external and compulsive laws. It compels him to keep 
extending his capital so as to preserve itt and he can only extend 
it by progressive accumulation, , 
38 
The capitalists' drive for profit, like the feudal drive for 
rent, is a social mechanism imposed as a condition of the reproduc- 
tion of the appropriating class. 
39 In the course of the extended 
reproduction of capital in the accumulation process, however, 
Marx notes that capital continually sets barriers to the develop- 
ment of the productive forces it simultaneously promotes. This 
essentially contradictory character of capitalist reproduction 
manifests itself in a number of ways; these include the trade- 
cycle and the overproduction crisis. Marx noted thatp 
"Overproduction is specifically conditioned by the general 
law of the production of capital, to, produce tolthe limit set 
by the productive forces, that is to say, to exploit the maximum 
amount of labour with the given amount of capital, without any 
consideration for the actual limits of the Market or the needs, 
backed by ability to pay; and thisjs carried out through con7 
tinuous expansion of reproduction, and accumulation and, therefor, e 
constant reconversion of revenue into capital, whiler on the 
other handl the mass of producers, remain tied to the average level 
of needs and must remain tied to it according to the very nature 
of capitalist production. , 
40 
As a result of the overproduction crisis,, the, less competitive I 
capitalists are eliminated or taken over by larger, or more effi- 
cient capitalist enterprises. This process is repeated from cycle 
to cycle and from crisis to crisis until the competition of., 
capitals begets the formation of monopolies in the capitalist 
economy. Indeed, Marx argued that the progressive monopolisation 
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of production*was the historical tendency of capitalist accumula- 
tion. 41 This process would reach its logical conclusion if and 
when "the entire social capital wa's united in the hands of either 
a single capitalist or single capitalist company. , 
42 In such a 
societyr the labour process would not be regulated by the law of 
value through the formation of production prices (which is charac- 
teristic of the capitalist economy) but'on'the contrary by mono- 
poly decision. -Insofar, therefore, as-capitalism is understood 
as a mode of production based on the operation of the law of 
valuer it would seem that it generates a process which will cul- 
minate in its own dissolution. 
Marx believed, however, that capitalist development was more 
likely to generate a transition to socialism than'to-a'society- 
based on a single monopoly. The negation by monopoly capital'6f 
the law of valueýwould-be founded on-a restriction of production 
whereas'a socialist negation would promote a progressive develop- 
ment of the productive forces. ' It seemed logicalf" therefore, to 
suggest that the restrictions-imposed'on the further development 
of production by monopoly, would be superseded by'a, transition to 
a socialist organisation of production and exchange. 'Socialism 
would not impose restrictions on the development of the produc- 
tive forces,, but'rather would-liberate themýfrom the'limits 
imposed by'capital-accumulation. Henceforwardv the'-pr6ductive, 
forces-would be developed for, the, benefit of the"c6llectiVe'pro- 
ducers and consumers; they would*be. ', free then from their depen- 
dence, on the relations of production'imposed by capital. ' 
I have repeatedly emphasiied how-a-dialectico-causal*inter- 
pretation of-historical materialism'strives to avoid any sort' 
of relapse into a priori history. Marx's account of the develop- 
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ment of capitalism must not be interpreted as some sort of in- 
evitabilistic theory. On the contrary, one should seek to analYse 
the historical development of capitalist societies so as to grasp 
how their own development generates the possibility of a transition 
to another form of society. In order to defend this view of 
Marxism, it is necessary to distinguish it from any sort of a 
priori assertion of the inevitable collapse of capitalism as 
expressed in some sort of"Zusammenbruchstheorie.,, 
43 
Some theorists have suggested that Marx's analysis of the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall guarantees, as it were, 
the inevitable demise of capitalism. Marx notes in Capital Volume 
3 that the process of capital accumulation brings about a rise in 
the organic composition of capital ie. r. a' proportionate rise of 
constant to variable capital ie, C to V. As profit is calculated 
by the relation of surplus value to C &'V iej, S/C & V,. 'capital 
accumulation implies that the rate of profit must fall given that 
the rate of exploitation remains the same. If, in addition, the 
tendency for the organic'compO'sition of capital-to rise'were 
irreversible, then capitalism as a mode of production founded'on I 
the necessity of profit, would be doomed to an inevitable collapse. 
1 
The process of capital accumulation proceeds from the maximis- 
ation of surplus value through lengthening the hours of labour 
(the production of absolute surplus-value) tO'a maximisation 
based on increasing the productivity of labour through a develop- 
ment of the forces of'producti6n (the production of relative' 
44 
surplus-value). This'development is accompanied'by a change 
in the "technical composition" of'capital because greater quan- 
tities of the means of production"are combined %4ith, labour-power 
in the productive'process. Changes in the value-compositiofi Of 
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capital s expressed in the relation 
of C to V. do not exactly parallel changes in the technical com- 
position of capital. Rather, Marx argues that "change in the 
technical composition of capital - is reflected - in its value iý 
45 
composition, but in a smaller degree. 
There are a number of reasons for the'discrepancy between 
rises in the technical and -volue. composition of capital, Perhaps, 
the most important factor modifying the rise'inthe, IV'kIL&L* com- 
position of capital is the relative cheapening of items of con- 
stant capital through revolutionisingr for instance, the produc- 
tion of the means of production. The decline in the rate of' 
profit can be modifigA, ',, therefore, by a proportionate cheapening 
of the elements of constant capital vis 'a vis variable capital. 
I 
It follows that if the tendency for the rate'of profit to'decline 
is to be theoretically established, then as Sayer notes, 
"Marx-would have to show that throughout the economy as a 
whole,, production will rise-faster in Dept'll-(production of the 
means of consumption), "-than in Dept. 1 (production of'the means 
46 
of production) . 
The only'way to establish'the tendency of the rate of profit 
to fall in capital'ist'societies, ''if'this kind of approach"i6--to 
be adopted, will be to analyse empirically the relation between 
the production of the means-of production, production'of the 
means of consumption and all other relevant factors. To adopt 
this approach'is simultaneously to abandon an'ine-vitabilistic 
theory'of capitalism and to concentrate instead on the concrete 
course of'the contradictory proCess'of capital accumulationo, 
While inevitabalistic formulations4law are rejected, this-under- 
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mines any predictive claims a dialectico-causal science might 
make. It seems that a dialectico-causal, science should rather 
confine itself to an analysis of ex post facto, processes. Insofar 
as it aspires to prediction at all it should merely generalisedboOti', 
tendencies generated in the, course of the, extended reproduction 
of socio-economic formations. The causalinterdependence of 
factors in a dialectical totality would seem, to, preclude the 
possibility of iron laws of history which depend precisely on the 
abstraction of parts from whole in the totality and giving them 
an autonomous and, illegitimately deterministic causal role. Laws 
of tendency, on the other hand should be, analysed case by-case in 
the context of an empirical analysis, which includes the simultan- 
eouslinvestigation of counteracting, influences, The predictive 
limitation of a dialectico-causal theory, far from. undermining, its 
scientific, claims should be regarded as a condition of a science 
of history since it avoids the single factor determinism required 
by any sort of, Zusammenbruchstheorie or, iron determinism. One, 
is faced with the choice. of giving up, the search for this pre-,. - 
dictive law. and remaining, content with laws of tendency or, else 
of giving, up the project, of. a social science. While admitting 
frankly th; ý,. approach introducQs - the problem of criteria of_ 
adequacy for any, given, explanation,, this cannot be considered a 
problem for the theory Ouch that if it cannot be solved in 
advance of each case one must abandon the theory) but a problem 
within, the practice-theory to be solved a posteriori in each case 
as it, occurs.. Beyond the formal conditions of a, dialectico- 
causal science which,. have to apply to all historicalexplanations 
within-the scope of.. the theory, additional criteria outside those 
supplied by historians, cannot help in determining what, counts 
as, an. adequate interpretation of a given process. Marx himself 
" It 
stressed for instance, that the rate of profit will not necessaril 
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fall,, only that, given his analysis of actual historical condi- 
tions as they were then available to him, it will tend to do so; 
and he reinforces this by proposing several possible counter- 
vailing factorst including the cheapening of elements of capital 
47 
and, of course, labour-power. His analysis of the tendency 
thereby reveals the essentially empirical foundation of his 
analysis. The demise of'capitalism is something which can only 
be established scientifically on the basis of an empirical analy- 
sis of the extended reproduction of capitalism as a socio-economic 
formation. In reproducing itself as capital, the accumulation 
process reproduces the struggle of classes divided over the pro- 
duction and appropriation of surplus-value. It has already, been 
shown how the moments of the totality viz the state, ideology, 
science etc., are involved in this extended reproduction of, the 
socio-economic formation. If social scientists are to interpret 
Marx's analysis of capital accumulation in line with a dialectico-1, 
causal view of his methodology,, then they-must place discussion 1! 
of the accumulation process in the context of an analysis of the 
reproduction and development of capitalism as a socio-economic 
formation. 'It is this'process considered as aýwhole which pro- 
duces, the possibility of &-transition to a new form of society andl 
not the operation of any sort of supra-historical law or any 
inexorable decline in the rate of profit. 
IA dialectico-causal history wouldj'itýseems, eschew any 
attempt to elucidate problems of social development outside the 
empirical analysis of history - and in this respect the essential 
requirements for historical science are met. It is for this 
reason that I maintained in chapter 3 that a dialectico-causal 
interpretation of historical materialism is indeed a logical 
result of Marx's realist aim of explaining the historical process 
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in its own terms. In order to achieve this realist aimp however, 
I have ruled that Marx had first to transform the estranged 
discoveries of Hegel's dialectic into a conception of social 
development which was compatible with a scientific inquiry into 
actual history. Whereas Colletti, and Althusser failed to account 
for this transformation, a dialectico-causal interpretation sucmez&--', ý, 
in this task. Regardless of the detail of a dialectico-causal 
view of history, it would appear from my analysis so far in this 
thesis that this sort of conception of social development would 
remain a precondition of achieving historicity in social theory. 
This does not imply, howeverr that this methodology is worked out 
to a point beyond which it can not be further developed. Both the 
methodology and the theories generated on its basis should be 
subject to modification in accordance with the method of science 
outlined in chapter 1. 
5.2 DIALECTICAL CAUSALITY AND HISTORICAL SCIENCE 
I have outlined'a defence of a dialectico-causal methodology 
which meets the requirements of historical science. Now I wish 
to show, by reference to Marx and Marxist historianst how this 
methodology furnishes principles guiding an historical. invIestiga- 
tion of transitions from one socio-economic-formation to another. 
I will illustrate this claim by an examination of the development 
Cr f demise of Ancient Society and feudalism., - 
Marx analysed Ancient Society as a socio-economic formation 
founded on commun6al relations of production. 
48 
Even though it 
developed the city as its economic, military and political centre, 
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essentially, Ancient Society was rural in character, with a pre- 
dominantly agricultural economy in which access to the land was 
conditional on citizenship of the commune. The Roman, for 
instance, could only become a landowner insofar as he was a legal 
citizen of a commune. These relations of production, however, 
governed not only the individual producer's access to the means 
of production, but also determined the extended reproduction of 
this society. This' brings me to Marx's account of the dissolution 
of-Ancient society. 
According to Marx, war became a major economic task of 
49 
Ancient Society. The city communes were compelled to defend 
their territory from rival communes as well as to capture addi- 
tional land commensurate with the demands of their growing 
community. The extended reproduction of the Ancient commune 
through military expansion provoked in the end, the development of 1: 
production based on slave labour and commodity production and to 
the formation of new relations of production corresponding to 
these, changes. To preserve the identity of the original commune 
in the face of military expansiont-a majority of the members of 
subjugated city states or villages had to be denied citizenship 
of the dominant commune. In these conditions# military expansion 
culminated in the introduction of slavery which was "determined 
negatively" bythe commune's attempt to reproduce itself as a 
50 
socio-productive whole based on the old property relations. 
So the introduction of slavery or enserfm6nt'eventually changed 
the character of the commune. The expansionist nature of the 
commune helped promote a socio-economic foundation for the 
development of exchange. Commodity production on the basis of 
slave labour, Manufacture and mercantile trade increasingly"under- 
mined the-original form of Ancient society. Marx claimed, there- 
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fore, that a certain stage reproduction "is at the same time 
51 
necessarily new production and destruction of the old form. " 
The gradual break up of Ancient society, a break up whose 
seeds lay in its extended reproductionr did not culminate in 
social revolution. The transition to a new-mode of production 
came about partly as a result of military invasion and destruc- 
tion. This is evidently the case with, for exampler the Roman 
Empire. However, invasion does not thoroughly explain the internalý 
weakness of this socio-economic formation. Yet, it was the con- 
tradictory development of eg., the Roman empire as a form of 
social production which was responsible for its inability to 
withstand external threats as it had done for centuries before. 
One should not therefore attribute the demise of this form of 
society to external factors like military invasion alone, if it 
is apparent that the decline of Ancient Society was impl I icit in 
its own'socio-economic character. 
This exposition of Marx's discussion of Ancient society con- 
firms two contentions of this thesis. First, it demonstrates how 
Marx employed a dialectico-causal methodology in'the analysis of 
pre-capitalist societies and, secondlyp it reveals how such a 
methodological approach is compatible with an intrinsically 
historical account of social development and the rigours of 
empirical analysis. It should be acknowledged, however# that 
Marx's analysis of Ancient Society is no more than a brief outline 
of its development and demise. This analysis shares'the empirical 
incompleteness of Marx's analysis of all pre capitalist socio- 
economic formations. Notwithstanding this qualification, there 
appears to be no methodological reason why historical research 
should not proceed on the lines of what is essentially a diAlec- 
tico-causal account of the reproduction and development of this 
socio-economic, formation. 
The progressive dissolution of Ancient society by mercantile 
activity, commodity production and slavery did not lead to the 
formation of the productive relations characteristic of industrial 
capitalism, where the labourer becomes separated from the means of 
production. The technological backwardness of a slave economy 
did not lend itself to such a development. As Hilton observes, 
once the slave supply declined, 
"Far from keeping the slave separate from the means of 
production - necessary precondition of capitalism - the slave 
owners solved (or tried to solve) the economic problems of 
late ancient society by settling, their, slaves on peasant hold- 
ings; in fact by creating the production relations characteristic 
of feudal society. " 
52 
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The demise of Ancient society eventually led to the formation 
of feudal relations of production and the emergence of feudalism 
as the dominant form of production. in Western Europe., This 
brings us to an analysis of the-development-and demise of feuda- 
lism. 
Under conditions of feudal production, where the individual 
- producer was a de facto,,, if not de jure, owner, of the, landr the 
characteristic relation of production between the feudal-. appro- 
priator and producer was one of personal dependence in, 
lwhich 
the 
labourer existed in a state, of bondage to the Lord. Marx states, 
, "It is furthermore evident that in all forms in which the - 
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direct labourer remains "possessor" of the means of production 
and labour conditions necessary for reproduction of his own 
means of subsistence, the property relationship must simultan- 
eously appear as a direct relation of lordship and servitude, 
so that the direct producer is not free, -,,.,, 
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The peasant producer could only have been compelled to yield 
up a surplus to the lord if he wast in some sensel'not free to dis- 
pose of his product as he pleases. The relationship of lordship 
and bondage almost invariably arose from military domination of 
direct producers and had to reproduce a form of politico-military 
domination becauser without compulsion, there could have been no 
objective foundation for the appropriation of a surplus. 
According to Marxi the transition from feudalism to capitalismý 
cannot be attributed to the supposedly "intrinsic"*properties of 
merchants' or userers' capital -. forms of capital which were 
to be found in th7e'major'ity of preý-capitalist economic formations., 
If the existence of'these-forms of capital were a sufficient 
condition for the origin-s of capitalism, then,, as Marx observes 
"ancient Rome'# Byzantine etc., would have ended their history with,, 
II 54 if free labour and capital. These early forms of capita1remaine(U, 
confined to the sphere of circulation and did'not-radically alter 
the productive process. Indeed, the merchant capitalists were 
an organic part of feudal Europe. -In. Italy and, Flandersltheir 
profits derived from-'finahcing trade with the-middle'and far 
East (Silk, spices etc) and from financing the wool trade and 
gold imports. Iri Italy# merchants also acted as bankers to the 
Papacy. Even when, as in tlie'case of the Flemish Merchants, they 
organised the buying of raw materials and the sale of the goods 
of'handicraft producers, their intervention did not revolutionise 
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the productive process. 
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Merchants were also. involved in usury and finance. Their 
usurers' capital was directed at the feudal lord or serf. 
Usurers' capital dependedýon the reproduction of the relationship 
between lord and serf; it was-the indispensible means of approp- 
riating an interest directly from the peasant producer or indirec- 
tly via the Lord's rent. - In this context,, usurersl-capital was 
not revolutionary; it did not develop the productive forces but, 
insteadi paralysed, their development by extracting its interest 
and leaving diminished funds for productive investment. Merchants, 
and usurersl-&apitall it is true, did assist the dissolution of 
certain aspects of the feudal mode of production. For example, 
the transformations of labour-rent into money-rentýand of land, 
through being priced into a commodity3were enabled by mercantile 
capital, and these transformations, in concert with other condi- 
tions, generated.. the socio-economic means for the development of 
direct commodity-production. Usurers' capital too, helped erode 
the feudal relations of production by ruining the feudaljord 
and dispossessing the small scale producer. In both cases, how- 
ever, the dissolving effects of these forms of capital depended 
on changes in feudal society caused by other factors. Marx-makes 
this clear in the case of usurers' capital when he' claims, 
... "only when and where the other pre-requisities of capita- 
list production are present does dswrtj ýecome one-of the means of assis- 
ting the establishment of the new mode of production by ruining 
the feudal lord and small scale producer, on the one hand, and 
centralising the conditions of labour into capital, on the 
other. " 
56 
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The same applies to merchants' capital, which could only trans- 
form itself into industrial capital once the labourer had been 
separated from the means of production, so that both labour - 
power and the means of production can be bought and sold as commo- 
dities. Consequentlyr even though these early forms of capital 
may have assisted in the transition to capitalism, it would be 
incorrect to ascribe them a major role in the dissolution of the 
feudal - mode of production. 
It would be equally mistaken# according to Hiltong to attri- 
bute to the urban centres of feudalism the leading role in the 
- 57 transition. Simple commodity production largely based on 
handicrafts did indeed become significant in-the towns of Western 
feudalism in the thirteenth century. Once the medieval craftsment 
as Hilton notest produced "not only for their Lord,, but for 
others who clustered around these centres of powerr and for 
peasants bringing their produce for sale as well as rent in'kind, 
then we have the beginning'of urban based commodity production. " 
58, ýj 
Commodity production in these conditions, however, was hampered 
by feud I al res - trictions whi ch preven I ted any sort of direct develoP-', 'l 
ment into capitalist production. The feudal artisan ýqas subject 
to exploitation and servitude which'was analogous to that-endured 
by the feudal peasant. 'The feudal protectorate still demanded 
stall fees and house fees directly in unenfranchised towns and 
indirectly in boroughs. Even if the urban artisans escaped this 
feudal domination, their activity would have been increasingly 
controlled by the merchant capi - talists who'would have conspired 
to inhibit direct commodity production because it represented 
a threat to the monopoly of trade. The power of these restric- 
tions on urban based commodity production is expressed by"th'e"' 
historical fact that capitalism, as Marx observed, first emerged 
1 j4 
outside of the feudal town. 
59 
In order to account for the 
transition to capitalism, it was necessary. to discover the forma- 
tion of wage-labour and private ownership of the means, of produc- 
tion in the feudal countryside not in the feudal town. The feudal 
city did not play the leading role in the dissolution of feudalism, 
but,, on the contraryt only succumbed to, capitalist industry once 
capital became a dominant force in rural agriculture and, -industry. 
Marx analysed, the development of production in the feudal 
countryside via an investigation into the evolution of different 
forms of feudal rent. 
60 The earli est and simplest rent-form was 
of coursel labour rent in which the producer performed surplus- 
labour on the Lord's land. Labour rent, had a number of economic 
disadvantages and these limited the magnitude of the surplus-7 
product. First, production was wastefully'divided in space and 
time which prevented, continuous working of the landl and secondly, 
direct, supervision of labour on the Lord's fields was an, economic 
necessity., Labour rent,. consequently gave way to rent in kind 
which permitted, of a more continuous application. of labour. All 
the land became the de facto property of the producer who rendered 
a surplus in the form of a-share of the produce'. In addition, 
this form largely dispensed with the, expense of supervision 
because, as Marx observes,, "the direct producer is driven rather 
by force of circumstances than by direct coercion, through, legal 
enactment rather than the whip. , 
61 
The highest formlof feudal rent, was money-rentiinstead, of 
transferring his productr the peasant producer was now obliged 
to turn over "its price to, the landlord.,, 62 Henceforward, at 
k 
least a portion of the peasants1product had to be converted into 
or produced directly as commodities. The appropriation of feudal 
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money-rent still took place in the context of the relationship 
of lordship and bondagey but the money-form, Marx argueso, "pre- 
supposes a considerable development of commercer of urban 
industry, of commodity production in general, and thereby of 
money circulation. , 
63 Although the money-rent was an authentic 
product of feudalism its further development undermined the rela- 
tion of lordship and servitude and le'-da in Marx's view, "either 
to the transformation of land into peasant's freehold, or to the- 
form corresponding to the capitalist mode, of productionp ie., 
rent paid by the capitalist tenant farmer. , 
64, 
Money rent gradually transformed the peasant producer into 
a tenant whose rent was fixed by-law. The feudal peasant might 
have developed into an individual commodity producer or perhapsr 
if he was in command of a surplus in excess of his rentr he 
might have become a small capitalist farmer employing wage-labour. 
If, however, he failed to pay his rent, then in the new economic 
and legal conditions atta-t-ched to money rent, he might well have 
been expropriated from his land to join the ranks of property- 
less day labourers who, at this stage of development, formed a 
convenient source of labour-power for the growing numbers of 
small capitalist farmers. Marx argued that the development of 
money-rent leld to the establishment of a socio-economic climateý 
where it was possible "to expropriate more and more the old pea- 
sant producers and to substitute capitalist tenants in their 
stead. ,65 The landlord, who became parasitic on capitalist 
farming, encouraged this development insofar as it ensured him 
the highest possible rent. -In fact, it appears that as in 
other socio-economic formationsIthe drive to maximise the surplus 
by the ruling class functioned as an important mechanism in'the 
development and demise of this mode of production. -Now J., can 
Ij -2 
enter into a discussion of Hilton's emphasis on the role of 
class conflict in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. 
Even though Hilton emphasises the crucial role peasant 
struggles against feudal impositions played in the transition to 
capitalism, he does not analyse the transition as a process 
brought about solely by the resistance of the peasants to feudal 
obligations. It was also promoted by the feudal Lord's drive for 
rent and by the manner in which he disposed of his surplus. 
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The drive for rent was imposed as a condition of political 
sovereignty over feudal territory and defence from rival powers. 
The outcome of the rent struggle determined the ability of the 
feudal lord to perpetuate his control over a given-territory. 
The drive for rent should be regarded, therefore, as a social 
mechanism necessary for the reproduction of feudal principalities. 
It was precisely this underlying class struggle over the produc- 
tion and appropriation of feudal rent which formed the economic 
foundation for the well-documented power struggle between feudal 
dominions. 
The drive for rent explains the readiness of the Lord to 
develop new forms of exploitation which could guarantee him a 
larger surplus. These changes in'forms of rent helped to promote 
the growth of towns and of commerce. Hilton notes; therefore, 
that "the urban revival of the eleventh and twelth centuries 
coincided with the'development of new forms of serfdom.,, 
67 4ýn 
increasing portion of the Lord's surplus was realised in a cash 
form through taxes, fines-or payments for grinding corn at the 
Lord's mill, and this increased the velocity of cash transactions 
and general commerce. In addition,, ''towns were often founded to 
add' to the Lord's income through the imposition of stallrents 
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and trade monopolies on certain important items. The development 
of money-rent and the growing magnitude of surpluses, is seen by 
Hilton as "the basis for the growth of simple commodity produc- 
tion, r seignorial incomes in cash, international luxury trade and 
urbanisation. , 
68 It is evident that the growth of the urban 
market and commerce in the towns, as well as the development of 
commodity and capitalist production in the countryside, is to be 
explained by the development of new forms of rent brought about 
by the class struggle between the feudal lord and serf. 
The feudal lord's drive for rent does not by itself explain 
the development of new rent-forms. It merely explains his 
willingness to adapt old forms or even invent new forms as cir- 
cumstances changed. The key transformation of feudal rent'can'- 
only be explainedl according to Hilton, by the political resis- 
69 
tence of feudal peasants to a reimposition of old feudal duties. 
In order to arrive at an adequate account of the transition to 
capitalismr it is necessary to be aware, therefore, of both sides 
of the class struggle between lord and serf in the context of the 
reproduction and development of the feudal mode of production. ' 
Hilton claims that the historical development of feudalism in 
England from the ninth to the fourteenth century confirms the 
importance of the class struggle over rent for the transition to 
capitalism. 
70 The population collapse which followed the Black 
Death in the fourteenth century could have led to a strengthening 
of serfdom. Indeed,, for the--two decades after 1350 this strategy 
was attempted, but resulted in peasant revolts in England in 1381 
and in the French Jacquarie of 1359. Although/ all the major 
rebellions were quelled, "local resistance could not be over- 
'71 
come. " '"* This resistance to the reimposition of old forms of 
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servitude was the central causal factor behind the development 
of new rent-iorms and the socio-economic conditions favourable 
for the development of commodity and eventually capitalist pro- 
duction. Hilton argues, 
"But,, this peasant resistance was of crucial importance in 
the development of rural communities, the extension of free tenure 
and status,, the freeing of the peasant and artisan economies for 
the development of commodity production and eventually the emer- 
gence of the capitalist entrepreneur. " 
72 
In Eastern Europe the feudal peasants succumbed to a second 
serfdom, but in Western Europe and most strikingly in Englandf 
peasant*resistance prevented this outcome. 
73' The resistance of 
the "serfs" to a reimposition of the old forms of feudal domina- 
tion was of decisive importance for the emergence of widespread 
commodity production unhampered by feudal restriction. Hilton 
observes that in the wake of this political resistance, 
"Rents were sufficiently low and the ability of both land- 
owners and the state to control the free movement of peasants 
was so minimal in practice that, at the end of... the fourteenth 
century, and for the greater part of the fifteenth century, the 
feudal restrictions on simple commodity production virtually 
disappeared. , 74 
The feudal countryside was eventually transformed by this 
development until thelandlord/capitalist and farmer/wage-labour 
relations succeeded in supplanting the lord/serf relation of pro- 
duction. This transformation in agriculture was accompanied by 
the. movement of craft production into the less restrictive socio- 
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economic climate of the countryside, away from the gild-dominated 
towns which prohibited the free exploitation of wage-labour. The 
formation of capital in agriculture and industryl therefore, pro- 
gressively eroded the feudal class structure and undermined the 
integrity of feudalism as a mode of production. 
This analysis of the transition from feudalism to capitalism i 
is perfectly consistent with a dialectico-causal interpretation 
of historical materialism. The transition is explained not by 
external factors, but by the development of feudalism itself. 
Although this account is partial insofar as it has yet to integrate' 
the contribution of the political and ideological moments of the 
transition, this one-sidedness does not reflect a shortcoming in 
methodology - rather it expresses a need to enrich the theory 
by engaging in further historical research. Evidently a dialec - 
tico-causal approach can and does serve as guide to the empirical 
analysis of the origins, development and demise of socio-economic 
formations. I have, therefore, established the claim I outlined 
earlier that this methodology not only meets the formal require- 
ments of an hi storical science, but also serves as a workable tool 
in the hands of historians. 
5.3 SOCIAL SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS' 
Now I intend to develop a critique of the major sociological 
schools of thought from the viewpoint of a dialectico-causal 
account of the methodology of social science. Whereas my inter- 
pretation of historical materialism seems capable of developing 
a theory of social change without resorting to supra-historical 
abstractions or principles, the accounts of social science deve- 
loped by the positivistst humanists and functionalists examined 
-I t) U- 
below,, fall squarely within the mechanical causality/voluntarism 
problematic analysed in the preceeding chapters. In consequence 
none of these sociological "schools" or "traditions" succeeds 
in developing an adequate account of methodology in the social 
sciences. 
In chapter 1,1 identified postivism in the philosophy of 
science with the adherence to a regularity theory of causation 
which was founded on the assumption of an epistemologically 
pri 'leged observation-language. I have also noted that socio- VP 
logical positivism, as initially developed by Comte, contained 
additional theses which were not necessary implications of a 
regularity theory of causation. The most important of these is 
the assertion that causal relations in. the social world are' 
analogous to those discovered in the world of nature. It is this 
assumption which ultimately justifies the sociological positivists'l 
insistence on the unity of science. Sociology should, according 
to this view, employ directly the methods and concepts developed 
in the natural sciences. Giddens defines sociological*positivism 
precisely in these terms. He notes that, 
"Positivism in sociology may be broadly represented as depend- I 
ing on the assertion that the-concepts and methods employed in 
natural sciences can be applied to form a "science of, man", or 
a "natural science of society. , 
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It is evident that sociological positivists cleave to a cer- 
tain view of the ontology of social science viz the natural 
science analogy, in advance of the scientific investigation of 
that reality. While it may be acceptable to assert the unity of 
science abstractly, with respect to the scientific method where- 
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by theories are developed in response to anomaly, it is scienti- 
fically unacceptable to prejudge the results of a science in any 
sort of ultimate ontological sense. The positivist assertion as 
to the identity of the form and content of causal relations in 
the realms of society and nature, therefore, endangers social 
science by foisting an a priori view of causality onto social 
science in advance of its practice. This is to say nothing of 
the positivists1mechanistic view of causality involved in the 
separate specification of cause and effect. However, to return 
to the argument. The appropriateness of the analogy with natural 
science can be established only by the practice of social science 
and not by a priori legislation. Two outcomes are possible. 
Scientific practice may confirm the existence of causal relations 
analogous to those in nature; or this positivist assumption may 
generate anomalies. In the first case, the positivist thesis 
would be established not by a priori legislation, but by scienti- 
fic practice. In the second case, the positivists would face a 
theoretical dilemma. They could either supersede the anomalies 
by abandoning their prior conception of causality or else deny 
the anomalies in favour of their prior assumptions. If they took 
the first course they would remain committed to the scientific 
enterpriser but only at the cost of abandoning their identity as 
a distinctively "positivist" school of thought. If they followed 
the second course they would protect their identity as a theore- 
tical school, but only by abandoning the method of science. It 
is possible to find precisely this theoretical dilemma in the 
sociology of August Comte. 
Comte's sociology theoretically fits history into a general 
law of progress which effects a transition from a theological to 
a metaphysical and then finally to a positivist society. 
76 This 
IOU 
social evolution parallels a development in human knowledge: 
religious thinking is replaced by metaphysical thought only to 
be superseded in turn by positivist science. According to, Comte, 
social scientists can analyse social progress in two ways. They 
can study the laws of co-existence of the various elements at an. 
instant in time (social statics), or they can study the-laws of 
succession by which eachýsocial, state is seen as the product of 
the preceeding state (social dynamics). 
77 If social scientists 
are interested in social dynamics, then they should use the 
"historical method" and engage in a comparative analysis of the 
various examples of human development,, "so as to reveal the laws 
of inevitable transition from one stage to another. , 
78 
For Comte, social evolution is the. outcome of an. -inevitablis- 
tic law and culminates in a. positivist stage in which progress at 
last achieves its final social expression. This lawAs not formu- 
lated on the basis of the practice of social science; it is 
asserted as a universal principle at the outset in such a way. that P 
actual historical counter-instances can only be regarded as pseudo-F 
anomalies which fail to bring the validity. of the. law into questioný' 
Durkheim argues that Comte's law is metaphysical because it is 
founded not on causality, but on a teleology which impells humanityj 
to strive for progress. Durkheim states, 
"One can well understand that the progress in a given period 
makes new fields of progress possible - But how does it pre- 
determine them? - one would have to admit an inherent tendency 
that impels humanity ceaselessly to go beyond its achievements ... 
and the object of sociology would be the manner in which this 
tendency developed. Butt without harking back to the difficulties 
such a hypothesis implies, there could not be anything causal 
about the law which expresses this development. , 
79 
Durkheim's interpretation is, however, inconsistent with 
Comte's assertion that the law is modelled on the pat tern of 
explanation of the natural sciences. The inevitability of the 
law could be derived from a mechanistic interpretation of social 
causality rather than from a theory of human nature. Comte attri- 
butes an autonomy to human knowledge which is defin. ed as a reality 
in its own right and not as a moment of a general evolution. 
80 
He then explains social development to be a result of an evolution 
of human knowledge. If, however, the move to abstract human 
knowledge from its historical context was blocked then it could 
no longer be projected as an ultimate explanatory principle 
because it would itself be an historical result of social develop- 
ment. Comte faces a theoretical dilemma. He could defend the 
inexorability of the law of progress by ascribing a supra-histo- 
rical effectivity to human knowledge. Alternatively, he could 
histoiicise human knowledge, but only at the cost of undermining 
the inexorability of the law of progress. In the first case, he 
would abandon the scientific enterprise for a metaphysical theory 
of development. In the second, he would remain committed to the 
principles of scientific inquiry only at the cost of abandoning 
his positivist notion of social causation. This is a dilemma 
which is not unique to Comtea, &ý-, sociology, but is one which 
emerges whenever a mechanistic causal analogy is applied to social 
science. For as long as positivist sociology insists on applying 
a mechanicisin or real opposition conception of causality to social 
phenomena, it will inevitably face the dilemma of abandoning this 
analogy or else of abandoning the possibility of social science. 
Humanist sociology challenges the positivist unity of science 
thesis by arguing that the subject matter of social science is 
unique in containing a specifically volun I taristic element. 
81 
Insofar as the humanists remain committed to the scientific enter- 
prise, they hold the view that social scientific explanation should 
be founded on principles compatible with what they assume to be 
the nature of social or human phenomena. Weber, for instancer in- 
sisted that sociological explanation must always involve a 
reference to a voluntaristic element even if the social action to 
be explained involved a deviation from a pure type of teleological 
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action. Two theoretical problems arise from the humanist 
approach to sociology. Firstr the humanists must show how the 
teleological or voluntaristic element is consistent with a scien- 
tific explanation of social phenomena. Secondly, they should 
attempt to vindicate the teleological assumption through the 
practice of science, even if this leads to a modification of their 
original theoretical orientation. 
Weber attempts to explain social action, which forms the 
object of his "verstehende Soziolocri in terms of its relation 
to a set of rational types of which a pure form of teleological 
action - "Zweckrationalhandeln" - is the paradigmatic example. 
Here the actor's free choice of rational ends and means explain 
the subsequent course of his action. Behaviour determined by 
"external" causes is deemed to be merely reactive without relation 
to teleology and, therefore, beyond the rp-blm of social action. 
However, in his substantive workr as I have shown, Weber con- 
cluded that bureaucratisation, as the culmination of a process 
of rationalisation, is the inevitable fate (Schicksal) of the 
West. Weber's methodology, therefore, generates a piece of 
sociological theorising which assumes an inevitablistic conception 
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of social causality, evidently in contradiction with a voluntaris- 
tic conception of social action. If bureaucratisation were truly 
inevitable then it would be absurd to explain it on the basis of 
a reference to a teleology because the inevitability of the social 
process precludes the free play of action which forms the starting 
point of the methodology. Weber, like Comtelis faced with a theo- 
retical dilemma. Either he defends his humanist assumption and 
abandons science or else he remains committed to the method of 
science, with the consequence that he must abandon his theory of 
action. This theoretical dilemma locates Weber squarely in the 
mechanical causality/humanistic teleology problematic I have al- 
ready investigated. It is apparent, therefore, that Weber's 
voluntaristic theory of action is contradicted by a mechanistic 
view of the process of rationalisation and bureaucratisation. I 
merely need to reiterate that neither side of this polarity 
succeeds in developing a scientifically adequate theory of history, 
simply because this polar opposition must result in a methodology 
which abstracts either social "laws" or man as an abstract subject 
from the historical process. In short, such a problematic commits 
social science to a supra-historical approach to the study of 
social change. 
The structural functionalists are also trapped within this 
theoretical polarity. Hempel notes, for example, how structural 
functionalism arose originally out of a teleological tradition in 
social thought. He states,, 
_ 
"Historically speaking, functional analysis is a modification 
of teleological explanation, ie. rof explanation not by reference 
to causes which "bring out" the event in question, but by refe- 
rence to ends which determine its course. , 
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The later functionalists, - however,, have outgrown their 
humanistic roots and now adhere to a model of explanation which is, 
in principle compatible-with a positivist conception of scienti- 
ficity. Hempel argues that functional explanations of this type 
have the following logical structure: they attempt to explain an, 
activity "I" in a system I'S" by showing "S11-is in a state or 
internal condition "Cl" and in an external environment "CV, such 
that under these two conditions "C",, "I" has effects which satisfy 
some functional requirement of 'IS",, ie,, a condition "N""which is 
necessary for the system's adequate or "normal" working order. 
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Functional explanation involves an implicit reference-to deductive- 
nomological laws since both the causal role of "I" and"'N" can 
only be substantiated if they are instances of well-established 
lawlike regularities. Howeverr the activity "I" cannot'be"derived 
from generalisations concerning I'S" and 'IN" unless ora regardS "I" 
to be functionally indispensible for the'system I'S"*' If,, on the 
other handf the condition 'IN" could be fulfilled by other activi- 
ties, then it would not be*possible to derive the particular 
activity "I" from the general'conditions of 'IS" fulfilled by 'IN". 
Functionalists generally reject the concept of functional indis- 
pensibilityand -maintain that'different activitie's can and do per- 
form the same function and this position is given an overt theore- 
85 tical expression in'the notion of "functional equivalents 
If,, however,, the'explanandum, "I" cannot be derived from, the 
functional pattern of, explanations, it-follows-that the attribution 
of "I"! 5---functional importance to a system "S"can only be made 
on ad hoc grounds which are, strictly'speakingr external to func- 
tionalist theory. ýThe functionalists, must either assume functional 
indispensibi'Lity in which case they generate the anomaly of 
functional equivalents which they claim characterise social systems, 
or else they retain the concept of functional equivalencef but 
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then the functional pattern of explanation fails to account for 
the alleged causal significance of its explanandum. 
Structural functionalists should also provide objective 
criteria of a system's "normal" working order,, because activities 
are supposedly explained only as they contribute to this state. 
If. however, societies are in a constant state of flux and 
development, it would seem that the search for cri-Eeria of norma- 
lity, which presuppose the social totality is ordered and inter- 
nally equilibratedr is an impossible task. The functionalists 
therefore find it impossible to account for the endemic phenomena 
of social conflicti, crisis and disorder. Indeed, the theoretical 
encounter with these prima facie anomalies for the functionalist 
model of explanation, prompts Merton to formulate the concept of 
" 86 a "dysfunction It is apparent,, however,, that a "dysfunction" 
can be either functional or dysfunctional. If a dysfunction is 
functional, then despite its dysfunctional appearance it fulfills, 
in reality, a functional pre-requisite. However, in the absence 
of objective criteria for the ascription of functional and 
dysfunctional properties to social activities, it would be possible 
to regard all prima facie anomalies as functional without advanc- 
ing social theory to an adequate account of either "functional" 
or "dysfunctional" phenomena. If,, on the other hand, a dysfunc- 
tion is genuinely dysfunctional, then ipso facto the functiona- 
list's notion of an equilibrated social totality must be amended* 
However, such a modification necessarily implies an abandonment 
of the functionalist model of explanation because it is inextric- 
ably connected with a notion ofasocial whole which is in normal 
working order. As soon as the functionalists confront the ano- 
malies generated by the analysis of social change, they are obli- 
gedp in the interests of science, to abandon functionalism as an 
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adequate form of social scientific explanation. Againt these 
theoretical problems are generated by an allegiance to a funda- 
mentally mechanistic understanding of social causality. Hence, 
the functionalists employ an analogy from cybernetics in which 
relations between parts and whole are mechanically determined by 
their pre-allocated place in a closed system. The critical 
analysis above adequately demonstrates the theoretical limitations 
of developing social scientific theory on this foundation. 
I have demonstrated how all these schools of sociological 
thought make prior assumptions about the object of studyl theore- 
tical assumptions which generate anomalies and internal incon- 
sistencies. These anoinalies, it seems, can only be superseded ly 
a theory - change. Consequently, each of these schools of socio- 
logical thought face a similar dilemma. They must either accept 
theory-change and abandon their identities as schools of thought; 
or alternatively, they may retain their specific orientations, 
but only, at the cost of absolutising their initial theoretical 
assumptions. In the first case, they would remain committed to 
the principles of scientific inquiry, but lose their identities 
as distinctive schools of thought. In the second, they would 
retain this identityr but would abandon the principles of scien- 
tific inquiry. If these schools refused to supersede the anoma- 
lies in the required process of theory change, then it would 
appear that their theoretical accounts of social life would be 
inescapably metaphysical. They would degenerate from attempts 
at a social science to just another form of metaphysics. A 
dialectico-causal interpretation of Marx's methodology, on the 
other hand, is founded on a commitment to the historicity of con- 
cept construction in social science which compels it both to avoid 
any absolute approach to historical ontology, and to amend its 
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theory in the face of anomalies even if this should, in the last 
analysis, compromise its original conception of the methodology 
of social science. 
I DO 
CHAPTER 6 MARX'S REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE 
Having developed a dialectico-causal interpretation of 
historical materialism, I intend to argue in this chapter that 
Marx used this idea of social causality to develop his critique 
of classical political economy. I present this critique as a 
revolution in science in the sense outlined in Chapter 1. In 
additiont I contend that if one understands Marx's value-theory 
on the basis of the principles of a dialectico-causal interpreta- 
tion of capitalism as a mode of production, then it is possible 
to show how certain classical "problems" of Marxist political 
economy like the so-called transformation problem, may well be 
based on a misunderstanding of Marx's methodology: and his theore- 
tical aims. In order to support these arguments, however, it is 
necessary to expound Marx's value theory in its most general- 
terms. The first three sections of this chapter are concerned, 
therefore, with a general exposition of the form and'substance 
of value, Marx's theory of surplus value and finally with Marx's 
analysis of the prices of production. 
6.1 THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF VALUE 
In order to clarify the manner in which the law of value 
operates in the capitalist economyl it is-essential to begin with 
a clear exposition of Marx's conceptual tools. For this reason 
I intend to begin with Marx's notion of the relationship between 
the form and substance of value before proceeding to his account 
of the law of value. - MY aim is not merely to expound Marx's 
political economy as it stands in his writings# but also to 
remove certain ambiguities in his value-theory which may inhibit 
an adequate account of the reproduction and development of capit- 
alism as a mode of production. 
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According to Marx, the-value-form is a specific form of the 
representation of social labour (ie labour for others) which 
comes into existence with the development of commodity exchange 
and commodity production. It is this value-form which underlies 
all the phenomenal expressions of value in concrete forms of 
value eg prices, -, profitt rent etc. 
1 
If, a product is'produced 
or sold as a commodity, then the labour it contains cannot appear 
directly as labour for others. Under, conditions of commodity 
exchange or commodity production, labour only becomes labour for 
others once the product has been exchanged as a, commodity. Social 
labour can only be expressed? therefore;, -in the value of a, product 
as a commodity. 
2 In this situation# theývalue-form expresses , 
not only social labour per se, but also the, social -relations of 
production which give rise to the-displaced-appearance of social 
labour in the value of a commodity. -These relations of production 
consist in private ownership of commodities and the means of, pro- 
duction for producing commodities., -In the context of such rela- 
tions, each commodity producer cannot continue as a commodity- 
producer unless he exchangesýthe commodities he produces. In 
the absence of commodity exchange, private commodity producers 
would be unable to reproduce themselves as agents of production. 
By facilitating commodity-exchange, therefore, the-value-form 
plays an indispensible role, under, conditions-of commodity pro- 
ductionrin-determining the reproduction, of the'labour process. 
This process is taken one step further in capitalist-society'. 
In the capitalist mode of production labour-power as well as the 
means of production-take on the-value-form'and-are, ", b-ought and 
sold as coruiodities. 
3 
-In this situation, -it is possible for 
money to produce relations of production directly through pur- 
chasing the elements of production--and bringing them--together to 
- 170 - 
produce commodities. On the surface of capitalist society, there- 
fore,, it appears as if money and commodities-are directly res- 
ponsible for reproducing the labour-process. Marx termed this 
4 
phenomenon "commodity fetishism" . Without denying the pheno- 
menal reality of commodity fetishismF Marx revealed how the power 
of money and commodities to determine the reproduction of the 
labour-process has historical pre-conditions. The exchange of 
commodities-can only perform such a role where private ownership 
of the elements of production exists. Only in the context of the 
social relations of commodity production does the reproduction 
of the labour-process necessarily involve commodity exchange. 
Whereas this is only a marginal feature of societies which organise 
their production largely independently of commodity production, 
it is'indispensable once the social relations, of production be- 
tween independent commodity producers are realised through commo-, 
dity-exchange. This is the case in capitalist commodity pro- 
duction. Social labour, in the context of, the social relations 
of production of capitalism, for thisýreason,, must be expressed 
in the'value-form of the commodity. 
It should be clear fromthe exposition above that Marx's 
analysis of the value-form as an expression of social labour 
brou4ht about by the social relations of commodity productiont 
will play a key role in the understanding of the reproduction of 
the labour-process in societies based on generalised commodity 
production. Now according to Marx the reproduction of the labour 
process through commodity exchange is not a random process, but 
one determined by the expenditure of socially necessary labour- 
time. ' 5 For Marx, therefore,, 'the law of value in its most general 
terms-refers to the process whereby the prices at whichýproducts 
exchange in generalised commodity production ie. j capitalism, are 
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somehow determined by the expenditure, of socially necessary labour 
time. I-havej, however, run ahead of my analysis. Before it is 
possible to determine the movement of prices in commodity exchange 
according to the law of Value, it is necessary to be clear as to 
the nature of the. "labour" responsible-for determkii)gvalue as a 
magnitude. Whereas social relations of production are respon- 
sible for the form of, value, the question of the magnitude of 
value is decided by an analysis'of the quantity of"Ilabour" ex- 
pended in production., This, ibrings us to Marx's discussion of 
the substance of value. 
Marx began his analysis of the substance of value by noting 
that'every labour-process, involved the production of use-values. 
The diverse,,, useful aspectsof products, were, Marx maintained, ýan 
outcome'of the expenditure'of different types-of concrete labour. 
6 
Use-value production is the precondition of the reproduction of 
human life and of, human history. So concrete labour has to exist 
in all modes of'production. In pre-capitalist societies, concrete 
labour is also, for the most,, part,, directly social labour; 'but 
in generalised commodity production social labour is displaced in 
the form'of value of the product. Labour for others becomes 
embodied in the value of the commodity and not in, its. 'use-value. 
Marx concluded, thereforef that concrete labour could, not be the 
substance-of value. ' Consequently, even-though concrete labour 
is a precondition of'commodityýproduction since the, coMModity is 
a unity of value and use-value, it has no direct role in the anal- 
ysis-of the value-form and the magnitude of, value. " 
The labours embodied in the-displaced form of the value-of 
a commodity are expressed as labour which is qualitatively equal. 
Commodity exchange'equalises commodities as value-products regard- 
-1 /Z - 
less of their multifarious characteristics as products of concrete 
labour. This qualitatively equal and homogeneous labour cannot 
be concrete labour. Once one abstracts from the concrete forms 
of labour, however, one is left with nothing but the abstract 
character of labour as an expression of the expenditure of labour- 
8 time. Marx argued, therefore# that it was this "abstract labour" 
which was the substance of value of a commodity. From this analy- 
sis it follows that under conditions of commodity production, 
labour can only become social labour insofar as it is also 
abstract labour which is expressed in the value-form of commodi- 
ties. 
Marx emphasises that abstract labour counted as value-produc- 
ing labo'ur only if it was also socially necessary labour,. 1 -9 The 
proof of the social necessity of labour in generalised commodity 
production is accomplished by the exchange of a commodity as a 
value. If a commodity cannot be sold, then the abstract labour it 
contains is void and does not count as socially necessary or value- 
producing labour. This explains an alleged anomaly of the labour 
theory of value. It is often maintained that as products of 
labour, commodities which prove unsaleable have value, but no 
price. This "fact" is then put forward as a "proof" that there 
is no necessary relation between price and value in the capitalist 
economy. However, a condition of a commodity possessing value is 
that it is a product not only of'abstract, but of socially neces- 
sary labour. For a commodity to have a value without a price 
is straightforwardly not possible since commodities have value 
only insofar as they are exchangeable ie. j only insofar as they 
are products of socially necessary labour. Yett of necessity, this 
implies that the value of a commodity must take on a price-form 
as a condition of its sale in the capitalist economy. In this 
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context there are no commodities which somehow possess value and 
yet do not express their value in the form of relative prices. 
The objection to the law of value outlined above can be viewed 
as a misunderstanding of Marx's general theory. 
According to Marx's value theory, the value of a commodity is 
determined by "the quantity of labour necessary for its production 
in a given state of society, under given average social conditions 
with a given social average intensity and average skill of labour 
employed. " 
10 The value of. a commodity is a socially relative 
magnitude which has no necessary relationship to a quantity of 
labour measured, in any. sort of physiological units - whatever 
form such units may take. 
11 The value of a commodity, as a 
social quantityl will express-'an aliquot-portion of the total 
social labour expended in. the production of commodities. It 
follows, in the context of this analysis that "every increase in 
the quantity of labour wanted for the production of a commodity 
must, augment its value, every diminution lower it. " ý 
12 
An abstract formulation of the law of value alone does not 
provide the basis for an analysis of the development and reproduc- 
tion of the productive process under conditions of capitalist 
production. It is merely the first stage in-the development of 
an adequate value-theory. The determination of commodity prices 
by socially necessary labour only comes about through a whole 
series of deviations of prices from value. 
13 If Marx is to 
explain the operation of the law of value through a series of 
fluctuationslof prices from value, then he must begin by making 
a clear theoretical distinction between value as determined 
exclusively by socially necessary labour time, and the expression 
of yalue in the price-form. However, following the letter of 
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Marx's treatment of value in capital Vol. 1 part 1, section 1., 
one will discover. that Marx 'treated ex6hange-value 
as if it were directly reducible to abstract-labour! If, this 
were 'the case the implication would be that an equal exchange 
of commodities expressed in price-terms would, ipso facto represent 
'an equal exchange in value-terms. Such a position overtly con- 
tradicts Marx's insistent claim that the law of value only oper- 
ated through a deviation of prices from value. 
Marx fortunately corrected his treatment of value in "section 
31' of Capital part 1,, where he argued that it is not possible 
to reduce exchange-valueýdirectly to abstract-labour, because 
value always mediated the relation between the e xpenditure of 
socially necessa'ry labour time and the expression of'value I in 
exchange. The'relationships-#, fo'r Marxf bet; ýde'n abstract labo'ur 
and prices can only be'understood through a prior determination 
of'value in general. It is through the relationship'to value 
that one should then understand the value-mediated relationship 
between'abstract labour'-and piices in the capitalist I econo'my. 
abstract laboui"is only expressed mediately through value-and 
if 
the value-forms, then there can'be no direct reduction of prices 
to labour quantities. ' Marx clarified his position when he made 
exchange-Value dependent on value. Exchange-value'is theorised 
as a phenomenal expression of value and not as a direct expres- 
sion of abstract labour. Marx claimed, therefore, that-'all 
commodities'are expressions of value and consequently possess 
"a value form common to them all and presenting a marked contrast 
with the varied'bodily forms of use-value 1 . 11 
14 
If'Marx had failed to correct his-early reduction of'exchange- 
value to abstract'labour, then he would have been unable to'accoun- 
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for price-formation in the capitalist economy since commodity 
pricesp under conditions of capitalist production, are not direct 
expressions of value, but are rather determined by prices of pro-__ 
duction. Evidently, Marx's general formulation of the law of 
value and his conceptual distinction between the form and sub- 
stance of value are merely preliminary steps towards a more ade- 
quate theory of price foi; Mation and its role in the reproduction 
and development of capitalism as a mode of production. 
6.2 MARX'S THEORY OF SURPLUS-VALUE 
On-the surface of capitalist society it may appear, that 
price-formation is determined by the law of supply and demand. 
i 
on closer scrutiny it will be noted, that levels of supply and 
demand are, in turn, regul ated by prices of production, 
15 Accord- 
ing to Marx, the price of production consists of the cost price 
of a commodity K- the price of the elements of production#, and the 
average rate of prof it -P- allotted to individual capitals in the 
course of capitalist competition. Competition brings out the price 
of production since capital will only cease moving in or,. moving 
out of a specific branch of production once its individual rate of 
profit conforms to the average-rateýof profit for the whole. - 
economy. Thus, the, competition ofýcapitals leads to the, formation, 
of an average rate of profit in the long terml, on account of the 
ceaseless search for the highest rate of profit. If, this 
tendency towards the-formation of prices of production ceased to 
operate$ then it would cause dislocation in an,. econoTy based on 
the profit-motive since-the various branches of theýeconomy would 
only continue to produce insofar. as, they receive something 
approaching-the average rate-of profit. It should be apparentr 
therefore, that the formation of production prices plays a crucial 
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role in the reproduction of the labour-process in capitalism. It 
appears to be through theformation of production prices,, that 
the distribution of capital and therefore of social necessary 
labour-time is achieved in a mode of production which has no 
mechanism for regulating the productive process either by tradi- 
tion or by social-'planning. - 
Marx-noted in Volume 3-of "Capital" that the price of pro- 
duction was brought out-by capital'ist"competition. He also argued 
that the-average rate of, profit'. was-not an arbitary phenomenont 
but rather was'a definite, magnitude to be determined -in value- 
terms. Marx recognised, thereforer the need to-de. velop. a.. theory 
of capitalist profitýwhich would be consistent with the labour 
theory of value., This would be a precondition of developing an 
understanding of price-formation in the capitalist economy con- 
sistent with the'law of value.. For, this-reason Marx, ascribed 
major importance to his theory of surplus-value first developed 
16 in 1859 withýthe discovery of"labour-power. 
Marx's discussion of capitalist profit begins with the assump- 
tion of equivalent exchange. Although Marx was aware that commo- 
dities-do, not exchange as equivalents, in the capitalist economy. 
except in-the socially average, case whereýprices express the price 
of production and the latter is a direct'representation of valuej, 
he nevertheless insisted this was the correct theoretical starting 
point.. The assumption-of equivalent exchange has two important 
'functions. 'First,, it poses the problem of explaining profit in 
the, sphere of production in-abstraction from the sphere of, . 
exchange, ýand the distribution of profit. Secondly,, -it corresponds 
to the reality of capitalist exchange in the sociallyýaverage 
case. In this-situation equivalents-exchange and yet the average- 
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rate of profit, is still realised. Marx was justifiedf so it seems, 
when he claimed that if you are unable to explain capitalist profit 
on the assumption., of equivalent exchange, then, "you cannot explain 
it, at all. " 
1ý7 
Marx's attempt to explain capitalist profit on the basis of 
the labour, theory of value arose, from a critical encounter with 
the theoretical inconsistencies of classical political economy. 
once value is to be determined by labour-time according to the 
law of valuej,, it would appear that classical political economists 
like Smith, and Ricardo should determine profit a value-f orm -as 
a. deduction of, the value-product created by labour. Marx noted,, 
howeverr that the classicists believed: that the magnitude of 
profit as a deduction ofthe general value-product, could only be 
established once political economy had-. determined the., "value of 
labour". 18 However, the. theoretical attempt, to determine the 
"value of labour" leads inevitably, to contradictions and incon- 
sistencies. for. a labour theory of valuq. In the, firstf to deter-_ 
mine the value of labour by labour is tautologous. Marx argued, 
therefore, thatj 
, "To say that the value of a ten hour. s working day is equal 
to ten hours labour, or the quantity contained in it, would be 
a, tautological and, more over, a nonsensical expression. " 
19 
This tautology assumes,, in addition, that the labourer, receives 
the whole of the value-product. No conceptual space is left for 
a theory of profit founded on a labour theory of value. In this 
formulation, the labour theory of value as a determination of 
the value. of commodities and the theory of capitalist profit are 
seemingly irreconcilable. The fundamental, weakness of this 
II %J 
approach consists in the fact thatj as Marx observed "there exists 
no such thing as the value of labour in the common acceptance of 
the word. " 
20 Even though labour, or to be more precise, socially 
necessary labour is undeniably the substance of value, labour 
can have no value in-itself. It is the subject of the labour- 
process and not its product.. 
21 The labour theory of value can 
only determine the value of commodities and obviously not the 
value of the labour which produces these commodities. 
The failure of Adam Smith to realise the impossibility of 
determining the "value of labour" led inevitably to inconsistencies 
in his theory of profit., For instancer even though Smith succeeded 
in analysing "profit, rent and interest as deductions from the 
product of the workers' labour" he failed toýwork out an adequate 
22 theoretical foundation for this analysis. His theory of 
profit as a deduction from the value-product created by the labou- 
rer,, is inconsistent with his determination of the "value of 
labour"-which assumes the labourer receives, the whole of the value 
product. In fact, such is the extent of Smith's theoretical 
confusion, that he put forward a costs of labour theory of value 
as if it were also a labour theory of value. 
23 In this theory, 
the value of commodities is determined by the amount of wages 
their production cost. The existence of capitalist profit, how- 
ever, reveals that their value is consistently-above the value 
of the wages which the labourer receives. Instead of developing 
the labour theory of value to account for the difference between 
the value of the labourer's wages and the value of his product, 
Smith resorted to a summation theory in which the value of a- 
commodity was analysed as a summation of three independent sources 
of value viz labour, capital and land. 
24 These three elements 
contribute the value of wages, profit and rent respectively. If, 
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however# these sources of-value are independent and mutually 
irreducible, 'then it follows that a summation theory of value 
diverges from a'laboUr theory which determines value'exclusively 
by labour-time. 'Smith's attempt to account for capitalist profit 
through a prior determination of the value Of , labour"leads, 
finally, to the abandonment of the labour theory of value. 
Ric I ardo,, Marx obs'erved'y attempted to improve on'Smith's 
treatment'of the problem. In the first place, he admonished Smith 
for confusing the "incorrect" determination of the value of a 
commodity by the cost of the labour'involved'in'itsproduction, 
with the'"correct" determination of value by the quantity-of labour 
a commodity contains'. Ricardo claimed that, 
"The value of a commodity#,, or the quantity of any other 
commodity 'for which it WI ill exchanger depends on the relative 
quantity of labour which i's ne66ssary for its production-and-'- 
not on the greaýe'r'or les'sercompensation which is paid for that 
labour. 25 
Ricardo, however, had'still to work out'a'solution to the 
vexed problem of the'"value of-labour". Atý'first, he'determi'ned' 
the "value of labour" by the value of "the means Of subsistence 
which'in Ia given S101 ciety, 'are-'traditionally necessary for the 
26 maintenance and reproduction of the labouier. "- The"valub of 
the means of subsistence are determined in turn, howeverl'by the 
law of supply and demand and, not by the-law of value. Marx 
noted that Ricardo "determines value here, in'one of th'e"basic 
propositions of the whole system, by-demand-and supply as Say 
notes with malicious pleasure. 
27 
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But if the law of value is supposed to explain the law of 
supply and demand, it is evidently self-defeating for this-theory 
of value to determine the "value of labour" by supply and demand! 
This procedure led Ricardo'into the vicious circle where,, tautolo- 
gously, value is determined'by value. Marx noted that in Ricardo's 
formulation, 
"The value of labour is determined by the value of the money 
which is paid for it.,, 
28 
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Despite this failure, Ricardo, does succeed at another point 
of his analysis, when he determines the'ývalue of average wages 
consistently with the labour theory of value. Marx claimed that 
for Ricardo the value of average wages was to be "determined 
neither by the money, nor the means of subsistence which the 
labourerzeceivest but by-the labour-time which, it, costs to pro- 
duce it,, ie.,,, by the quantity of, labour materialised in the, means' 
of subsistence of the labour. " 
29 
Ricardo succeeded in a correct determination of the value 
of average wages because he abandoned the impossible task of 
determining the "value of labour" and instead successfully deter- 
mined the value of the means of subsistence. as an expressionýof 
labour-time. Ricardo's treatment of average-wages revealed the' 
division of the working day between the labour-time necessary-to 
produce the means of subsistence ie., the value of average-wagest 
and labour-time surplus to this requirement which is the source 
of capitalist profit. Ricardo unwittingly, determined not the 
"value of labour" but the value of "laboUr-power" ieý,, of the, 
labourer's capacity to produce value as a labourer, which is in- 
extricably bound up with the reproduction of the means of sub- 
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sistence. Marx developed-this "estranged-insight" in Ricardo's 
political economy to the point where-he could at last-reconcile 
the law of value with a theory of profit and explicate a single 
measure of value viz,, Socially necessary labour-time which could 
be applied to determining the value of all commodities in the 
30 
capitalist economy including that of-labour-power. This is 
the theoretical foundation of his theory of, surplus-value. 
A labour, theory of value assumed that no new value-can be 
created--by, the exchange of commodities. Value is a magnitude 
determined exclusively by-the expenditure of labour-time. The- 
value of products-as commodities-will, remain the same regardless 
of the final pattern of distribution of that value. -As Marx 
stated, 
"If commodities are sold at their values, then the magnitude 
of value in the-hands of buyer and seller remains unchanged. Only, j 
the form of existence is changed. If commodities are not sold-at 
their values, then the sum of converted values remains unchanged, 
the plus on one side is a minus on the, other. , 
31 
A genuine valorisation of, capital refers to the process wherebyl 
an initial sum of money has augmented its-value so that it can 
now command more products of labour than previously. 
32 Accord-, 
ing to a "labour theory of value", ýthe source of this valorisation 
cannot be found in the sphere-of exchange or-the distribution of 
value since exchange merely re-distributes a pre-determined value 
magnitude. On the contrary, insofar as, -the augmentation of capi- 
tal is conditional on the appropriation of new value rather than 
the distribution of value products already existing, then the 
source of this new value can only be discovered in the sphere of 
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production. The secret of capitalist profit-'should be revealed, 
therefore, in-the analysis of what occurs-in the process of-pro- 
duction. 
According to Marx, the circuit of industrial-capital begins 
with money capital which is transformed into productive capital 
when the capitalist purchases, as commodities, the means of pro- 
duction and labour-power. 
33 The means of production, raw 
materials and'all otherelements of the productive process except 
labour-power form parts of constant capital'whose value is al- 
ready determined by the socially necessary labour time for-their 
production prior to their role in, production. 
34 Consequently, 
constant capital can only transfer onto the final product such 
value as it already possesses and this transferrence-of value can 
only occur insofar as labour-power productively consumes the means 
of, production in the labour-process. The wage-labourer-transfers 
the value of constant capital C onto the productr'creates the 
value of the wages used to purchase his labour-power ie., 'variable 
capital-Wand produces a "surplus-value" S over 'and above that 
portion of capital us'ed to buy his capacity to labour. 
35 It - is 
the surplus-labour of the wage-labourer materialised'in-the value 
of the product which forms the source of surplus-value and of 
capitalist profit. This surplus-labour,, as the only possible 
source of a real valorisation of the initial sum of money invested 
in the'elements of capital,, depends on the: rp- being a difference 
between the value of labour-power as bought and sold in the 
sphere of exchange' and the value of its product. ItAs only 
possible to determine surplus-value as a magnitude,, therefore, 
through a prior determination of the value-of labour-power. 
Marx determined the value of labour-power by the labour-time 
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socially necessary for its production and reproduction. 
36 This 
means its value is determined by the labour-time socially neces- 
sary for reproducing the wage-labourer as a wage-labourer since 
the capacity to labour is not separable from, the existence of the 
labourer. The value of labour-power is determined,, therefore,, by 
the labour time socially necessary to produce the means of sub- 
sistence. 
Marx observed that labour-power was unique as aýcommodity in 
being inextricably linked to a class of wage-labourers. Unlike 
other commodities, its value contained a moral or historical- 
element which varied according to the cultural level of the 
37 
working class. The value of-the means of subsistence is there-,, 
fore a socially relative magnitude. It is not pre-givent but 
determined by the class struggle in capitalist society. There ist 
even so, an upper and lower limit to the value of labour-power in 
the capitalist economy. The capitalist must be able to buy labourjý 
power in sufficient quality and quantity, and to buy it at, a pricejý 
which makes possible the valorisation of his capital. Consequen- 
tly,, although the value of labour-power is indeed socially rela- 
tive, it oscillates between the objective limits of the minimum to 
reproduce the means of subsistence, and the maximum where it wouldl, ( 
erode the capitalists' source of profit. 
Marx's analysis of capitalist profit sidesteps, the pseudo- 
problem of determining the value of labour and instead correctly 
determines the value of labour-power. The distinction between 
labour and labour-power facilitates an analysis of profit which 
is consistent with the labour theory of value and which escapes 
the vicious circle which dogged Smith's and Ricardo's treatment 
of -the problem. It is not the actual expenditure of labour-time 
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which the capitalist buys, but rather the labourer's capacity to 
labour. This is bought at its value viz the value of the means 
of subsistence. Labour-power, howeverr possesses the use-value 
of producing a surplus-value in excess of the amount it receives 
in the form of wages. It is this difference between the value 
of labour-power and the value of its product which is the source 
of all capitalist revenues: commodities can exchange as equiva- 
lents and yet the capitalist can realise a surplus-value in the 
form of profit. This possibility exists because the value-com- 
position of the commodityl under capitalist conditions, consists 
of C- the value transformed onto the commodity by the elements 
of constant - capital, V- the value created by labour power as 
an equivalent for its wages, and S- the surplus value created 
by the expenditure of labour-power. 
39 Cr V and S as components 
of a single value-product are magnitudes determined byýthe labour- 
time socially necessary for their production. Marx's theory of 
surplus-value is perfectly consistent with the law of value. 
Value is still determined by socially necessary labour time even 
when, as in the capitalist mode of production it-is, invariably 
expressed as a relation between necessary labour-time devoted to 
the production of the means of subsistence and surplus labour- 
time which determines the magnitude of surplus-value shared by 
the capitalist appropriators. 
An exact expression of the rate of surplus-value-is given by 
the ratio of S/V. 
39 As S and V are expressions of the ratio of 
surplus labour-time to necessary labour time, one can also formu- 
late the rate of surplus value as surplus labour-time/necessary 
labour time. S can be calculated by subtracting V from the total 
value product: C can be discounted insofar as it reappears in 
the-product. The rate of profit expresses surplus-value as a 
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ratio of total capital and is formulated as SIC+V. 
40 - if S/C+V 
is taken to be an expression of total'surplus value in relation 
to total social capital then it would express the general rate 
of profit in value-terms prior to its phenomenal expression and 
distribution among the many, competing capitals. - This'value 
determination of the general rate of, profit is of fundamental 
importance to Marx's theory of the concrete workings of the law 
of value as determined by exchange at prices of production in the 
capitalist economy. 
6.3 MARX'S THEORY OF THE PRICES OF PRODUCTION 
It is now possible to explicate Marx's account of the-concrete 
workings of the law of value which is contained in his theory of 
the prices of production developed in volume three of "Capital". " 
Before Marx could elaborate his value theory in this context, how- 
ever, he had first to overcome an apparent contradiction between 
the law of value and capitalist commodity exchange. In virtue 
of-the formation of a general or average rate of profit in the 
capitalist economy, capitals yield profits not in correspondence 
with their own individual value rates of profit, but do so, in- 
stead, -in proportion to their size. This implies,, however,, a 
prima facie contradiction for the law of value since it means that 
exchange at production prices necessarily involves a deviation of 
prices from value-magnitudes. ' Individual capitals would,, -it seemspli 
rarely if ever receive the exact value of the, product they created. 11 
Ratherp a redistribution of value must take place through capita- 
list commodity exchange. I intend to analyse how Marx reconciles 
this phenomenon-'with his general value-theory by tracing his 
treatment of this problem through his critique of the theories of 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo. 
In his-ýýhýori'es of'ý'urplus--Value, Marx criticis'ed Ricardo 
for treating the long-term price at which commodities exchange in 
the capitalist economy as if it were a direct expression of value. 
Adam Smith, on the other handv was praided by Marx for emphasising 
the apparent contradict ion between price formation according to 
production prices and the abstract formulation of the law of 
value. Marx statest 
"It is his (Smith's) theoretical strength that he feels and 
stresses thi's contradiction, just as it is his theoretical weak- 
41 
ness that it stakes his confidence in the general law..... ' 
Although Ricardo was ahead of Smith insofar as his general 
theory of value is concerned, Marx observed he was behind Smith 
in his account of commodity exchange under conditions of capita- 
list production. Marx states, 
"But, he (Ricardo) is behind Smith in that he does not even 
suspect that-this presents a problem'. and therefore the specific 
development which the law of value undergoes with the formation 
of capital does not for a moment puzzle him or even attract his 
42 
attention. " 
Marx argued that the correct reaction is neither to abandon 
the law of value to account for exchange at prices of production, 
nor to deny or ignore the regulation of exchange through the 
formation of anaverage rate of profit. Marx sought to demons- 
trate how,, "an equal-average rate of profit can and must come 
about, not only without a violation of the law of valuel but 
43 
on the very basis of it. " 
Marx's account of the formation of an average rate of profit 
has its theoretical foundation in an analysis of capitalism-as a 
mode of production based on a dialectical unity of production 
and exchange. The necessary I relationship betWeen socially 
necessary labour time and prices is jointly determined by the 
spheres of production and exchange-. In the first instance, --pro- 
duction as the source of all value products - is-also the source 
of capitalist profit. Regardless of the distribution of profite 
the average rate of profit is-always an expression-of"'the rela- 
tion of total surplus-value to the total social capital. ' The 
exchange of commodities at prices of'production only affects the 
distribution of surplus-value-and not its actual magnitude. 
Precisely for this reasonj without a value analysis of the average 
rate of profit, the whole notion of"a general rate of Profit 
would be, from the outset,, a vague and arbitary construction'. 
Even though all capitalist revenues including p'rofit'are 
created in the-productiVe process, -an avera'ge'rate, of profit 
will only come about in the capitalist economy insofar as competi-) 
tion between capitals is freely're*peated. ' The formation of, an 
average rate of-profit is, the'refore, 'co--de"termined by the'sphere 
of exchange in which the many, capitals compete. Indeed,, -Marx 
went so far as to suggest'that the law of value could 'only 
operate in the context of capitalist competition. ' In the 
"Grundrisse"j, he stated, -' 
"Free " competition is the relation of capital itself'to 
another capital, I ie., the real conduct of capital as capital. 
The inner laws of capital - which'appear merely as tendencies 
in the preliminary'stages of de'velopmen t'- are for the first time 
Posited as laws : _,, 
44 
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The-law of valuej, it seems#, can assert itself only through 
the-formation-of prices of production in-the capitalist, economy. 
According to Marx#, the average. rate of profit can-be, no more 
nor less. than; a magnitude of surplus-value determined exclusively 
in the sphere of production and expressed as a relation to the 
total social capital. However, this magnitude of, surplus-value 
is distributed among the many competing capitals not, in propor-.,,, 
tion to their individual value compositions, but rather in pro- 
portion. to their size. A distribution of surplus-value takes 
place, in, which, as-Meek observes, "the aggregate. surplus-value 
produced over the-economy as a, whole is,,, _as, _it, _were, re-allocated 
among, the different, capitals so that they share in it not in,, 
accordancewith the amount of capital they have spent, -on wages,, 
but in accordance, with., the total amounts. of capital which. they 
have severally employed. , 
45 In other words, the formation of 
production prices has the function of distributing the total 
surplus-value produced in an economy among, the competing, capitals. 
The, share-of surplus-value gained from exchange, with-other 
capitals will depend,, on the, organic composition of the, individual 
capital in relation to,,, the other, capital and average, social 
capital. An exact, expression-of the organic composition of a 
46ý 
capital is, --given 
by the relation of constant to variable, capital. 
A capital has a high-organic composition, if its proportion. of 
constant to variable, is greater-than the, average and a low organic 
composition if. the converse is the case., In the, economy as a 
whole, commodities, will, be-sold above, their. value in, areas with 
a higher organic composition, below their value in_areas, with a 
lower organic composition, and, only at their value where a capital 
is an exact-expression of the social average capital., These 
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deviations of production prices from value are a necessary condi- 
tion of all these areas receiving the average rate of profit. 
This deviation of price from value is by no means an anomaly for 
the law of value, but, on the contrary, can only be explained by 
the theory. First, the law of value and theory of surplus-Výalue 
explain the nature and magnitude of what is being distributed by 
the exchange at prices of Production* Secondlyi, an analysis of 
the losses and gains in distribution presupposes a "value" explan- 
ation which refers both to the organic compositions of individual 
capitals and the total social capital. Hence# Marx is able to 
explain exchange at prices of production on the basis of the 
labour theory of value. The common value-product is simply divi- 
ded according to the respective value-compositi6ns of the many 
competing capitals. The law of value continues to operate, but 
is mediated by'ihe formation of prices of produ ction'and an 
average rate of profit. ' 
The movement of capital in the capitalist mode of production 
is determined by'the search for the highest profit ieo'sp by the 
same mechanism which leads to'the formation of an average rate of 
profit. It is this same movement which by regulating the dis- 
tribution of capital in the economy determines simultaneously the 
distribution of socially necessary labour time. The mechanism 
which is responsible'fOr'price-f'Ormýtion according to prices of 
production is,? ' therefore, at the same time, the mechanism res- 
ponsible for the reproduction of the labour process in the capit- 
alist mode of production. This helps explain the theoretical 
importance of a theory of price formation for a Marxist social 
science. By squaring the law of value with the theory of pro- 
duction pricest therefore, Marx is able to'reveal the long term 
foundation for price formation and also the'6oncrete mechanism 
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of the reproduction and. development of-the productive process in 
a modeof production where socially necessary labour time is 
regulated neither by custom nor by social planning. 
Many commentators have argued that Marx puts forward two 
separate and irreconcilable theories of value in volumes 1 and 3 
of "Capital". 
47 According to this view, there is a contradiction 
between Marx's general theory of value and his theory of the 
prices of production. 
- 
Bo'hm-Bawerk#, for instance,, pointed out, at 
the turn of the century, that the theoretical transformation of 
values-into prices always expresses a mathematical incongruity 
48 between price and value, magnitudes. It appears1that the formal 
derivation of prices from values can only be achievedr. as Shaikh 
put itt at. the cost of "severing the links between price and 
value-magnitudes which Marx seemed to emphasisle in his own, pro-_ 
cedure. ', 
49 If, however, there were no connection between value 
and price magnitudes, then there could be no link between a 
general theory of value and a theory of production prices. In 
other words, it would be impossible to account for price-formation 
in the capitalist mode of production on the basis of the law of 
value. 
In order to defend Marx's value-theory against this critical 
onslaught, it is necessary to retain the idea of there being a 
necessary link between value and prices. However, this need 
not imply that the connection must be one which conforms to a 
mathematical proportionality of the type required by the formal 
derivation of prices from value-magnitudes. It seems to me that 
the attempt at such a derivation is caused by a methodological 
misconception. Indeed I have observed how Marx's value-theory 
has. other methodological purposes. The necessary connection be- 
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tween value and prices is regarded as a social necessity for the 
capitalist mode of production. It is the means'through which 
this mode of production reproduces the labour process. Obviouslyr 
therefore, the failure of this process to conform to the pattern 
of a simple mathematical deduction of prices from valuesl does 
not undermine its necessity as a social mechanism. There is no 
prima facie reason why it should be supposed that social causality 
should be governed by canons of mathematical proportionality any 
more than it should be assumed that it operates through relation- 
ships of real opposition or contrariety. Even if it were esta- 
blished that Marx's. mathematical procedures of transforming values 
into prices were invalid and, in addition,, that no mathematical 
prices from values were possible in advance of derivation o 
exchange, this would not Undermine Marx's historical analysis of 
the necessity of a causal relation between socially necessary 
labour-time and prices as a precondition of capitalist reproduc- 
tion of the productive process. The understanding of capitalism 
as a mode of production cannot proceed on the flimsy basis of 
an economic calculus or even by use of a purely "economi c" method; 
it is to be achieved by a dialectico-causal analysis. So Marx's 
value-theory should be interpreted as part of his general theory 
of history and not be mistakenly presented as a mathematical devic4E, 
for calculating the price of commodities. 
Marx's theory of value does not require an identity or 
IýX 
even a relation of direct proportionality between the average 
rate of profit as determined in value-terms and as expressed 
in exchange at prices of production. The value rate of profit 
is expressed phenomenally in an approximate manner and then only 
in the long term. The law of value, as Marx repeatedly observed# 
only asserts itself through a whole series of fluctuations and 
deviations of prices from values; and this also typifies the 
relation between value and the prices- of production. 
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Marx's theoretical aim is not to calculate prices in advance 
of exchange, but rather to understand the process whereby value 
is transformed into prices in the capitalist economy. 
This is, by its very nature, a process accomplished by the compe- 
tition of capitals in the market. It could only be calculated, 
in advance of exchange, thereforer by a prior knowledge of an 
almost unlimited number of variables affecting both production 
and circulation. The basis of a desire which seeks to reduce 
prices directly to labour time rather than to understand the 
historical reality of capitalist reproduction, is, I believe, to 
be found in a theoretical allegiance to a mechanistic account of 
the relationship between production and exchange. It is necessary, 
therefore,, to challenge such mechanicism by clarifying the 
dialectico-causal underpinnings of Marx's value theory. 
t) 
The law of value comes into operation only when the elements 
of the productive process viz the means of production and labour- 
power, take on a value-form.. Henceforward, the labour process can 
only be reproduced through-the mediation of value-forms. Exchange 
becomes a necessary phaseýof production, and, production is accord- 
50 ingly mediated by commodity. exchange. The capitalist mode of 
production ist thereforer a dialectical unity of production and 
exchange. If productiont as, a moment, 9f,, the productive totality 
determined the, other moments,, then it follows that it would. be 
51 "itself determined by the-other moments" Relationships,. of 
dialectical causality exist-in the capitalist mode of production* 
Marx, states 
"A distinct mode of production thus-determines the specific 0 
mode of consumption, distribution, exchange, and the specific 
relations of these different phases to one-another. Production 
in the narrow senser however, is in its turn also determined by th 
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other aspects. " 
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To conceive of production as determining all the other moments ' 
of the whole, would be to reduce the complex relationships in the 
dialectical whole to a simple mono-determinism. Production would 
be conceived as superior to the social totality and as the un- 
mediated determinant of its development. The'attempt to reduce 
prices directly to value is founded precisely on such a mech- 
anistic conception of the causal relation between production and 
exchange. It is assumed that value-magnitudes created in pro- 
duction must be expressed in directly proportional magnitudes of 
prices in the sphere of'exchange. The sphere of exchange becomes 
merely an epiphenomenal reflex, of the sphere of production, and 
denied any sort of causal role in the capitalist economy. Marx's 
value-theory, on the other handl, recognises that the sphere of 
exchange is also a causally relevant'factor in determining the 
relationship between prices. This is one of the reasons why it 
is impossible to'determine price formation in the capitalist 
economy by reference-to the sphere of production alone. It is 
equally true that'the sphere of exchange cannot be the sole 
determinant of the relationship between prices in capitalism. 
Rather, according to our interpretation, price formation is the 
outcome of a dialectico-causal relation between production and 
circulation. The source and magnitude of profit is determined 
in production and the'sphere of exchange brings out the prices 
of'production in the'long term via the competition of capitals. 
Marx's labour theory of-value depends, therefore, on the same 
notion of dialectical causality which characterises-his approach 
toýthe study of social'development in general. 
. Any attempt to reduce prices to value-magnitudes in advance of ; 
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exchange, on the other hand, is founded not only on a misunder- 
standing of Marx's theoretical aimst but also on a mechanistic 
notion of causality. Insofar as theorists adopt this methodolo- 
gical approach in an attempt to solve the so-called "transformation 
problem" ie., the transformation of values into prices, they fall 
into a crude social mechanicism. 
53 In fact, our dialectico- 
causal approach to the problem of price-formation in capitalism 
does imply that the attempt to calculate prices from values is 
based on a methodological misconception. According to our inter- 
pretation, Marx's value-theory does not aim to develop such a 
theory nor does it need this sort of mathematical'proportionality. 
On the contraryt once it-is realised that the relation between 
production and circulation is characterised by a-dialectical 
causality, then there is no'difficulty in understanding the forma- 
tion of prices to be a'socially necessary - if not directly 
calculable - moment in the-reproduction of the labour process., 
The reality of this social' necessity,, which is theoretically 
explicated by'Marx's value theory, is not in the least undermined 
by its failure to conform to a standard of direct proportionality 
no more than it is invalidated because it is not founded on a 
mechanistic reduction of exchange ±a production. 
6.4 DIALECTICAL CAUSALITY AND MARXIS'REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE 
Inýthis sectiont I intend to present Marxs'supersession of 
the anomalies of-classical political ecOnomy'as'a revolutionIn 
science. In the previous sections, I have explained how Marx 
solved the'problems of reconciling capitalistýprofit and capita- 
list commodity exchange with the general principles of a labour- 
theory of value. 'These same prima facie'anomalies for the law of 
value, however, caused fundamental inconsistencies in'the-theories 
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developed by Adam Smith and David Ricardo. I intend to discuss 
the theoretical problems encountered by these two pioneering C 
thinkers before proceeding to a discussion of the methodological 
basis of Marx's improvement of the labour theory of value. 
Smith's costs-of-labour theory of value, discussed briefly 
in 6.2.,, led directly to a summation theory of value which con- 
tradicted the law of value, once-Smith encountered the problem 
of explaining the value of commodities under capitalist conditions 
of production. It is. -apparento, therefore, that neither capitalist 
profit nor ground-rent can be regarded as items of value deter- 
mined by wages or the costs of labour. Smith, therefore, 
developed an alternative theory of value - the trinity-formula - 
which analysed the commodity to be a summation of three indepen- 
dent sources of value viz labour, land and capital. 
54 According 
to this theory, the value of wages is contributed by labour, profit 
or interest by fixed or money capital, and ground-rent by land. 
Henceforth, labour is responsible only for the determination of 
the value of its-own wages and not for the value in general. 
This analysis of the value of a commodity -has a strong 
phenomenal foundation in the capitalist mode of production. The 
wage-form disguises the reality of capitalist exploitation by 
making it appear that the wage-labourer is paid for the expendi- 
ture-of all his labour-time and not merely for that part of the 
working day necessary to produce the value of his means of sub- 
sistence. Consequently, to the wage-labourer#,, "the value or price 
of his labour-powerjýnecessarily appears to him as the price or 
value of his labour itself. " 
55 
-In contrast to surplus-labour 
performed inýpre-capitalist economic, formationso,, the surplus, 
labour-time, appropriated by, theýcapitalist is, not directly visible 
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because it is not divided in time or space from necessary labour- 
time expended in the productive process. Marx argued that, 
"This false appearance distinguishes wage-labour from other 
historical forms of labour. " 
56 
If political economy fails to penetrate the fetishism of the 
i 
wage-formf then it must invent other sources of value which explain ý 
the existence of profit and rent-in a', context where it appears 
that the wage-labourer receives all the value created by his 
labour. 
According to the trinity formulal. fixed or money capital is 
supposedly the source of the value of profit or interest. This 
conception again has a strong phenomenal foundation in the(fetis- 
histic) appearance of capitalist production and circulation. The 
transformation of surplus-value into an average rate of profit 
makes the magnitude of profit a function of the size of individual 
capitals rather, than their individual value compositions. It 
appears, therefore, that profit springs forth from all the ele- 
ments of capital, rather than being the exclusive product of 
-power.. The source of profit is, further, l variable capital and labour 
obscured by the establishment of a rate of interest which func- 
tions as the price of capital as. a, commodity. The existence, of 
finance-capital s, eems-to testify to, the "natural" ability of 
money to multiply and beget interest rather like a tree, begets 
fruit. However, a real valorisation M-Mocan only take place in- 
sofar as the money which is sold as capital comes into a relation 
with productive capital which yields a profit through the.,, exploi- 
tation of wage-labour. The source of the-valorisation of finance 
capital must, despite,: its fetishistic appearance be the same as 
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the source of industrial profit. Through the lending of his 
capital the financial capitalists claims a part of the profit 
of the industrial capitalist. Interest is merely a division of 
profit whichtin turnpis a phenomenal form of surplus-value. It 
is,, therefore, unnecessary and inaccurate to posit either money 
capital or fixed capital as an independent source of value which 
accounts for profit on interest as value-magnitudes. 
Rentr like interest, is analysed by Marx'as a deduction from 
profit and,, thereýiorej, as-a pheno 
I 
menal form of surplus-value. 
Marx maintained that,, 
"Renti, interest and industrial profit are' only'different 
names for the different parts of the surplus-value of the commo- 
dity,, or the unpaid labour enclosed in itt and they are derived 
57 from this source and this source alone. " 
Differential rent is a deduction from the profit of the 
capitalist tenant which depends for its magnitude on the diffe- 
rence between the individual production price of the tenant and 
the social price of production for the agricultural branch as a 
58 
whole. The social price of production for the agricultural 
sector will be deternined by the worst land which it is necessary 
to cultivate in order to satisfy the social need. The worst 
land under cultivation will then be awarded the average rate of 
profit to ensure that, under capitalist conditions, it will in- 
deed be engaged in agriculture. Land of a superior quality will, ilj) 
therefore, yield a super-profit in excess of the social average. 
It thereby creates the possibility for the landlord to pocket 
the difference between the super-profit and the average-rate, 
while still preserving the economic conditions which will guaranteeý: 
:d 
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continued capitalist farming* - The size of differential rent will 
evidently vary in direct-proportion to, the relative fertility of 
the land. This creates the illusion-that "land" and not the 
relative magnitude of surplus labour-time creates the value of 
the rent. Land, as a natural phenomenon, however, cannot create 
value, nor can it have value in-itself. It functions rather as 
a'means whereby the owner is able to appropriate the surplus- 
- This-is true both of rent in profit from capitalist-producers* 
the agricultural sector and of ground, rent-relations throughout 
the capitalist economy. Marx observed that, , 
IlWhereverý-natural forces can be monopolised and guarantee 
a surplus-profit to-the industrial capitalist using themp, be it 
waterfalls, -rich minesl, waters teeming-with, -fish,, -or a favour- 
ably located building sitep, -there'the person who by, virtue of 
title to a, portion of the globe-, has-become the proprietor of, 
these natural objects will wrest this surplus profit--from func- 
tioning'capital, in the form of rent. " 
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Land has a price, despite the fact thatý. it has no value, 
because its, ownership, represents a claim-, on the profit of, working 
capital. -, -The--apparent "anomaly" of land having a price although 
it has no valuel, therefore, is one which is explained adequately 
by Marx's value-theory. -- 
Marx argued'thatýdesPite-its phenomenal, grounding: bourgeois 
production, -the trinity formula is a vulgar and'inadequate theory 
of value. -The-summations-,, it posits as elements of, value are'' 
"prima facie three impossible, combinations. , 
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-First, -the. -land- 
rent, formulation succeeds in reducing-the--exchange-value-of land 
as the, price of rent to the-use-value of land which resides, ex- 
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clusively in its natural properties and has nothing to do with 
value. Consequentlyr Marx argued thatf "a social relation con- I 
ceived as a thing is made, proportional to nature ie., two incommen- 
surable magnitudes are supposed to stand in ratio to one another. 19 
Secondly, the capital - interest formulation is absurd because 
it makes capital as a value unequal to itself. Capital is both 
M-a certain, initiallsum of money and M'- the same sum of money + 
interest. The process of this valorisation is not explained by 
the trinity formula, rather it assumes the, valorisation to be 
effected by the "natural" properties of money capital or fixed 
capital. Consequently, whereas the land-rent combination reduces 
rent as a form of value_. to the natural properties of landf the 
capital - interest formulation succeeds in reducing the social 
power of capital to yield. interest to a supposedly naturalistic 
power analogous to the fruit bearing of an apple tree. Finally, 
the labour-wages combination not only confounds conmte labour 
with value-producing labourp, but also fails to understand the 
division of-the working day between necessary. and surplus labour 
time which is the basis for production of surplus-value. No 
coherent analysis of value, profit, interest or rent is offered 
by the trinity formula. 
Smith's attempt to resolve the "contradiction" between the 
law of_. value_and exchange at production prices by abandoning the 
labour theory of value, leads to a theoretical impasse in which 
it is unable to account for price-formation, in the capitalist 
economy. If. on_the other hand, a strategy of eliminating. the 
concept of value altogether were adopted and prices were related 
directly to labour-quantities in the manner of Ricardor then 
poýitical economy would again fail to produce a consistent theory 
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of price-formation. Such a theoretical attempt would need to 
explain the deviation of prices from the expenditure of labour- 
time, evident in exchange, at production prices by recourse to 
ad hoc factors independent of a labour theory of valueý. - The 
average rate of profit would be transformed into an arbitaryl 
magnitude without any necessary relation to the expenditure of 
labour-time. It seems that it, is indeed necessary to perfect 
the law ofýývalue in the face of the apparent anomalies of capit- 
alist profit and exchanger in order to develop, an adequatet' 
theory'of price-formation in the capitalist, economy. 
Marx's -critique of political economy isý not a- wholesale 
rejection of classical theory, it is a development of the labour 
theory of value pioneered by the classicists. In this area of 
theory, Marx recognises that the classicists make a scientific 
contribution to the understanding of the, capitalist economy-even 
though they "all fall more or less into inconsistenciest half- 
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truths, and unsolved contradictions. "' Despite its shortcomings,,, j 
classical political economy's formulation of the law of value is 
a serious theoretical attempt to explain the whole phenomenon of 
price formation in an objective and causal manner. The. classi- 
cists tried toýunderstand price-formation scientifically,,. even 
if their analysis was constrained by a mechanistic, -asocial and 
I ý1 I AI ahistorical account of the relationship between production and 
exchange. - Indeed, this mechanicism spills over into their whole 
conception of the value-form which they-fail to-understand as an 
ii 
historical phenomenon. Marx, on the-other hand, recognises both 
the historicity of value-forms as-expressions of specific-rela--, - 
tions of production and also the historicity'of the law of value 
itself. - According to Marx's analysisj, therefore, the law of value, ', ý'ý, 
is 'not something characteristic of all modes of production, but 
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is rather a specific historical product of capitalism* The 
historical precondition for the operation of the law of value is 
the establishment of a mode of production based on theunity of 
production and exchange. It is only when this has occured that 
exchange becomes-a necessary phzseý,. of pioduction I and that re- 
production of-the labour process must be'me'diated through commo- 
dity exchange. However, 'this situation-only exists'in the'his- 
torical context-of generalised commodity production* where the 
elements of production themselves ie., the means of production 
and labour-power, take on the value form. The law of value'iS'l 
therefore, an historical result of the dialectical'relationship 
of interdependence between productiofi and exchange. 
A dialectico-causal approach to political economy helped Marx 
ti 
to achieve'a number of important aims. First, by adoptin4'this Aý 
'ble to under-, intrinsically historical methodology, Marx was a 
stand the'forms of value as they developed in specific socio- 
economic formations. The forms of value are grasped historically 
and not naturalistically as supposedly universal'andl therefore, 
invariant properties of all modes-of'productions In addition, -, 
the value-forms are analysed as dialectical moments of particular 
historic formations and not''as phenomena which have pre-determinedflý 
and set properties in themselves. It is precisely by adopting 
this approach'that Marx was able to discover the uniqueness of 
the value-forms in capitalism. where labour-power and, the means 
of production'for the first time take on the form of value. 
This' historical discovery is, of course, the foundation for Marx's 
theory of surplus-value and the value theory'of profit. Secondly, 
a dialectico-causal conception of the capitalism not only facili- 
tates an historical understanding of this-'mode of pro'ductionr 
but also provides a theoretical basis'for recon'ciling the law of 
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value with exchange at prices of production. Hence# I argued 
at the end of 6.3., that Marx's supersession of this apparent 
"anomaly", which simultaneously explained the mechanism for re- 
production and development of social, production in capitalismr 
depended on grasping, capitalism as a di alectical unity, of pro- 
duction and exchange. Without, such a conception, the historical 
specificity of capitalism as a mode of production which reproduces 
the labour process without a mechanism of social planning would 
indeed remain a mystery. Marx's development of the labour theory , 
of value is, therefore, the means whereby he succeeds in making 
capitalism a legitimate object of study for a dialectico-causal 
science of history. This implies a conception of the law of 
value as quite distinct from that adhered to by the classical 
political economists. The development and reproduction of capi- 
talism should now be understood as a dialectico-causal process 
in which the other moments of the totality viz social classes, 
the state, ideology etc., mutually determine events in the manner 
described in Chapter' 5. Political economy ought to become, 
therefore, a branch of a dialectico-causal history which studies 
the reproduction and development of social production in a mode 
of production where the labour process is"regulated"through the 
mediation of value-forms, according to the law of value. 
Marx's critique of political economy supersedes the anomalies 
of the classicists in a process of theory - change entirely con- 
sistent with our account of revolutions in science in chapter one. 
Marx solves the two most fundamental problems of the labour theory 
of value viz the problem of explaining capitalist profit and 
exchange at production prices, while simultaneously developing 
certain insights of the classicists in terms of his new theory. 
For examplet Marx develops the insights into the nature of surplus-ýIý 
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value achieved by Smith and Ricardo as well as using their theore- 
tical work on the general law of value'and production prices. 
Marx's theory of value-'not only resolves the'principal anomalies 
of the law of value as evident in the work of the classicistst 
but also preserves "a great deal of the most concrete parts of 
64 
past achievement. ' it is in'Virtue of Marx's scientific 
development of the theories of classicists'in a process of theory 
change which inclines one to view Marx's critique of poli- 
tical economy as a revolution in science. 
- 204 - 
Chapter 7. MARXF WEBER ANDýTHE METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
7.1 THE DEMISE OF CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE 
"METHODENSTREIT". - 
I argued in chapter 6 that Marx's critique of political 
economy develops the law of value'to the point where it is com- 
patible with historical science. Political economy, I suggestedr 
was. merely a branch of a general dialectico-causal science-of 
history. The general methodological orientation of such a 
science is confirmed by this conclusion since it recognises the 
value-form and all economic phenomena to be interdependent 
moments within a single causal process. This conception of the 
relationship between, history and political economy or "economics" 
was not one sharedr howeveriby the protagonists'in the 
"Methodenstreit". 
The "Methodenstreit"p, which took place'between Gustav - 
Schmoller-and Carl Menger, at the turn of the century, discussed 
the'aims and, methods'of economics and historical science in an 
intellectual climate which dismissed the very idea of'a Iabour 
theory of value'. Despite their theoretical differences, all 
antagonists in this controversy agreed on a common rejection', of 
classical political economy and the law of value which it had 
developed. 'Adey and Frisby correctly observe'#, 
II 
"In this controversy,, it was-perhaps not the"relation of' 
theory to 'reality which was at issue#, 'but'rather what constitutes, 
theory in a context in which both Schmoller and'Menger rejected 
2 
classicalrpolitical economy. "- 
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This debate was of central importance for the, whole of 
social science because it broadened out into controversy over the 
appropriate methods for the study of social phenomenon in general 
and not simply the economy alone. The-controversy is also 
fundamental, for understanding Weber's methodology. Indeed some 
commentators have. suggested Weber's writings in this field put 
forward some sort of "cure" for the "methodological pestilence" 
3 
of. the "Methodenstreit" An analysis of Weber's. methodology,, 
in relation to the "Methodenstreit" and the demise of classical 
political economy, should offerr therefore, a unique opportunity 
to develop a theoretical foundation, for the critical comparison 
of -the 
methodologies of Marx and-Weber. 
Schmoller and, the historical school of economics# inter- 
preted the econo-Tny as an expression of a nation's norms or ideals. 
4 
The historical school, as Unger pertinently observes, "emphasised 
the inclusion of economics in_ the totality of, the common moral 
5 
and national life. " A thoroughgoing understanding of economic 
phenomena, was to be achieved-by. adopting an inductive, historical 
approach; economics-needed to proceed on the basis of what the 
neo-Kantians would term an ideographic method., - Menger though, 
while accepting, history to be an ideographic sciencep argued.,,..,, 
that economics was a generalising and theoretical discipline 
6 characterised by a different methodology and theoretical aim. 
For Menger the subject-matter of economics prevented the. use of 
an historical, method because it was pre-eminently constituted-. 
by "transhistorical or ahistorically defined "types" or "forms" 
7 
of economic phenomena. " So he regarded economics, conclusively, 
as an "exact science" which-must, aspire to theoretical generalisa-! ýý 
tions analogous to those developed in the, natural sciences., 
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If one accepted the terms of the "Methodenstreit" as debated 
by Schmoller and Menger3then one would be trapped in a dualism 
between history and theory between ahistorical scientific general- 
isation,, and history stripped of scientific generality. The 
dilemma they forced on themselves is obvious. When history aspires- 
to theoretical generalisation it must cease to be ideographic 
and then it can no longer be regarded as an historical discipline; 
but if social science theory finds it necessary to-retain its 
historical side then it cannot expect to contain scientific 
generalisation. This applies not just to economic theoryt but 
to all other aspects of social science. Unless there is a whole- 1ý 
sale rejection of the intellectual polarities at the very heart 
of this controversy, there will be a permanent ban against the 
formulation of a methodology for a generalising science of history. C 
Weber's 'methodology is a self-conscious attempt to cure this, 
as he believed, false antagonism. It suggests a new relation 
between the generalising disciplines of economics and sociology 
and the ideographic discipline of history which keeps faith with 
a neo-Kantian conception of scientific generalisation. Weber 
accepts Menger's argument that economics is a theoretical rather fl, 
than anhistorical science. But the content of this theory has I! i 
fl 
to be based on ideal-types and an adequate theory of action. 
Weber, therefore, rejects any sort of attempt by marginalist 
economists to reduce the problem of price-formation in the 
economy to a function of the intensity of consumer desire inter- 
8 
preted in biological or psy hological terms. Price formation 
should neither be explained by a set of reified "norms" of 
national life as in the historical school, nor by an asocial 
theory of value as in psychologistic marginalism, but rather it 
should be understood as a result of the economic action of in- 
dividuals. 
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Weber regards economic action as a species of rational action. 
He defines economic action as an action which is governed in its 
course by an economic end and one which uses specifically economic 
and pacif ic means to attain that end. 
9 Even though it is evi- 
dent that economic action is socially mediated# its ends and 
means are still specifically economic and provide the subject 
matter for an independent economic science. For Weber, economics 
and sociology are, in consequencel separate disciplines with 
distinct "objects" of study. Sociology studies social action 
which is "other-orientated"#, 
10ý 
whereas economics investigates 
the course of economic action regulated by the pursuit of speci- 
fically economic ends through economic means. Although this 
appears to be merely a technical division between the two dis- 
ciplines, it has as its substantive premise the assumption that 
"economic" and "socialI. phenomena can and should be studied 
. 
independently. Weber develops, in line with this principle, an 
asocial view of economics and a non-ýeconomic conception of 
sociology. From this standpointr economic idealisations must 
abstract from the socio-historical ground of the economy just 
as sociological generalisation must abstract from essentially 
economic influences. It would appear that Weber's separation 
of economics and sociology, far from integrating them into a 
single historical science, reproduces the economics/history and 
theory/history dualisms of the "Methodenstreit". 
This brings me to a discussion of the relation between 
sociology and history. According to Weber, sociology and history 
study the same subject matter viz social action, while being 
nevertheless distinct disciplines. Sociology is a generalising 
science with the ambition of outlining a set of ideal-typical 
accounts of social action, whereas history remains ideographic 
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and individualising. Weber-recognised, however, that history 
can only achieve its ideographic aims if it has recourse to 
general concepts.,, Without-such con'cepts-historians would be 
unable to distinguish one historical configuration. from another 
and/or establish'its uniqueness. ' 
12 Weber, thereforej developed 
a- new sort of theoretical'term'- theldeal-type - in order to 
present a view'of Social scientific generalisation which is com- 
patible with a fundamentally neo-Kantian conception of social 
phenomena, Howeverý'as I pointed out in 2.4. j Weber's ideal- 
type cannot fulfill the theoretical role required of it because 
it fails to-providea co'gnitive foundation for scientific genera- 
lisation in historyl or for historicity in the generalisations 
of social scientific theory. To regard the ideal-type as a 
genuine solution'to the theory/history dualism of the "Metho 
13 
denstreit", wouldj, 'so it seemst be a mistake. ', 
Weber's"'solution"to the methodological pestilence of the 
"Methodenstreit" does no more than reconstitute -its underlying 
dualisms,,, this time in the-context of his. own methodology. They 
are expressed in the split between an ideographic, history and 
a generalising sociology and economics, and in'the separation 
of economics, ýwhose subject matter is unaffected by socio- 
historical influen'cesf from history and sociology. ' Finallys, 
the theory/history-dualism, reappears yet again in the context 
of-the concept-formation of ea6h'individual science, - since the 
generalising component of these disciplines, is ideal-typical 
and, thereforer constructed without regard to matters of, histOrY. 
What can be conceded, in the context of Weber's methodologyr*'is 
that the theory/history dualism loses much of its sting because 
the generalisations based on his idealisations can never aspire 
to-the status of deductive-nomological laws of the type Menger 
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hoped for when he conceived economics as an "exact" science. 
Insofar as Weber does develop a solution to the "Methodenstreit"p 
there can be no doubt its cost is the abandonment of any viable 
notion of scientific generalisation so as to retain a style of 
concept formation consistent with his neo-Kantian characterisation 
of social phenomena. If this is indeed the case, then the thesis 
I put forward in Chapter 21 that Weber's methodology is no more 
nor less'than a logical outcome of his neo-Kantian epistemology,, 
can be considered strengthened and reinforced., 
7.2- WEBER'S CRITIQUE OF MARXISM - 
Weber's attitude to Marxist theory was ambivalent. While 
he'sought to'criticise and reject mechanistic or Hegelian vari- 
ants of Marxism, Weber did wish to preserve-what he understood 
to be Marxism's scientific core. 
14 
Weber dismissed mechanistic 
interpretations of historical, materialism-on the grounds that 
they culminated in a single factor determinism with either the 
economy or'the productive forces abstracted from history. and , 
projected as the ultimate cause, of all social development. 
15 
Hegelian elements in Marxism were, of course-#, equally unscienti- 
fic . So he objected to the teleological method which he-claimed 
to have found in the Marxist tradition, whereby social develop- 
ment was regarded as a process to be'explained by an""end" to 
history. 16 Utterly unscientificjýhe believed, to see periods 
of human history as stages leading'to the accomplishment of & 
communist society-projected as the destiny of history. All this 
was admonished by Weber as methodologically suspect and empiri- 
cally false. 
Weber-developed his own view of the scientific merits of -'- 
41u 
Marxism. As far as he was concernedr historical materialism 
had to be regarded as one value-relevant theory among others. 
17 
It had to be understood as one theory, among theories of equal 
merit, which constructs ideal-types out of its specific value 
commitment to socialism. Weber claimed, therefore, that "all 
specifically Marxian "laws" and developmental constructs - inso- 
far as they are theoretically sound - are ideal-types. " 
18 
If 
one accepted this view of Marxism , then there would be no dis- 
tinction between historical materialism and Weber's methodology. 
In other words, Weber "saves" the scientific core'of Marxism by 
squaring it with his own conception of social science. 'Yet 
precisely in the elaboration of his conception of social scienceo, 
does Weber face what appear to be insuperable methodological 
problems. And if Weber's methodology fails-to justify its 
scientific pretensionst then it must follow that all attempts,, 
on those grounds, to distinguish scientific-fr6m unscientific 
elements in other social theories are doomed to failýire. 
I have already demonstrated in Chapter 2 how Weber's methO-' 
dology failed to provide an adequate cognitive foundation-for a 
generalising social science. My own interpretation of'Marxism 
as a dialectico-causal science of history, did appear to be 
more successful in this regard. Howeverp Weber-failed to offer 
even the possibility of'a dialectico-causal interpretation of 
Marxism either tor the works of Marx himself or his'su6cessors'. ' 
It is not Weber's methodology which-provides a solution to the 
dualisms of the "Methodenstreit",, but rather the'interpretation 
of Marxism developed here. From my argument in Chapters 5 and 
6 it should be eviaent that a dialectico-causal understanding 
of history overcomes the separation of economics" or polit I ical 
economy, on the one handp and sociology and history, on the other. 
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On this view of Marxism, social science is a single activity 
whose various branches seek to elucidate tne nature of a unitary 
causal process. Such. a view of social development puts paid to 
the dualism of the I'Methodenstreit" by building up history, as a 
generalising science and by ensuring social scientific theory 
remains historical. 
7.3 ECIENCEo, 
-POLITICS 
AND THE METHODOLOGY OF MARX AND WEBER 
I have argued that, Weber's conception of, the, methodological 
role of Wertbeziehung excludes. the-possibility of developing 
19 
value-free theories in social science, - Far 
from. excluding 
values, Weber's methodology-, provides a, rationale for tne thorough 
and continuous, intrusion of values into every stage of social 
inquiry. Stranger when seen in this light, that Weber'should be 
consistently presented as the father of value-free sociology,, 
when, his methodology transparently precludes the very possibility 
of. developing a value-free social science. It should be clear 
by now that instead of providing a. scientific means for arriving 
at political decisionst Weber's scientific position, is the 
result of ethical or political'values. And here one can, find a 
distinction-between Weber and Marx, which must be doubly under- 
lined. For this, imposition of politics, and values on,., scientific 
theory_, is fortunately not a logical implication of a dialectico- 
causal, -. view, of social 
development. In fact, I intend to demon- 
strate that Marx's political stance, far from being determined 
by ethical or political values, is derived from a scientific 
analysis of social development. 
In the remainder of this sectiont I intend to relate Marx's 
theory of political intervention to my conception of history. 
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Such a view of political intervention seemingly, rejects the 
diametrically opposed positions of political voluntarism and 
fatalism. This is a convenient place to spell this point out 
in greater detail. These two positions, fatalism and voluntarism 
are the political counterparts of the mechanical causality/humanis- 
tic voluntarism polarity analys6d-elsewhere in the thesis. 
Hence, if the course of history were thought to be determined 
by supra-historical laws then ipso facto, all political action 
would be pre-determined. The achievement of socialism could be 
safely left to the operation of inexorable laws-the "hidden hand" 
of history. A mechanistic social theory tends to lead to poli- 
tical fatalism. But if history were no more than the outcome 
of man's pure free action of the kind Weber requiredIthen socia- 
lism would be established by the exercise of this freedom 
regardless of the existence of what must count as "psuedo-11 
countervailing forces. These counteracting influences could not 
be causally constrainin', or the voluntari" 9 stic theory of action 
would have to be modified. 
Neither-position is capable of generating a scientific 
basis for political intervention in social developmeh , t'simply 
because neither arises from a scientific understanding of history. 
A dialectico-causal 'view of political intervention, however,, ' 
rejects by implication the'idea that socialism can'bý6*brought 
about by the operation of naturalistic laws or by the uncons- 
trained freedom of man as a political subject. Rather, if 
socialism or any other political-end is to be achieved, then 
it can only be by way of a practical intervention o'n', 'the basis 
of a scientific analysis of historical (and this includes 
Marxist) tendencies. 'In other words, Marxists must-theoietically 
appreciate'their plac , e'-and role in history before they can be in 
zIi 
a position to consciously transform itI. 
Marx, in his political-writings, understood that scientific 
theory alone can not itself achieve a socio-economic transforma- 
tion. Rather, a transition to socialism must depend on 
practical intervention in history. 
20 Marx believed the working- 
class would have to be the principal agent: of such a transition. 
There were two things he strove to do. First,. he attempted to 
make the struggle for socialism, espoused by many elements of the 
proletariat, scientific. To do this he had to. base, the theory 
of the transition from capitalism to socialism on an adequate , 
methodological basis. -Historical materialism was intended as 
just such a, scientific analysis of, the-reproductionýand develop- 
ment of capitalism, one which provided theoretical understanding 
of, the means-of-transforping, this socio-7economic formation. - 
Secondlyl Marx attempted, to, make his science practical or 
revolutionary. -,, Hence, he sought,. at all times, to extract political 
conclusions from analyses of historical events. The most con- 
spicuous conclusion isl, naturally, Marxlslcommitment, to socialism 
itself. These'twoýsides, of Marx's work, ie.,,,, the desire to make 
science revolutionary, and socialism scientific are expressed, in 
the composite formulation of, scientific socialism., 
21 It-is my 
intention to show how-Marx's, position, on this matterýis deter-,, I. 
mined by scientific than-by ethical or 
political values. 
- Marx argued that socialism-was the political solution to the 
contradictions between the forces and relations, of production , 
engendered by the-extended reproduction of the socio-economic 
22 formation known as, -capitalism. He, believed socialism--would 
present, a; social-foundation for a continuous-development, of pro- 
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duction, unhampered by the barriers generated by the relationships 
of private production and appropriation characteristic of capi- 
talism, This political conclusion., he tried to substantiate in 
his analysis of the contradictory development of capitalism as 
a mode of production contained, in the three volumes of "Capital". 
If Marx's analysis is, scientifically justified, then-it would be 
more-rational from theyiewpoint of science to identify politi- 
cally, with the social forces that will, promote the development 
of social production for the benefit of producers and consumersf 
than to align oneself politically with the forces that restrict 
this development in the interest of private capital accumulation. 
But it does need to. be emphasised that these political con- 
clusions only follow insofar, as Marx does demonstrate that-capi- 
talism is less able. -to guarantee the-future development of the 
forces of-production, forces on which-all societies have their 
foundation. Marx's position in politics is, -obviously contingent 
on the success or failure, pf his scientific analysis. 
, Scientists are methodologically obliged_to accept certain 
conclusions if it is shown that, these results follow logically 
from a well-founded theory. The application of this principle 
to socialism might well seem audaciousIbut that is no reason for 
shirking its application and avoiding those. conclusions. From- 
the viewpoint of a science of history, -socialism may well have 
a scientific foundation -. hence, Marx's term,,, scientific 
socialism and this must be followed through. Evident f irst, of all, 
is the thought that what may be rational from the viewpoint of 
an historical science, may not be rational from the. viewpoint of 
a social class with a very real interest in preserving the, , 
status quo. The capitalist class, for instance, would be acting 
irrationally with respect to their class interests if they sur- 
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rendered their ownership of the means of production in order to 
establish socialism. But, -- Marx maintainedp the class interests' 
of the proletariat are best served by a political commitment to 
socialism since the establishment-of such a socialist society is 
a precondition for overcoming social and economic exploitation 
and for establishing a planned development of social production. 
Whereas it would be irrational for the bourgeoisie to identify 
with a Marxist science of history, Marx believed it would be- 
irrational for the working-class not to be so identified. 
do not wish to assert that the scientific basis of Marx's 
theory is the only reason why people, should be committed to 
socialism. Aýdecision to accept Marxist politics. or even Marxist 
science may be determined by any number of alternative considera- z" 
tions. One would like to point out that the ideals of socialism 
are not hostile to ethics no more than ethical matters are excluded 
by the principles behind Marxist science. What is, important is 
to recognise the correct location of, these concerns-with respect 
to these topics: a question as yet largely unsettled'. However# 
it is important to remember that whatever brings a person to 
Marxism, the politics itself should, according to Marx, be based 
-on a scientific appraisal of social development. Some people 
may take the opposite course, they accept Marx's'--methadology and 
his analysis of capitalism and yet seek to avoid'or reject his 
political conclusions even though these conclusions follow from 
the theory. Such a position would again be quite irrational 
from the viewpoint of a science of history since it can only be 
generated by considerations - by reflections of class interest 
or whatever - which do not have any sort of scientific founda- 
tion. 
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If the argument of this section is correct and, of course, 
what I have said is far from exhaustive, then Marx's political 
theory is nothing more nor-less than a logical implication of 
his scientific conclusions. The justification of Marx's politics 
and all other attempts at political intervention which remain 
true to this tradition, must depend not on the content of the 
politics per se; how this content has been determined is over- 
whelmingly important too., Weber's methodology permitted, even 
if it did not exactly welcome or recognise5the intrusion of 
ethics-and politics into the domain of science; but a dialectico- 
causal science of history has no such deficiency. Rather, I have 
argued Marx sought to establish a, scientific foundation for 
practical or political interventions into history. As, 'Marx put 
it in his "Theses on Feuerbach", the point is not merely to inter- 
pret the worldr but to change it. Self-conscious and successful 
transformations can be achieved, and here is the root, of the 
argument, only on the 
developmental possibi, 
scientific socialism, 
socially transforming 
work of his life-long 
theory. 
. 
basis of a scientific appraisal of their 
lities. , The composite f6rmulation-of 
therefore, does justice to Marx's aim of 
, 
the world, while remaining within the frame- 
concern with the development of a scientific: 
I 
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the theories of social science. 
2. Much credit must-go to Harre R. for developing realist theories 
of science in recent Years. For a typical exposition of his 
views see Harrd R. "The Philosophies of Science" (London, 
Oxford University Pressj, 1972). See also Shapere D. "Notes 
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methodological positivism and conventionalism as theories of 
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On Popper's methodological falsification see Popper K. 
"Science: Conjectures and Refutations" (London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 1969) Popper's falsificationism is recognisably 
"positivist" in'intent insofar as it attempts to pre , sent 
the logic of science as based on a relation between hypotheses 
and "observations". Hence, even though the observations which 
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gical falsificationism as positivist despite the fact that 
Pdpp6r rejects the - label "positivist" and secondly, 
that Popper's falsification culminates logically in a form 
of conventionalism. 
See also Lakatos I, "Falsification and the Methodology of 
Scientific Research Programmes" in Lakatos I. and Musgrave A 
(eds),, "Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge" (Cambridge 
University Press 1970)t on the distinction between a naive 
falsificationism founded on supposedly theory-neutral 
observations and more sophisticated variants like'Popper's 
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6. See Hempel C. G. "The Function of General Laws in History". 
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exposition of the deductive nomological model of explanation. 
See also Hempel C. G. and Oppenheim P. "Studies in the Logic 
of Explanation", "Philosophy of Science",, 15,135-75 1948, 
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See Keat R. and Urry J. (1975 OPCIT) on an explication and 
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See also Harre R. "The Philosophies of Science" (London,, 
Oxford University Press, 1972) especially pp. 45-7 for a 
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See alsol Kneale W. "Probability and Induction" (Oxford,, 1949) 
especially Part II, 'The Traditional Problem of Induction' - 
and Black M. 'Induction' in Edwards P ed,, . 'The Encyclopedia of Philosophy volume 41 (New York: Macmillan and Free Press 
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8. See Keat R. and Urry J. (1975 OPCIT) on the failure of the 
deductive nomological model of explanation to provide suffi- 
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this model "does not 
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provide sufficient conditions for 
explanation, there is some important element it fails to 
capture" (p. 11 ibid). I relate this failure to the positivists 
lack of success in solving the problem of induction (See 1.1 
+ footnote, 7) . 
9. See Popper Karl 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery'. (London 
1959) especially Chapter I on Popper's rejection of the ýroblem of the induction. Parts II-IV pp. 85-232 deal with 
inductiong, and. Popper Karl (1969, OP CIT). This work also 
contains an exposition of Popper's conception of the logic 
of science, especially, in "l. Science Conjectures and 
Refutations" which-is also the general title of this collec- 
tion of Popper's articles. 
10. See Popper K (1969 OP CIT) P. 57+ on his account of degrees 
of corroboration. 
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observations as an epistemological bedrock for a theory of 
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Popper notes 'the empiricist project of tracing all knowledge 
back to sensing-and observations is impossible because of 
the socio-conventional determinations which underly all 
observations. Popper states, therefore, 
"This is why the programme of tracing back all know- 
ledge to its ultimate source in observation is, logically im- 
possible to carry through; it leads to an infinite regress. " 
(Popper p. 23 ibid) 
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12. See Kuhn T. S. "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" 
(University oflChicago Press 1962 whose position, at least 
in this early work is similar to the interpretation of a 
conventionalist theory developed here. For a general dis- 
cussion of recent conventionalist and Urry J. (1975 OP CIT) 
Chapter 3. For the logical and historical connectioR'-, - 
between Positivism and conventionalism see Shapere (1969 OP CIT 
13., The commensurabil, ty problem is also evident in Feyerabends 
attempt at an anarchist theory of knowledge in his "Against 
MethodýOutline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge", (New 
Left Books 1975). However, the relativism or anarchism 
which Feyerabend presents as a solution for a theory of 
science abandons the attempt to justify science as a rational 
activity. It takes refuge in relativism instead of challeng- 
ing it in the way that my realist theory of'science does. 
14. Shapere notes this lack of a theory of continuity in, the 
history of the development and succession of scientific 
theories is a serious weakness of conventionalist theories. 
He argues that the conventionalists "have failed to account 
for the fact that different theories - or different uses of 
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continuity in the. development of science". 
(Shapere 1969 OP CIT p. 121) 
15. The term 'object of knowledge' is derived from Althusser's 
epistemology., See Althusser. L. Balibarý"Reading Capital" 
(New Left Books 1970 Part 1) 
ýlthusser 
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process of anomaly generation and supersessionp Althusser 
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ing real processes. In fact, Althusser is compelled to 
explain the 'knowledge-effect' of scientific theories not 
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the supposed homology between the order of, theory and,, the 
real (see 4.2). He thereby ends up with an idealist con- 
ception of the method of science,, 'not unlike that of the 
conventionalists. 
16. See Kuhn (1962 OP CIT) for the distinction between 'normal 
science' and 'revolutions in science'. 'Normal science' 
takes place within the paramaters of a given theory or 
paradigm whereas 'scientific revolution' necessarily implies 
a theory change andl therefore, a reconceptualisation of the 
'object of knowledge' of scientific inquiry in a given field. 
-See below for the difference between Kuhn's conception of 
revolution in science and mý_ realist alternative. - 
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18. Kuhn (1962 p. 53Abid) 
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account of scientific inquiry is confirmed by the fact that 
he increasingly waters down the role of irrational factors 
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the continuing presence of unsolved problems for a theory. 
Such considerations enhance the tendency towards an explana- 
tion of theory change as a rational activity. On this 
point see, for instancep the "Postscript" to the Second 
edition of the "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (op cit) 
and "Reflections on My Critics" in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds) 
(1970 OP CIT). 
20. See Locke J. "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding" 
(Fontan 1964) p. 119+ 
21. See Durkheim E. "The Division of Labour in Society" (Tr 
Simpson G, Free Presst New York, 1964) especially Book 3 
Chapters 1,213. 
On the normal/pathological distinction see Durkheim E 
"The Rules of Sociological Method" (ed Catlin G. E. G. Tr. 
Solovay S. A. and'Mueller J. H. The University of Chicago 
Press, 1938) Ch. 111 p. 47+. 
See alsF -Lukes S. "Emile Durkheim. His Life and Work" 
(Allen Lane The Penguin Press 1973)l especially Chapter 7 
p. 172 on Abnormal forms and Chap-ter 10 on 'The Method add 
Subject Matter of Sociology. ' 
22. See Durkheim (The Rules 1938 OP CIT) Chapters 1 and 2. See 
also Benton T (1977 OP CIT) Chapter S. 
23. Kuhn (1962 OP CIT) p. 168. 
24. Kuhn (ibid) p. 168. 
25. This rejection of a unilinear-theory of scientific progress 
is in many ways analogous to my rejection of an interpreta- 
tion of Marx's methodology based on a unilinear conception 
of social progress (see s-. 1 and 5.2). A unilinear theory 
of progress would, in both cases, foist an apriori theory 
of development-onto the development of science anil societies. 
This sort of theory, in respect to Knowledge and Social 
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26. See Ruben D*. H. "Marxism and Materialism" (Harvester Press 
1977) on the circularity of philosophical explications and Te--fences of scientific inquiry, Chapter 4; especially Ruben's 
critique of Bhaskar's realism - see Bhaskar Roy ! 'A Realist 
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27. For a classical exposition'of the positivist unity of 
science thesis see Comte A. "The Positive Philosophy of 
August Comte. " translated"and condensed by Harriet Martineau 
1853. (London, Chapman 1896). It should be noted however 
that the additional thesis as to the nature of causality 
in the social world is not one that necessarily follows 
from positivist criteria of cognitive significance or the 
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positivists cannot justify-any sort of causal element in 
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50. Cf 4.2 on Marx's critique of the abstract individualism of 
, classical political, economy. See 4.3 for a discussion of the transition from feudalism to capitalism from the view- 
point of historical materialism. 
51. Lukes S. (p. 111 footnote 3) "Individualism" (Blackwell, 1973) 
Chapter 17. 
See also Lukes S, p. 119-129 "Methodological Individualism 
Reconsidered" British Journal of Sociology 19 (1968), 
52. Mommsen W. J. p. 3 "The Age Of BUreaucracy" (Blackwell, 1975). 
53. Mommsen W. J. p. xiv intro (ibid). 
54. Mommsen W. J. p. 11 (ibid). 
55. _On this see. Mommsen W. J. "Max. Weber's Political Sociology 
and his Philosophy of World History" p. 23-45 "International 
Social Science Journal" Vol. 17 (1965) Weberls universal 
theme, according to this view, arises from the conflict, 
between individual freedom and the causal process of ration- 
alisation. Mommsen claims, - 
"The conflict between these two principles was in his 
(Weber's) view the great theme of world history. " (p. 45). 
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For Collettils critique of Hegel. 's philosophy and its re- 
constitution in a supposed Marxism in "diamat" and soviet 
Marxism and in. the work of Lukacs and, the Frankfurt school, 
see the following. On Hegel see Colletti L. "Marxism and 
Hegel"j trans. Garner L. (NLBF 1973) especially ch's 1,11, 
lVf V& 1X. On Engels and the Young Hegelians and "diamat" 
and soviet Marxism see Collettils introduction to Marx's 
"Early Writings" (Marx 1843-5 E. W. ) ch 1& 111 of Collettils 
1973 OP CIT. an d of special interest in the development of 
this critique is Collettils "Marxism and, the Dialectic", 
New Left, Review 93r 1975 p 3-29. This article will be- 
discussed in detail--in chapter 4. A Colletti-esque critique 
of Engels is also developed by Stedman - Jones G. in "Engels 
and the End of Classical German. Philosophy", New Left Review 
79,1973, p17-36. On Collettils critique of Lukacs and the 
Frankfurt school, see ch X, "From Bergson to Lukacs" in 
Colletti 1973 OP CIT,, "From Hegel to Marcuse in Colletti 
"From Rouseau to Lenin" (NLB, 1972). And, again for a 
Colletti-esque treatment of Lukacs see Stedman-Jones G,, "The 
Marxism of the Early Lukacs, an Evaluation" in New Left 
Review 70,1971 p. 27-64., 
2. It will become clear, in the course of the thesis, that 
there is 
-a 
fundamental difference between Marx's dialectico- 
causal method and Hegel's dialectic. On Marx's 'acknowledge- 
ment of Hegel's contribution to his own theory consider 
the following: - 
"The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's 
hands by no means prevents him from being the first to 
present its general form of working in a comprehensive and 
conscious manner. " 
(Marxo, p. 20 "Afterýword' to the second 
German Edition of Capital" in Marx 1867 (Lawrence and Wishart) 
3. On Hegel's general philosophy, see Hegel,, W*'F. '"HegelIs 
Science of Logic" ed Lewis H. D., trans. Miller A. V. (London, 
1939)., 
Hegel-W. F. "The Phenomenology of, Mind" trans. with an 
introduction by Baillie J. B. (London, 1977) 
Marx's major critique of Hegel's philosophy is contained in 
the latter part of his "Economic and Philosophical Manuscriptdlýi 
(1844) in Marx 1843-5 E. W. The latter collection also in- 
cludes Marx's "Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State" 
(1843)-and "A contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right. " (1844). 
Useful commentaries include: 
Colletti L. 1973 (OP CIT) which I follow quite closely in 
the first part of 3.1; 
Kaufmann W. "Hegel - Reinterpretationt Texts,. -, and Commentary. " (Weidenfeld and Hicolson, 1966) This contains an extensive bibliography of secondary sources. 
Marcuse H. "Reason and Revolution" (Routledge, Keagan Paul 
Ltd., 1955). 
Taylor C. "Hegel" (Cambridge University Press, 1975) 
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4. Hegel "Science of logic" p. 154-5 (OP CIT). 
5. Hegel p. 155 ibid. 
6. For a clear elucidation of the distinction between reason 
(Vernunft) and understanding (Verstand), in Hegel's philosophy 
see Colletti (1973 OP CIT) p. 9+ and also translators note 
P090 
7. On this and related points see, for instance, ch 7. Dummet 
M. "The Foundations of Intuitionist Mathematics". 
(Clarendon Pressr Oxford,,, 1977) 
8. Presumably Davidson D. and his "followers" would adopt such 
a position vis a vis Hegel's absolute idealism. For an 
exposition of their views on the relationship between logic 
and language see e. g. Davidson D. (ed) "Semantics of Natural 
Language" N. Reidel Publishing Company, Holland. 1977 
9. Hegel p. 130 ibid. 
10. Hegel p. 130 ibid. 
11. Hegel p. 177 ''The Logic'''trans. from ''The Encyclopaedia of 
the Philosophical Sciences'', by Wallace W. (London, 1892 - 
second revised edition) 
12. For an analysis of the "logical" structure of dialectical 
contradictions see Colletti,, "Marxism and the Dialectic" 
(1975 OP CIT) 
13. Hegel BK 2 Science of Logic (OP CIT) 
14. Hegel ibid. 
15. On this see references cited in footnote 1 to Collettils 
critique of "diamat". 
16. Baillie correctly notes that in Hegel's philosophy "Mind" 
is,, therefores, "at once a conscious unity in all its processesý'j 
and the conscious source of endless differences and dis- 
tinctions within itself. " (Baillie J. B. introduction to 
Hegel's "The-Phenomenology of Mind"'OP CIT) 
17. Hegel p. 591 "Science of Logic" 
18. Hegel p. 585 ibid. 
19. Hegel p. 138,, 
" 
ibid. 
2.0. See Marx p. 381+ "The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" 
in Marx, (1843-5 E. W. ) 
21. Marx claims,, 
_ 
"Feuerbach is the only person who has a serious and a 
critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic ana who has 
made reEl discoveries in this field. He is the true con- 
queror of the old philosophy. " (P. 381 ibid) 
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22. On Feuerbach's Philosophy see "Ludwig Feuerbach Sahtliche 
Werke, Bolin W. and Jodl F. eds., 10 vols, Stattgart, 1903- 
1910., and "The Essence of Christianity" -trans. Evans M. 
new ed., (New York, 1957) See also "The Economic and Philoso- 
phical Manuscripts" p. 381+ and "Theses on Feuerbach" both 
in Marx 1843-5 E. W., for Marx's view. In additiont Collettils 
introduction to the latter contains some interesting obser- 
varions on Feuerbach's influence on the formation of Marx's 
thought. 
23. This paragraph is more or less a summary of Marx's view of 
Feuerbach's philosophy expressed on pages 381-2 of "The 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. " (OP CIT). 
24. This point is expressed by Marx through the positive value 
he gives to Hegel's contribution to an understanding of 
history in the "Manuscripts" p. 384+ (OP CIT) It is expressed 
again in a more poignant manner in the "Theses on Feuerbach" 
(OP CIT) 
25. See Marx ibid., 1, p. 421 in Marx 1843-5 E. W. 
26. Marx traces this historicisation of nature, as it were# to 
an insight in Hegel's philosophy. He notesr 
"The humanising of nature and of nature as produced by 
history is apparent from the fact that they are products 
of abstract mind. " (p. 385 ibid.,, ) 
For Marx the development of "real objectification" or 
production does not imply an end to the objectivity of 
nature, but rather merely alters the character or form of 
its existence. Again, he finds the source of this idea in 
Hegel's philosophy. He claims Hegel's dialectic, "is the 
estranged insight into the real objectification of man, 
through the destruction of the estranged character of the 
objective world ........ (p. 395 i=.,, ) 
27. Marx VI "Theses on Feuerbach" in Marx (1843-5 E. W. ) 
28. Marx III p. 422 ibid. 
29. Marx p. 64 "The German Ideology" Marx 1845-6 G. I. (L & W) 
30. See Marx especially p. 392+ "Economic and Philosophical 
manuscripts. " 
31. Marx p. 385 ibid. 
32. Marx p. 395 ibid. 
33. Cf 3.1 for an account of Hegel's dialectic with 5.1 where 
I develop my interpretation of Marx's dialectic. 
34. On the Herr/Knecht relationship see Hegel's "The Phenomeno- 
logy of Mind" (OP CIT) p. 228-40. 
Taylor C. Ch V (1975, OP CIT). 
35. Marx p. 384.1843-5 E. W. 
36. - On abstract negation see Hegel p. 234 "The Phenomenology". 
Ad 
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37. Hegel p. 236 ibid. 
38. See Hegel p. 239+ ibid. -, '+ Taylor C. p. 148-50'(1975, 'OP CIT)o 
39. Marx p. 382.1843-5. 
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93,1975. 
2. Colletti L. p. 6 ibid. 
3. Colletti L. p. 3+ 
4. See particularly Colletti's conclusion p. 29 ibid., where he 
argues that the principle of non-contradiction excludes the 
existence of dialectical contradictions. 
S. Colletti L. p. 6 ibid. 
6. Colletti L. p. 6. 
7. Colletti L. p. 7. - 
8. See 5.3 for My : ýritique of the ahistoricism and mechanicism 
implicit in, functionalist explanation and cf. the critique 
of Godelier's structuralist Marxism developed in the first 
part of 5.1 
9. See 5.1 where I distinguish, between instances of, dialectical 
opposition. between-things persons or forces in the world and 
the more embacing concept of dialectical causality -a-- 
causality involving dialectical relationships between parts 
and whole in a single totality. 
10. Hence, an, empircist-idea of causality requiring as-it, does 
a separate specification of'cause and effect, also excludes 
a, dialectical notion, of causality, and insofar as, it develops 
an idea of social causality at all, it would seem that it 
must be confined to a mechanistic idea of causal relationships 
in the social world. On this see 5.1. 
11. Hegel W. F. p. 230 "The Phenomenology of Mind" (London,, 1977 ed., 
12. Colletti L.. p. 23 (OP'CIT)- 
13. Colletti L. p. 23+ 
14. See Colletti L. p. 22+ N. B. From this point of view,, Colletti 
must now credit Hegelian "Marxists" for their discovery of 
Marx the "Philosopher" as much as he should credit positivist 
"Marxists" with their allegience to Marx the Scientists! 
He can only criticise these two opposing theoretical tradi- 
tions insofar as they overstate' their case and-claim, there 
is 
, 
only a "philosophical" or only a "scientific" element in 
Marx's corpus. The correct interpretation now is to recognise, 
both elements, in Marx's work and to define their respective 
boundaries. 
15. On this point see also Edgley R. p. 48+ "Dialectic : -the Contradiction of Mr. -Collettill Critique 7 p. 47-52 1976-7. 
16. Edgley p. 48+ idid. On Edgley's alternative idea of dialectical 
opposition and my critique of its limitations vis aý vis what 
is required of a dialectico-causal view of Marxism see 5.1. 
- 233 - 
17. For references on this, see again Notes-, to Chapter 3,, (1). 
18. Colletti L. p. 66 "Bernstein and the Marxism of the Second 
International" in I'FromýRouseau to Lenin",, (New, Left Bookst 
1972). 
19. Colletti L. P. 67 ibid. 
20. Colletti L. p. 67 ibid. 
21. See Chapter 2, especially 2.5. 
22. On Althusser's 
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Critique of empiricism and idealism see 
Althusser L. p. 34+ "Reading Capital", Althusser L. and 
Balibar E, tr. Brewster B., (NLB, 1970). 
23. See Althusser's Interpretation of Marx's 1857 introduction 
to the "Grundrisse" on this point part j. sect. 13, 
"Reading Capital' OP CIT. 
24., See especially 1.2 on this.. 
25. Benton correctly relates the problem of specifying the 
mechanism of the knowledge-effect with the search for 
criteria of cognitive adequacy of a scientific theory in 
Althusser's philosophy. This becomes particularly important 
for the demarcation of science from ideology -a demarcation 
required for establishing historical materialism as a 
science. Benton notes in this regard: 
"Presumably we can just see that the "object" of a theore- 
tical ideology is not the knowledge of the real object, 
whereas that of science is! But elsewhere, Althusser 
recognises the problem and its importance: .... "the pro- blem of the 
i 
relation between these two objects (the object 
of knowledge and the real object), a relation which, con- 
stitutes the very existence of knowledge. " In this texty 
Althusser makes it, clear that the search here is not, as 
in classical (empiricist and rationalist) epist 
, 
emology, for 
some "guarantee" of certainty in knowledge, for some time- 
less criterion by which to distinguish knowledge from mere 
belief. Rather, the search is for the "mechanism of the 
knowledge - effect. " Beyond making the search sound more 
scientific, it has to be recognised by Althusser that this 
is hardly a solution. " (Benton p. 186) On this and related 
points see Benton T Ch. 9 "The Three Sociologies" (Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1977). 
ý6. ' Alýhus*ser L. p. 166-7'in, "For Marx" trans. Brewster B. 
(Penguin, 19169), 
27. Glucksmann A. p. 74 "A Ventriloquist Structuralism", (New 
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"The real object as an epistemological device has the 
same defect as the Kantian notion of the thing-in-itself - 
it is something about which nothing can be saidf but of 
which something must be'said if it is to have a theoretical 
place in the system. ",, 
Benton T. p. 186 OP CIT 
28. Althusser L. p. 216 "Reading Capital. " 
29. Glucksmann A. p. 74 OP CIT. 
30. This seems to be the inspiration behind Balibar's attempt 
to deduce the existence of "historic" modes of production 
for Marxist science from the general concept of a mode of 
production. See Part 111 Ch. 1. "Reading Capital. " 
31. See Althusser L. Chapter 6,, "For Marx". 
32. Althusser L. p. 169 ibid. 
33. Hegel W. F. Book 2 "Science of Logic". See 3.1 on Hegel's 
dialectic. 
34. See Althusser Ch. 5j, "Reading Capital" for his analysis of 
Marx's break from Hegelian historicism and Feuerbachian 
humanism. 
35. Althusser L. p. 108 ibid. 
36. Althusser L. p. 100 ibid. 
37. See Althusser L. p. 177-181 on the Structure of "Marx's", 
comPlex whole. 
38. See Althusser L. Ch. 3 "Contradiction and Overdetermination', 
for a classical exposition of the concept of overdetermina- 
tion. I should emphasise that I reserve my criticisms of 
this concept to its employment in Althusser's system and 
do not extend criticism to its use in psycho-analysis of 
which I know very little. 
39. See Althusser L. Ch. 3 ibid., on his notion of the complexity 
of contradic%ions in the Marxist totality. 
40. Althusser L. p. 188 ibid. 
41. On this point see Marx's treatment of the form of value 
which I discuss in 6.2. 
42. On this see Glucksmann A. p. 83+ OP CIT. 
43. Glucksmann A. p. 86 ibid. 
44. See Althusser p. 186+ "Reading Capital" for his rejection 
of transitive and expressive causality. 
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45. Glucksmann A. p. 88. 
46. Ruben D. H.. p. 148 "Marxism and Materialism" (Harvester, 1977). 
47. On the seemingly insuperable problems of demarcating science 
from ideology from this epistemological standpoint see 
Benton T. p. 187-193 OP CIT. See also my suggestions on 
this complex problem which begin from a realist view of' 
scientific inquiry - Chapter 1. p. 18. 
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For, this sort of "theoretical anti-historicism", see, for 
example, Hindess. B and Hirst,, P. Q.,, "Pre-Capitalist Modes 
of Production", (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul# 1975). 
2. Seej, Godelier M. p. 334-68 "Structure and Contradiction in 
Capital". in Blackburn R.,, "Ideology in Social Science" 
(Fontana/Collins, 1972). 
3. See Godelier M. Sect 2. ibid. 
4. Godelier M. p. 356 ibid. 
5. Godelier M. p. 356 ibid. 
6. Godelier M. p. 356-7 ibid. 
7. Godelier M. p. 363 ibid. 
'343 ibid., Godelier. M. p. 
9.1 must frankly admit that the study of the opposition between, 
socio-economic formations is outside of the scope of my - 
inquiry, and*hence there is no examination as to the dialec- 
tical or undialectical nature of this type of opposition. 
As far as my thesis is concerned, the status of this sort 
of "opposition" is yet to be determined. 
10. Marx p. 20 "Afterward to the Second German-Edition" 1867 L/W. 
11. In this chapter I concentrate largely on the theoretical 
error of reducing a socio-economic formation to, social 
relations per se; a reductionism implicit in much sociolo- 
gical theory and sometimest as with Weber, taken one step 
further' by the reduction of social relations to resultants 
of the actions of individual social actors. In Chapter 6, 
howeverf I'present the opposite reductive error Marx 
criticised in his critique of the classical political 
economists - the reduction of an historic socio-economic 
formation viz capitalismito production conceived naturalis- 
tically as an all determining sphere. 
12. Marx notes thatfroudhbm-, attempts to reduce, 'a*'la Hegelp 
'the movement of history to separate phases of. the-,, "idea". 
He rejects such'an approach because-"the limbs of the social 
system are dislocated. The different limbs of society are 
converted: into so many separate societiesr, following one 
upon the other. " (p. 123-4). The correct approach does in- 
deed, seem to, be dialectically holist since Marx protests 
In the following terms: 
"How indeed could the single logical formula of move- 
ment, of-sequencer of timer explain the structure of 
societyf in which all relations coexist simultaneously and 
support one another? " (124) in Marx 1846-7 L/W. 
` This conception , 
is also apparent in Marx's 1857 introduc- 
, 
tion to the "Grundrisse" when he discusses the relationship 
, 
between production, distribution, exchange and consumption 
in the capitalist mode of production. Marx argues, 
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. "The conclusion we reach-is not that production, dis- 
tribution, exchange and consumption are identical, but 
that they all form members of a totalityr distinctions with- 
in, a unity. Production predominates not only over itself, 
in the antithetical definition of productionj but over the 
o, ther moments as well. The process always returns to pro- 
duction to begin anew. That exchange and consumption cannot 
be predominant is self-evident. Likewise, distribution as 
distribution of products; while as distribution of the 
agents of Production it is itself a moment of production. A 
definite production thus determines a definite consumption, 
distribution and exchange as well as definite relations bet- 
ween these different moments. Admitt7edly,, however,, in its- 
own-sided formy production is, itself determined by the 
other momeRts. " (p. 99 intro to Marx 1857). 
NB This passage also supports a dialectico-causal view 
of the "primacy of production" in which production is primary 
only in the sense that the moments, of a whole feature as. in- 
terdependent parts of a socio-productive totality. 
13. Benton T. p. 70 "Philosophical Foundations of the Three 
Sociologies. 11 (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977). 
14. The classical text in this regard in Marx's 1859 introduc- 
tion to "A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy. " 
15. See particularly Marx p. 20-21 1859 L/W. 
16. On Marx's treatment of the Asiatic 
, 
mode of production, see 
p. 459-71,1857 in which Marx discusses this socio-economic 
formation in the context of a general analysis of pre- 
capitalist modes of production. See also Mandel E. Ch. 8, "The 
Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx" (NLB p 1971) . 17. On this see the "Manifesto of the Communist Party", Marx 
- 1848 (Penguin) . 
18. This primeaval socio-productive whole 
, 
is hinted at by Marx 
in many of his texts including the "Grundrisse" p. 483+. 
19. See 3.1 on Hegel's dialectic. 
20. See 3.2 for this critique of Feuerbach's philosophy. 
21. See Marx p. 81+ 1857. Marx observes somewhat ironically that 
the very epoch that gives rise to the illusion that the 
individual determines the conditions of existence of'a 
socio-economic formation, -is and must be, the hitherto most developed socio-productive whole. He argues 
"Only in the eighteenth centuryg in "civil society"t do, 
the various forms of social connectedness confront the in- 
dividual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as 
external necessity. But the epoch which produces this 
, standpointl that of the isolated individualt is also preci- 
sely that of the hitherto most developed social (from this 
standpointl general) relations. The human being is in the 
most literal sense a "political animal", not merely a gre- 
garious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself 
only in the midst of society. " (p. 84) I 
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22. On this--point, see again my treatment of Weber's methodolo- 
gical individualism 2.6. 
23. Marx claims, 
ý-"'No credit' is, due to me for discovering'the existence 
of classes in modern society, nor yet the struggle'between 
them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described 
the historical development of this struggle, of-the classest 
and bourgeois economicists the economic anatomy of the 
classes. What I did that was new was to prove: (1) that 
the existence of classes is only bound up with particular 
historical 'Phases in the development of production 
Letter to Weydemeyer, 51 March,,, 1852. 
24. The feudal drive for rent and its role in the transition 
to capitalism is examined in 5.2. 
I 
25'. - This interpretation seems to be borne out by the following 
passage: - 
"Like all its predecessors, the capitalist process of 
production proceeds under definite material conditions which 
are, however, simultaneously the bearers of definite social 
relations entered into by individuals in the process of 
reproducing their life. Those conditions, like these rela- 
tions, are, on the one handf prerequisites, on the other hand,,, 1, 
', 
results and creations of the capitalist process of produc- 
tionf they are produced and reproduced by it. " Marx p. 819j 
1894 L/W. 
Cf Appendix, to Marx 1867 (Penguin) "Results of the 
Immediate Process of Production" especially sect III. 
26., Marx p. 128, -9,1846-7. 
27. See Edgley R. "Dialectic the Contradiction of Mr Colletti"f 
Critique 7. p. 47-52j, 1976-7. 
28. - See, for instance,, Jones G. S. who demonstrates how Lukacs' 
- 
Marxism culminates logically in a theoretical humanism in 
"The Marxism of, the Early Lukacs: an Evaluation, " New Left 
Review 70,1971. 
29. See Marx Ch 10,1867. 
30. Hobsbawm observes, therefore: 
"We are still left with the specific historical problems 
of the nature and succession of socio-e nomic formations, 
and the mechanisms of their 'internal development, and 
interaction. " (p. 281). 
Hobsbawm E*J., "Karl Marx's Contribution to Historiography" 
in Blackburn (ed) (OP CIT, 1972). 
31. See Balibar E. Part 111,1 in "Reading Capital" (NLB 1970) 
joint authorship with Althusser L. 
32, Marx p. 792 1894. 
33. For, a good account of historical materialism as a non- 
unilinear theory of progress see Hobsbawm E. J. (OP CIT) and 
his introduction to Marx, "Pre-Capitalist Economic Formationd', ' 
(L/W 1964). 
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34. See, for example# Marx p. 471+1 1857, and Part Eight, 1867, 
Ch 20, Ch 36 1894, for illustrations of this thesis in 
Western Europe. 
35. Marx'is quite aware of the derivative nature oIf World 
history-as a single interrelated process. He notes in his 
introduction to the "Grundrissell: 
"World history has not always existed; history as world 
history a result. " (p. 109,, 1857). 
36. MarxIin letter to Zasulichj March 81 1881, in Hobsbawm p. 145, ' 
"Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations? ' (OP CIT). 
37. For a critique of this sort of theory see Collettils devasta-: 
ting critique of Kautsky's "Zusammenbruchstheoriell in 
Colletti L. "From Rouseau to Lenin" (p. 45+) 
38. Marx p. 739 1867 (Penguin) 
39. See 5.2., for an analysis of the feudal drive. for rent from 
this point of view. 
40. Marx p. 534-51 Vol 2.1861-3. 
41. On this see. Marx, Ch 32,1867. 
42. Marx p. 627t 1857., ý_ 
43. See. 
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Collettil. p. 45+ (OP CIT) 
44. See Marx,, Parts III and, IV,,. 1867. 
45. Marx p. 122-3.1867 see also Sayer D. p. 107+j "Marx's 
Method" (Harvestery 1979). 
46. Sayer D. p. 167 ibid. 
47. See Marx Ch13 , 1894. 
48. See Marx p. 474+, 1857. 
49. Marx argues, 
"War is therefore'the great comprehensive task, the 
great communal labour which is required either to occupy 
the objective conditions of being there alive, or to pro- 
tect and perpetuate the occupation. " (p. 474 ibid). 
50. See also Marx p. 91+ in Hobsbawm (ed), 1964. 
51. Marx p. 92, ibid. 
52. Hilton R (ed) p. 112 in "The Transition from FeudalismIto 
Capitalism" (New Left Books 1976). 
53. Marx p. 790f 1894. 
54. Marx p. 247-81 1857. 
55. On this see Hilton p. 22 (OP CIT). 
56. Marx p. 597,1894. 
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57. Hilton p. 20+ (OP CIT). 
58. Hilton p. 21 (OP CIT). 
59. For Marx's mature views on the centrality of changes, in the 
feudal countryside as central to the formation of capital, 
see especially Marx Ch 47y 1894. For a more recent state- 
ment of the. same thesis, see Merrington J., "Town and 
Country in the transition to Capitalism" p. 170-195 in 
Hilton R. (OP CIT) . 
60. See again Marx Ch 47,1894. 
61. Marx,, p. 795 ibid. 
62. Marx, p. 797 ibid. 
63. Marx,, p. 797 ibid. 
64. Marx, p. 798 ibid. 
65. Marx, p. 798 ibid. 
66. On this see Hilton R. p. 16+ (OP CIT). 
67. Hilton R. p. 17-18 ibid. 
68. Hilton R. p. 27 ibid. 
69. Hilton R. p. 27 ibid. 
70. See all of Hilton's contributions in the collection of 
articles on the transition which attempt to substantiate 
this thesis. 
71. Hilton R. p. 25 ibid. 
72. Hilton R. p. 27 ibid. 
73. On this see again Hilton R. p. 27+. 
74. Hilton R. p. 25. 
75. Giddens A. (ed) p. 3 introd uction to "Positivism and Sociology",!:, 
Weinem ann, . London 
1974). 
76. On this aspect of Comte's theory see Keat R., Urry J. p. 71+ 
Social Theory as Science" (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974)9 
77. See again Keat R. and Urry J. p. 74. ibid. 
78. Keat R and Urry J. p. 74 ibid. 
79. Durkheim E. p. 117-8 "The Rules of Sociological method"# 
ed G. E. G. Catlin, (The University of Chicago Press, 1938) 
The subsequent pages of this chapter contain an interesting 
critique of Comte from the viewpoint of Durkheimian metho- 
dology. For a critique of Durkheim's methodology see again 
2.1. 
80. - On this see again Keat R. and Urry J p. 74+. 
Z. 41 
81. See again Chapter'2 for a typical statement of "humanism" 
in social science as developed by Weber and the neo-Kantians. ' 
82. See 2.51from which this critique is taken. 
83. Hempel C. G. p. 303 "Aspects of, Scientific Explanation" (The 
Free Press, New York, 1965). 
84. ., See Hempel C. G., p. 306+ (ibid) on this. - 
85. 
,,, 
On, functional equivalents see Hempel (ibid) p. 311+. 
86. Merton R. K., p. 105-7 "Social Theory and Social Structure", 
- enlarged ed (The Free Press, New York, 1968). 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
NB This explains the logical priority of Marx's treatment of 
the value-form in general contained in part 1 of capital 
volume 11 and his specification of surplus-value, over the 
analysis of the complex concrete forms of value viz interestp 
profit and rent examined in volume 3 of capital. 
2. See Part 1. Sect 4, Capital Vol. I "The Fetishism of Commodi- 
ties and the secret thereof" - on this. Marx states,, for 
example, that in commodity production; 
- 00" the mutual relations of the producers within which the social character of their labour affirms itself, takes 
the form of a social relation between products.. " 
(Marx p. 72 1867 L/W) 
3. See Marx Ch VII Sect 2 (ibid) on the commodity form of labour- 
power and the means of production under capitalist conditions 
of production + Ch VI on the buying and selling of labour- 
power. 
See Part lf Sect 4 Capital Vol. I. 
5. Mar x observes, thereforej, that "in the midst of all the acci- 
dental and ever fluctuating exchange-relations between the 
products, the labour-time socially necessary for their pro- 
duction asserts itself like an overriding law of nature" 
(Marx p. 75 1867 L/W) . 
6. See Marx Ch VII (ibid) "The Labour Process and the Process 
of Producing Surplus-Value" for a good exposition of, the 
relationship between concrete labour, abstract labour and 
value. 
See Marx Ch 1 Sect 3 (ibid). 
Marx observes that, 
"On the one hand,, all labour is, speaking physiologically, 
an expenditure of human labour-power, and in its character of 
identical abstract labour, it creates and forms the value of 
commodities. On the other hand, all labour is the expendi- 
ture of human labour-power in a special form and with a 
definite aim, and in thist its character of concrete useful 
labour, it produces use-values. " (p. 46 ibid). 
This sums up the duality of I'labour" under conditions of 
commodity production. 
10. Marx p. 51 ibid. 
11. For a clarification of the differentiation of Marx's idea of 
abstract labour from any sort of physiological reductionism 
see Rubin Ia. ch 13-16, "Essays on Marx's Theory of Value" 
(Blackrose Books, Montreal, 1973). This is also a useful 
commentary on Marx's value-theory. 
12. Marx p. 52,1865. ' 
d 
13. Marx acknowledges the deviations of prices from value as part 
of the workings of the law of value in many. places including 
p. 75 Vol. I quoted in note 5 above. In squaring Marx's 
treatment of value in sect 1. of "Capital"-with the general 
consideration of the deviation of prices from value, I am 
indebted to Itoh's interpretation of Marx's theory of value 
contained in his paper,, "A Study of Marx's Theory of Value"# 
p. 307-340 in Science and Society 40,1976-7. 
14. Marx p. 47 1867 L/W. 
15. On this point Marx. claims, 
"Hence, if supply and demand regulate the market-price, 
or rather the deviations from the market-value, then, in turn, 
the market value regulates the ratio of supply and demand or 
the centre around which fluctuations of supply and demand 
cause market prices to oscillate. " Marx p. 1811 1894. 
See Marx ch 1,1894 for his analysis of prices of pro- 
duction. 
16. On-the discovery of labour-power and Marx's use of the concept 
in developing his theory of surplus-value see Marx 1859. 
17. Marx p. 54 1865. 
18. See Marx sect'VII ibid. 
19. Marx p. 55 ibid. 
20. Marx p. 55 ibid. 
21. Itoh observes that "the value form of labour-power lacks the 
substance of. value-as the embodiement of labour-time, because 
it is not the product, but the subjective force of human 
labour. " (p. 322 OP CIT). 
22. See Marx p. 73-4 Volll 1861-3. 
23. On this aspect of Sm ith's value-theory and Ricardo's critique 
of, it see Dobb M. p. 76+,,, "Theories of Value 
- and 
Distribution 
since Adam Smith -, Ideology and Economic, Theory" (Cambridge 
University Press, 1973). 
24.1 analyse Marx's critique of this theory'of. value known as 
"the trinity formula" in 6.4. 
25. Ricardo D. quoted in Dobb M p. 76 OP CIT. 
26. Marx p. 400 Vol 11,1861-3. 
27. Marx p. 400 ibid. 
28. Mark p. 403 ibid. 
29. Marx p. 404 ibid. 
30. Sayer notest in this regardt that socially necessary labour- 
time can henceforth "consistently be applied to all commodity 
exchanges including that between wages and labour-power"I 
p. 134 in Sayer D. 
"Marx's Method", (Harvester, 1979) 
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31. Marx p. 129 - 1885 L/W. 
32. Shaikh correctly observes, therefore, that a genuine valorisa-,, 
tion of capital M to M-r the same sum of money plus profit, 
is only genuine insofar as it is "matched by an actual in- 
crement in the commodities available, and hence in materia- 
lised labour-time. " See ShaikhAp. 118,, "Marx's Theory of 
Value and the "Transformation Problem. " in Schwartz J (ed. )# 
"The Subtle Anatomy of Capitalism", (Goodyear, California, 
1977). 
33. See Marx Ch VII Part 2 on the circuit of industrial capital 
1867 L/W. 
34. See Marx Ch VIII on the determination of the value of constant 
capital. 
35. See Marx ibid. 
36. See Marx Ch-VI, ibid. 
37. See Marx p. 171+ ibid. 
38* See Marx Ch IX Sections 1 and 2. 
39. See Marx ibid. 
40. See Marx ibid. 
41. Marx p. 87-8 Vol 1, ý1861-3. 
42. Marx p. 87-8 ibid. 
43. Engels p. 8 in preface to Marx 1894 L/W. 
44. Marx 1857 p. 650. 
45. Meek R. L. p. 188 "Studies in the Labour Theory of Value" 
(Lawrence and Wishart, 1973). 
46. On the organic comPos ition of capital and its ef f ect on the 
distribution of surplus-value see Engels'preface to Marx 
1894 p. 14+; and on treatments of the relationship between 
production prices and Marx's general theory of value of 
which my account is partly derivative see Itoh, M (OP CIT) 
and Rubin I. I. Ch IV (OP CIT). Rubin correctly notes the 
theoretical interdependence of these different levels of 
Marx's analysis. ' Rubin states, 
, 
"Thust the theory of production prices must without fail 
be based on the labour theory of value. On the other hand, 
the labour theory of value must be further developed and 
completed in the theory of production prices. " (p. 253 ibid). 
47. * The classical critique is put forward by Bo"'hm-Bawerk in "Karl 
Marx and the Close of his System" ed Sweezy P. along with 
Hilferding's reply (Merlin Press, 1975). 
48. On this point see Shaikh A p. 106 + (OP CIT) and N. B. Shaikh 
attempts a "Solution" of the transformation problem by a 
theoretical recognition of, the unity of production and 
exchange in the capitalist mode of production. 
49. Shaikh A p. 107 ibid. 
50. On this crucial point see Marx Ch. 20 1894. Marx notes the 
limits, of pre-capitalist commodity production and the deter- 
mination of value-magnitudes by other factors than the law 
of value outside of capitalist production when he states: 
"The quantitative ratio 
is at first quite arbitary. 
dities inasmuch as they are 
of one and the same third. 
regular reproduction of exc: 
more and more. " 
in which products are exchanged 
They assume the form of commo- 
exchangeable, ie., expressions 
Continued exchange and more 
hange reduces this arbitariness 
It 
, 
is only in conditions of generalised commodity pro- 
duction where the labour-process is reproduced via commodity 
exchange that the law of value has its legitimate sphere of 
operation. Hence, Itoh claims, 
... the social inevitability of regulating value-relation 
according to the labour-time embodied in each commodity cannot 
be shown logically without considering capitalist production. " 
(Itoh p. 313 OP CIT). 
51. Marx p. 99 1857. 
52. Marx p. 205 1859. 
53. This mechanicism is identical to the type criticised in 
Chapter 4 and 5 of the thesis. 
54. On the trinity formula see Marx p. 814-31,1894. A useful 
analysis of this text is contained in Sayer D. Chapter 3 
(OP CIT). 
55. Marx p. 59 1865. 
56. Marx p. 59 1865. 
57. Marx p. 61 1865. 
58. On this see Sayer D p. 51+ (OP CIT). 
59. Marx p. 773 1894. 
60. Marx p. 817 1894. 
61. Marx p. 817 1894. 
62. Marx p. 830 1861-3. 
63. On this see again note 50. 
64. Kuhn S. p. 168 "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. " 
(Chicago, 1962) 
NB Although Sayer is also aware of Marx's overcoming of the 
anomalies of the classical political economists, his treat- 
ment of Marx's value-theory is limited by his insistence on 
an analogy from Kant - something I have already criticised 
in Collettils "Marxism". According to this view,, Marx's 
value-theory by reconciling the law of value with exchange 
at production prices, succeeds in reproducing the "phenomenal 
- Z40 - 
world" on the basis' 
" 
of fundamental theoretical categories. 
It is in this sense analogous to Kantian categories - cate- 
gories which again produce the objective world of phenomena. 
without wishing to pursue a detailed critique of Sayer here 
I do wish to emphasise the following. First, Marx's philoso- 
phical commitment is realist and any considerations of his 
epistemology and its relationship to his methodology should, 
it seems, start from realism if they wish to remain true to 
Marx's own aims. Certainly, to begin from Kant is bound to 
lead to purging historical materialism of its dialectico- 
causal component. Secondlyr why present t. he critique of 
political economy on the basis on an analogy from Kant's 
analytic if it can be explicated on Marx's own terms as a 
development of a scientific theory? The need for any sort 
of analogy from philosophy disappears once one recognises the 
scientific aspirations of Marx's critique. Sayer's inter- 
pretation of Marx's critique of political economy, on the 
other hand, is doubly misleading because the analogy from 
Kant's philosophy is not only inappropriate for explicating 
a development in the domain of science - not philosophy - 
but it is also operating with a philosophical system quite 
alien to Marx's realism in philosophy and in science. 
- 247 - 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 
On the "Methodenstreit" see Burger T. chapter 3 section 7. 
"Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation". (Duke University 
Press 1976) 
Frisby D. introduction to "The Positivist Dispute in German 
Sociology" translated and edited Adey G. and Frisby Do- 
(Heinemann, 1976) 
In German useful texts include: - 
Hansen R. "Der Methodenstreit in, den Sozialwissenschaften 
zwischen Gustav Schmoller und Carl Menger" in Diener A. 
(editor) "Beitrage zur Entwicklung der Wissenschaftstheorie 
in 19. Jahrhundert" (Meisenheim, 1968) 
Ritzel G "Schmoller versus Menger. Eine Analyse des Metho- 
denstreits in Hinblick auf den Historismus in der Nationalo*_ 
I 
konomiell (Frankfurt, 1950) 
2. Frisby D p. xix in Adey G and Frisby D op cit. 
3. See for instance Guy Oakes Introduction to Weber 1906 and 
Pfister B. "Die Entwicklung-zum, Idealtypus", (Tubingen 1925) 
who argue along these lines. 
4. On the views of Schmoller and the historical school of, 
economics see the following: - 
Schmoller G. "Die Volkswirtschaftr die Volkswirtshaftlehre 
und ihre Methodell (Frankfurt, 1949) 
"Zur Methodologie der Staats und Sozialwissenschaften" 
in "Schmoller's Jahrbuch (Leipzigr 1883) 
See also Unger J. S. p. 454-) "The Historical School" in "The 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences" edited 
Sills'D. L. (Macmillan, 1968). 
5. Unger T. S. p. 455 ibid. 
6. On the views of- 'i4engerýsee the following-- 
Menger C. "Problems of Economics and Sociology" -translated F. J. Nockj ed. and introd. Schmeider L. (Urbann, 1963) 
"Untersuchungen.. Aer die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften ý1, 
I und der politischen Okonomie insbesondere" (Leipzig, 1883) ! j, 
"IrrtUMer des, Historismus in der deutschen Nationalo- 
Konomie", in "Kleinere Shriften zur Methode und Geschichte 
der Volkwirtschaftlehre (London, 1935) 
7. On this aspect of Menger's economic theory see Oakes G. 
introduction to Weber M. 1907 from which this quote is taken 
(p. 19) See especially p. -16+., 
8. NB the following passage where Weber distinguishes his con- 
cept of economic action from any sort of psychologistic 
reductionism. He states, 
"The definition of. economic action must be as general 
I as-possible and must bring out the fact that all "economic" 
processes and objects are characterized as such entirely 
by the meaning they have for human action in such roles as 
ends, means, obstacles and by-products. It is notr however, 
permissable to express this by saying, as is sometimes doner 
that economic action is a "psychic" phenomenon. The productioný!!; 
A. 12 %J 
of goods, prices or even the "subjective evaluation" of 
goods, if they are empirical processes, are far from being 
merely psychic phenomena. But underlying this misleading 
phrase is a correct insight. It is a fact that these pheno- 
mena have a peculiar type of subjective meaning . This alone 
defines the unity of the corresponding processesf and this 
alone makes them accessible to subjective interpretation. " 
(Weber p. 64 Chapter 11 Section 2). 
9. On Weber's definition and, conception of economic action see 
Chapter 11 Section 1,1922. 
10. On Weber's definition of social action see Chapter 1 Section 
1B 1922'. 
On the relationship between sociology and history see 
Chapter 1 Section 11 11.1922. 
12. Weber notes the dependence of an ideographic history on the 
concepts of sociology in Chapter 1 Section lt 11, while 
history remains primarily concerned with establishing the 
cultural significance of events and personalities, sociology 
is given a causal role. Weber claims, for instance, 
"An important consideration in the formulation of 
sociological concepts and generalisations is the contribution 
that sociology can make toward the causal explanation of 
some historically and culturally important phenomenon. " 
(p. 19 ibid). 
Howeverr my arguments in Chapter 2 and here deny that Weber's 
Sociology can play such a role. 
13. Commentators taking this line include: 
Burger T. Chapter 3 Section 7 (OP CIT) 
Pfister B. "Die Entwicklung Zum Idealtypus. " (Tubingen, 1928) 
14. For a lucid exposition and critical discussion of Weber's 
views on Marxism see Kocka J. "Karl Marx und Max Weber in 
Vergleich: Sozialwissenschaften zwischen Dogmatismus und 
Dezisionismus" in "Geschichte und 6Konomie" edited Wehler 
H. U. (Koln, 1973) p. 54-84. 
15. On this and related points see Weber 1904 p. 68+. 
16. For Weber's critical attitude towards Hegelian notions of 
social development see also his critique of Roscher's method 
of historical inquiry - Weber 1903. 
17. See Weber 1904 p. 71+ for his views on the value-relevance 
and one-sidedness of the economic conception of history 
which he identifies with Marxism. 
18. Weber 1904 p. 103. 
19. On this point it is perhaps pertinent to observe that, accord- 
ing to Marcuser Weber's own sociology is tainted by the 
intrusion of values into supposedly value-free conceptions. 
In an excellent critique of Weber's sociology and its concept 
of 11rationality"t Marcuse argues, for instance: 
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"Max Weber's analysis of capitalism was not value-free 
enough, r for he incorporated into the "pure" definition of formal rationality the specific norms and values of capitalism" 
Marcu'se H. p. 15 "Industrialization and Capitalism" in New 
Left Review 70,1965. 
20. See Marx and Engels "The Communist Manifesto" for a classical 
statement of this position (Marx and Engels 1847-8). 
21. For a classical exposition of the principles of scientific 
socialism see Engelsi,,, "Socialism Utopian and Scientific" (Engels 
1880). 
22. See 5.3 for a critical, exposition of Marx's view of the 
possibility for a transition from capitalism to socialism. 
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